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ABSTRACT 
Although diversification and insurance are acknowledged as important in ameliorating risk, to 
our knowledge, no empirical study has investigated how the two approaches work in concert 
in developing countries. Given increasing climate variability and the risks it poses to rain-fed 
agriculture, this study uses the Expected Utility Framework to develop two non-separable 
household mathematical programming and simulation models to examine the relationship 
between crop-diversification and index-based (area-yield) insurance for a representative 
agricultural household. The representative household is constructed using the IMPACT Lite 
household survey on Ghana, collected by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security. In the base model, the 
household manages risk by diversifying their activities and allocating resources among six crop 
activities without the option of insurance. In the second model, the household has the option 
of both diversification and area yield insurance. Also, we assess how insurance coverage level 
and premium subsidies influence household participation and overall welfare benefits from 
insurance using sensitivity analysis. The results point to a highly risk averse representative 
household with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of 0.016. The level of diversification 
increases with risk aversion in both the base and insurance models. Although insurance does 
not completely substitute for crop diversification, it reduces the degree of diversification. The 
degree of diversification for low and very high risk averse households is 23% and 35% more 
in the base model than in the insurance model, respectively. At 70% insurance coverage, the 
representative household insures all of its available land, regardless of risk aversion and 
premium subsidies. However, it only insures part of its available land at 90% coverage, due to 
higher premiums, and the portion under insurance decreases as risk aversion rises. For the 
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household to insure all of its available land at the 90% coverage level, 80% of its premiums 
must be subsidised. Regardless of risk aversion, coverage level or subsidy, the availability of 
insurance increases the household’s expected value of consumption and thus increases welfare. 
Comparing welfare (as measured by the expected value of consumption) in the base and 
baseline insurance models (i.e., no subsidy and 70% coverage level), our results show that 
insurance increases welfare by approximate 45% and 55% for low and very high risk averse 
households, respectively. For policy makers, this study provides empirical evidence suggesting 
that even in the presence of diversification, introducing area yield insurance would help reduce 
the perceived riskiness of rain-fed agriculture and increase agricultural households’ welfare.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context: Agriculture, Climate Variability and Risk Amelioration 
Given its contribution to developing economies, agriculture is a cornerstone of most 
government policies (Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986; Anderson and Martin 2005). Agriculture 
is considered a risky venture due to its biological nature and reliance on variable rainfall. 
Agricultural households are thus constantly faced with risks and uncertainties (Dercon 2006; 
Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009) that include climate (Antle 1995; Ito and Kurosaki 2009; Maatman 
et al. 2002), production (Park 2006; Hazell and Norton 1986), income (Kazianga and Udry 
2006), consumption (Shively 1997) and price (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). 
Climate variability is seen as a prominent source of risk affecting rain-fed agricultural systems 
(Kurukulasuriya and Ajwad 2006; Magombeyi and Taigbenu 2008; Lotze-Campen and 
Schellnhuber 2009). Studies indicate that the climate is changing and its impact and potential 
consequences are large and numerous (Olesen and Bindi 2002; Olesen et al. 2011; 
Mendelsohn, Dinar and Dalfelt 2000; Hertel and Rosch 2010; Laux et al. 2010). Although 
climate variability and its accompanying challenges affect the globe as a whole, its negative 
impact is more prominent in developing countries as compared to their developed counterparts 
(Antle 1995; Cooper et al. 2008; Hassan 2010). It has been argued that the developing world 
contributes the least to the changing climate, yet, suffers the most consequences (Mendelsohn 
et al. 2000; Mendelsohn and Dinar 1999; Mendelsohn 2008; Antle 1995; Hassan 2010; 
Kurukulasuriya 2006; Laux et al. 2010; Hertel and Rosch 2010; Cooper et al. 2008). The 
rippling effects of climate risks are especially evident in agriculture, and aggravate production, 
income and price risks, and ultimately, poverty and food insecurity (Ito and Kurosaki 2009). 
Serious efforts have, therefore, been made to understand and help farmers in developing 
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countries deal with these challenges (Adger et al. 2003; Smit and Skinner 2002; Seo and 
Mendelsohn 2008; Cooper et al. 2008; Tsuji, Hoogenboom and Thornton eds 1998; Ngewnya 
2014; Paavola 2008). 
Studies have highlighted a number of approaches that poor agricultural households employ to 
cope with risks (Berbel 1993; Maatman et al. 2002; Nyikal and Kosura 2005). Poor farmers 
attempt to reduce their risk exposure through several strategies, the most prominent being: 
growing their own necessities (Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1991; Fafchamps 1992), diversifying 
their activities (Walker and Ryan 1990; Anosike and Coughenour 1990; Bradshaw, Dolan and 
Smit 2004), savings (Dercon 2014), grain storage (Park 2006), raising livestock (Ajao and 
Ogunniyi 2011; Kazianga and Udry 2006), credit (Mishra 1994), social networks and gift 
giving (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Molini et al. 2008),  insurance (traditional and index-based) 
(Mishra 1994; Keyzer, Molini and Boom 2007; Sakurai and Reardon 1997) and adopting risk-
reducing production inputs/factors (Just and Pope 1979). 
In coping with climate variability in the developing world, two important risk management 
strategies are 1) diversification (Hassan and Nhemachena 2008; Deressa et al. 2009; Perz 2005; 
Cooper et al. 2008) and 2) insurance  (Barnett, Barrett and Skees 2008; Kunreuther 1996; 
Linnerooth-bayer and Mechler 2007; Nnadi et al. 2013; Gine, Townsend and Vickery 2008). 
Diversification is a farmer-initiated, self-insuring activity that involves spreading livelihoods 
across numerous activities. It may be on-farm, where households grow more than one crop 
and/or livestock, and/or off-farm, where they supplement farming with other income-
generating activities. In contrast, insurance is an externally offered means of risk amelioration 
where an outside organization offers a service for risk management. 
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The efficacy of diversification strategies can be difficult to interpret. Studies show that 
diversification might not occur as the result of a choice, but out of necessity (i.e. desperation-
led diversification), due primarily to poverty (Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001; Reardon et al. 
2000; Little et al. 2001). In such cases, diversification is not a risk amelioration option but a 
“desperate struggle for survival” (Ellis 1998, pp2).  A review of the literature by Dercon (2002) 
suggests that farmers are likely to give up significant income to lower risk when they diversify, 
but many times are not successful at smoothing risk. Moreover, the benefits of diversification 
usually come at a cost of reduced expected short-term net returns (Markowitz 1952; Chan, 
Karceski and Lakonishok 1999; Cooper et al. 2008). Nevertheless, diversification can be an 
effective risk reduction strategy since it minimizes income variability by relying on strategic 
complementarities between activities that are not perfectly, positively correlated; thus, it 
remains popular among agricultural households in developing countries (Sakho-Jimbira and 
Bignebat 2007). 
Similarly, insurance is typically used to hedge against contingent losses. It is conventionally 
defined as “the equitable transfer of a risk of loss from one entity to another in exchange for a 
premium or a guaranteed and quantifiable small loss to prevent a large and possibly devastating 
loss” (Vetrivel and Yoga 2012, pp.2). Insurance is regarded as a potentially effective method 
for mitigating the perceived riskiness of agriculture (Kunreuther 1996; Barnett and Mahul 
2007). Conventionally, agricultural insurance assesses the risk of the insured on an individual 
basis (Skees, 2008). Indemnity payments are made to compensate for actual individual losses 
(Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011; Ali 2013). But, this form of insurance has been troublesome in 
the developing world due to underdeveloped or non-existent insurance markets, poor contract 
enforcement, information asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection), high transaction 
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costs, and high exposure to spatially covariate risks (Skees, Barnett and Ky 2006; Skees 2007; 
Collier, Skees and Barnett 2009; Skees, Hartell and Murphy 2007; Barnett and Mahul 2007; 
Skees, Barnett and Collier 2008; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011). Index-based insurance has 
arisen as a newer form of agricultural insurance that assesses losses using measures such as 
area-wide yields, or weather, that cannot be influenced by the actions of the insured, but are 
correlated with yields as a proxy for individual losses (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Miranda and 
Farrin 2012). Indemnity payments are made based on deviations from the index and not on 
individual losses (Ali 2013). This form of insurance seems to address challenges of traditional 
insurance, present in developing economies, by reducing transaction costs and information 
asymmetry (Barnett et al. 2008; Barrett et al. 2007; Leblois et al. 2013).  
Several developing countries have explored the potential of index-based insurance on a pilot 
basis, though there are few instances of large scale implementations of such programmes (Gine 
et al. 2008; Barrett et al. 2007; Chantarat et al. 2007; Hess, Richter and Stoppa 2001; Stoppa 
and Hess 2003; Keyzer et al. 2007; Skees, Hazell and Miranda 1999; Miranda and Farrin 2012; 
Sina 2012; Collier et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2013; Panda 2013; Panda et al. 2013; Binswanger-
Mkhize 2012; Varadan and Kumar 2012; Kumar et al. 2011; Ali 2013; Barnett and Mahul 
2007; Barnett et al. 2008). Some pilots have seen low demand and low willingness to pay (Hill, 
Hoddinott and Kumar 2011; Sarris, Karfakis and Christiaensen 2006; Gine et al. 2008). 
Debates on the effectiveness of index-based insurance programmes are thus complex and 
mixed, notably because of the challenge posed by the associated basis risk1 (Vedenov and 
                                                 
1Basis risk arises as a result of an imperfect correlation between the insurance index and the yields of 
farmers (Barnett et al. 2008; Barnett and Mahul 2007).  The consequence of this imperfect correlation 
might be that a farmer may experience yield loss but receive no insurance pay-out, or experience no 
loss but receive an insurance pay-out (Leblois et al. 2013). 
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Barnett 2004; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012). However, the lack of a better alternative makes it a 
promising insurance option in the developing world; therefore, designing index-based 
insurance products with lower basis risk has been central to several studies (Miranda and Farrin 
2012; Barrett et al. 2007; Barnett et al. 2005; Stoppa and Hess 2003). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Further to the discussion above, much of the attention given to ameliorating risk in the 
developing world’s agriculture has focused on diversification or insurance. Although each of 
these means of ameliorating risk is acknowledged as being important, little research has 
investigated how the two approaches work in concert. Studies on the relationship between 
insurance and diversification have mostly focused on traditional crop insurance in developed 
countries (O’Donoghue, Key and Roberts 2005; Wu 1999; Wu and Adams 2001; Goodwin, 
Vandeveer and Deal 2004). To our knowledge, no comparable empirical studies have 
examined the relationship between crop insurance (traditional or index-based) and 
diversification in a developing world context. An assessment of the relationship between 
diversification and index-based insurance in the developing world would address this 
knowledge gap and thus improve our understanding of farmers’ choices of risk mitigation 
options. 
This study begins by assuming that farmers have the option of diversifying to varying degrees, 
and that traditional crop insurance is unavailable. We then ask, what role could index-based 
insurance play in agricultural households’ overall risk management and decision-making? 
Does index-based insurance complement or crowd out diversification? Knowing the explicit    
relationship between the two strategies might help answer these questions, and inform policy 
and the design of insurance programmes to effectively attract more farmers. 
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1.3 Research Objective and Questions 
The main objective of this study is to understand how diversification and index-based 
insurance work in concert under climate variability. Two broad questions guide this study. 
I. Does index-based insurance complement or substitute for diversification? 
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) argues that wealthy farmers may already be self-insured through 
income diversification and their assets; thus, formal insurance may not be valuable to them.  
Poor farmers, on the other hand, cannot pay insurance premiums for crops that only pay out 
after harvest (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012).  Given the possibility to diversify is insurance a 
better option? It has also been argued that risk management options are not mutually exclusive 
and are likely to complement each other (Barnett et al. 2008; Barrett et al. 2007). To what 
extent, therefore, is insurance complementary to or substitutable for diversification already 
employed by farmers? How do insurance premiums and coverage (i.e., the percentage of area 
yield below which a farmer gets insurance pay-out) affect this relationship? 
II. To what extent can index-based insurance reduce yield risk and how does risk 
preference influence diversification and insurance behaviours? 
Risk-averse farmers are thought to prefer low-risk and low-return investments to high-risk and 
high-return ones. This risk aversion is believed to be a major reason underpinning the poverty 
trap phenomenon in many developing economies (Moscardi and de Janvry 1977; Yesuf and 
Bluffstone 2009; Barrett et al. 2007; Paavola 2008; Barnett and Mahul 2007). If risk influences 
farmers’ production and investment choices, to a large extent, then one would expect that any 
effort to reduce their risk exposure could change their production and investment patterns and, 
as a consequence, improve welfare. However, whether index-based insurance is effective at 
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lowering the perceived riskiness of agriculture, in the context of climate variability where 
farmers have the option to diversify, seems to have been neglected empirically in the 
developing world. We thus examine the extent to which insurance reduces the perceived 
riskiness of agriculture and how it affects production decisions and overall welfare. We also 
investigate how farmers’ risk preferences affect their diversification and insurance decisions. 
1.4 General Approach 
This study employs farm-level modelling to achieve its objectives. Rohm and Dabbert (2003) 
argue that farm-level models present a viable alternative to sectorial models, which are often 
too aggregated to capture the details that form the core of the agro-environmental analysis. 
Buysse (2010) iterates that “ the farm is the actual centre of decision making in agriculture 
and, therefore, the interpretation of results of a farm-level approach is easier than for an 
aggregate approach” and a “good farm representation and farm process understanding also 
enhances the development of more aggregate models” (pp.3). 
A mathematical programming approach is used to develop the farm-level models. 
Mathematical programming has become a widely used tool for agricultural analyses. Howitt 
(1995) identifies three major advantages to using mathematical programming. Firstly, it 
facilitates analysis in cases where time-series data are unavailable and/or cannot be used 
because of structural changes in a developing economy. Secondly, programming models are 
structured in a way that makes it easy to characterize resource, environmental, or policy 
constraints. Lastly, mathematical programming represents production technologies in such a 
way that intrinsically allows input determinism. Mills (2014) and Buysse (2010) stress that a 
key motivation for using programming models is making the best use of limited data. This 
motivation is a significant issue in the case of index-based insurance in developing countries, 
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where experience and data are limited. As a basis for our empirical model, we employ data 
from the IMPACT Lite survey collected by CCAFS on production behaviour and 
diversification (Rufino et al. 2012). We then allow household the opportunity to add index-
based insurance in policy simulations. 
1.5 Organization of Study 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
presents a review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are respectively devoted to 
the theoretical considerations and empirical methods. Chapter 5 explains the data, study area 
and parameters used in the models. Chapter 6 presents the results and discussions of the 
research findings. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the results, presents conclusions, 
recommendations and suggests areas for further study. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides a review of relevant literature for this study. Given the objectives of this 
thesis, three broad areas of literature, agricultural household models, diversification, and index-
based insurance are reviewed. The main purpose of the review is to use previous research to 
provide background and to guide this study. 
2.2 Agricultural Household Models 
Agricultural household models combine the producer, consumer and labour-supply decisions 
of households into a single conceptual framework. These models can be adapted to households 
in widely different socio-economic environments (Singh et al. 1986; Huffman 1991). One 
extreme application of these models is pure subsistence farm households where only family 
labour and available land are used to produce all the goods consumed. In this case, households 
do not sell or purchase labour, consumption goods and farm inputs. Levels of production, 
leisure and consumption are determined simultaneously (Hazell 1982; Nakajima 1969). Hazell 
(1982) iterates that “such models are inherently difficult to apply” since “the parameters of the 
utility function cannot be estimated in direct or indirect form, and it is difficult to estimate 
production and consumption systems simultaneously when these are nonlinear and 
inadequately identified” (pp. 384). He also argues that such models cannot be easily adapted 
to account for risk. On the other extreme, commercial farm households use hired labour, 
purchase farm inputs and consumption goods and sell most of their output (Huffman 1991). In 
such cases, production, leisure and consumption decisions are completely independent. 
Barnum & Squire (1979) and Lau, Yotopoulos, Chou, & Lin (1981) note that when markets 
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are perfectly competitive, the simultaneity between consumption, leisure, and production 
decisions completely breaks down. 
Early applications of agricultural household models typically assumed separability between 
production and consumption. In this sense, production and consumption are treated 
recursively. These models have overly restrictive assumptions—all markets are complete, 
perfect and competitive; family and hired labour are perfect substitutes; on- and off-farm 
family employment are perfect substitutes; and there are no transaction and commuting costs 
(de Janvry 1991; Singh et al. 1986).  de Janvry (1991) notes that if these assumptions hold, 
then, production and consumption decisions can be taken sequentially, since production 
outcomes determine consumption decisions but not conversely. The household equilibrium is 
derived from a two-stage process. Firstly, on the production side, households maximize income 
given that labour is valued at the market wage. Secondly, households’ consumption is 
determined given income and market wage. Hazell (1982) notes that this formulation is 
practical since indirect utility functions can be derived in prices and income, and a farm’s 
production function independently estimated. Barnum & Squire (1979) and Delforce (1994) 
argue that separation of production and consumption does not necessarily hold if risk and risk 
aversion are introduced. 
In the developing country context, it is well-documented that farm households are exposed to 
numerous market imperfections and constraints, such as labour (Maatman et al. 2002; Ito and 
Kurosaki 2009; Fafchamps 1992), credit (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Barnett et al. 2008; 
Holden, Shiferaw and Pender 2004; Ellis 1998; Mishra 1994; Dercon 2002; Clarke and Dercon 
2009), food (Steven Were Omamo 1998; de Janvry et al. 1991) and insurance (Barnett et al. 
2008; Shen and Odening 2013; Janvry and Sadoulet 1993; Rosenzweig 1988; Dercon 2002; 
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Korir 2011; Ito and Kurosaki 2009; Chantarat et al. 2013; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011). 
Thorbecke (1993) contends that farm households’ behaviour cannot be understood without 
reference to these imperfections. Coyle (1994), Kanbur et al. (1993)  and Yotopoulos & Lau 
(1974) argue that in the presence of market failures and risk, agricultural households’ 
production and consumption decisions are non-separable, and should therefore be modelled as 
such. Kanbur et al. (1993) describe a non-separable household model as one where “the 
household’s decisions regarding production (use of inputs, choice of activities, desired 
production levels) are affected by its consumer characteristics (consumption preferences and 
demographic composition)” (pp.2). 
Empirical research on non-separable models is limited. Omamo (1998) considered a non-
separable model examining the impact of transport costs on smallholder farmers’ cropping 
decisions in the Siaya District, western Kenya. As one would expect, the market imperfections 
cited earlier prevail in this part of Kenya, and in the region of Ghana studied in this thesis. 
Omamo (1998)’s results indicate that households diversify production partly to meet their own 
demand for diversity in consumption, and that proximity to markets and transport infrastructure 
increase the amount of land allocated to cash crops and decrease that allocated to food crops. 
Non-separability in production and consumption leads to what Ahn & Squire (1981) term as 
semi-commercial household models, which lie between a wholly commercialized farm and a 
pure subsistence farm. The representative households simulated in Omamo (1998) fits into this 
semi-commercial category. In semi-commercial household models, two fundamental blocks of 
microeconomic analysis, the household and the firm, are integrated (Singh et al. 1986). Singh 
et al. (1986) contend that most agricultural households in developing economies produce partly 
for their own consumption and partly for sale. They purchase part of their inputs and provide 
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some on their own. Non-separable household models, as used in this thesis, try to capture these 
interactions.  
2.3 Diversification 
Diversification is a common risk mitigation and income smoothing strategy among agricultural 
households (Sakho-Jimbira and Bignebat 2007), particularly in developing countries. A key 
reason for diversification is to “create a portfolio of livelihoods with different risk attributes” 
to manage risk exposure (Paavola 2008, pp. 644). Sing et al. (2009) parse diversification into 
two broad types: 1) horizontal or the addition of new activities (such as livestock, aquaculture 
or new crops, improved crop varieties and increased production for the market, income 
diversification through off-farm employment) and 2) vertical or value-added activities, e.g., 
processing, packaging and marketing (Kankwamba, Mapila and Pauw 2013). Kandulu et al. 
(2012) enumerate several benefits of diversification, including as a buffer against commodity 
prices and input fluctuations, and climate variability; insofar as the effects of variability differs 
among different agricultural enterprises, losses incurred from investing in one enterprise may 
be offset by gains from another enterprise. These benefits are underpinned by an imperfect 
correlation of net returns from various activities (Kandulu et al. 2012). 
2.3.1 Measures of Diversification 
Although there are various measures of agricultural diversification, the most common are the 
Herfindahl (HI), Transformed Herfindahl (Simpson) Index (THI) and Modified Entropy Index, 
each of which is derived as the proportion of total cropping area under the cultivation of 
different crops in a defined geographical area (Kumar and Sharma 2012; O’Donoghue, Key 
and Roberts 2005). While the ease of derivation and interpretation may differ among these 
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indices, they provide comparable results. When applied to diversification, the THI2 is derived 
by subtracting the HI from one as represented in  Kankwamba et al. (2013):  
THI = 1 − HI = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑃𝑖 =
𝐴𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(2.1) 
The HI is derived by summing the squares of each crop’s share in the total amount of land 
cultivated, where 𝑃𝑖 is the proportion of land allocated to the ith crop and 𝐴𝑖 is the land 
allocated to the ith crop (Sichoongwe et al. 2014; Pal and Kar 2012; Kankwamba et al. 2013). 
Bound between 0 and 1, the THI values increase with diversification; THI is zero when there 
is complete specialization and tends to unity when there is complete diversification as n 
approaches infinity.  An alternative index, with the same range and interpretation as the THI, 
is the Modified Entropy Index (MEI), defined as below (Kankwamba et al. 2013): 
MEI = ∑ Pi
n
i=1
 ∗ lnn (
1
Pi
) (2.2) 
where n, the number of crops, is also the base of the logarithm function.  
Given its intuitive ease of interpretation and following Sichoongwe et al. (2014), the THI is 
used in this thesis.   
                                                 
2 As noted in Kankwamba et al. (2013), the key advantage of the Transformed (Simpson) Herfindahl 
Index over the Herfindahl lies in the ease of interpreting diversification. Whereas high values 
(approaching unity) of the former imply increased diversification, low values (tending to 0) of the 
Herfindahl suggest the same. 
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2.3.2 Empirical Studies on Diversification as a Risk Management Strategy  
The studies cited in this section use different empirical approaches and assess the importance 
of diversification as a risk management strategy in developing countries. 
Ajao and Ogunniyi (2011) examined farmers’ strategies for adapting to climate change 
conditions of reduced precipitation and high temperatures in the Oyo state of Nigeria. Ajao 
and Ogunniyi (2011) used a multinomial logit model to determine the adaptation strategies 
farmers chose based on a number of climate attributes and socioeconomic characteristics. Their 
findings indicate that farmers adapt to climate variability by growing new crops, adapting 
drought tolerant/resistance crop varieties, diversifying from crops to livestock production and 
using new land management practices. A major limitation of this study is that it does not 
identify which combination of these strategies is most effective in dealing with climate 
variability.  
Similarly, Hassan and Nhemachena (2008) used a multinomial logit model to analyze the 
determinants of farm-level climate adaptation measures among farms in eleven African 
countries, including Ghana. Given perceptions of warming temperatures, decreased 
precipitation and frequent droughts, Hassan and Nhemachena (2008) found that farmers used 
various measures in combinations, the most prominent being emphasizing livestock over crops, 
switching from dryland to irrigation and diversifying into mulitiple crops and mixed crop-
livestock systems. Their results indicate that 52% of the African farms surveyed relied on a 
combination of multiple cropping and livestock rearing in dryland conditions.  
Other diversification research stresses the importance of supplementing farm employment 
activities with off-farm activities to attenuate risks. Paavola (2008) studied how farmers 
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modified their livelihood strategies under climate variability in Morogoro, Tanzania. They 
found that while livelihood diversification was the primary adaptive mechanism for 
agricultural households in Morogoro, farmers also switched between crops (e.g., changing 
from maize to sorghum if there was a threat of a drought) to smooth their consumption. 
Reardon, Delgado and Matlon (1992) also examined the effects and determinants of 
agricultural household income diversification in Burkina Faso. They defined income 
diversification as combining full-time off-farm employment with farming.  Their results show 
that a harvest reduction promoted income diversification, which, in turn, was associated with 
greater incomes and consumption over time.  
In sum, although the foregoing studies on diversification do not examine it within the context 
of index-based insurance in developing countries,—indeed, we found no literature, to the best 
of our knowledge for even developed countries—all point to the significance of diversification 
to agricultural households seeking to ameliorate their production and income risks, and to adapt 
to climate variability. 
2.4 Index-Based Insurance 
The original idea of insurance using indices is attributed to Halcrow (1949) with renewed 
attention in the 1990s (Hardaker et al. 2004). The basic feature of this type of insurance is that 
contracts are written and sold for specific events  (e.g., drought or area yield loss) in standard 
monetary units, with a certificate for each unit bought called a Standard Unit Contract (SUC) 
(Skees et al. 1999). Pay-outs are not based on individual losses but on a third-party measure 
defined at a regional level (e.g., historical area yields or weather variables recorded at a local 
weather station) with the aim of overcoming the challenges of traditional insurance (primarily, 
information asymmetry and high transaction costs) (Skees et al. 2006; Skees 2007; Collier et 
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al. 2009; Skees, Hartell, et al. 2007; Barnett and Mahul 2007; Skees et al. 2008; Linnerooth-
Bayer et al. 2011). Farmers who buy the same contracts in a given region pay the same 
premium rate for a SUC and receive the same pay-out per SUC if the insured event occurs 
(Skees et al. 1999).  
A major challenge of index-based insurance is its associated basis risk, where an insured may 
experience a loss but receive no pay-out or, experience no loss but receive pay-out 
(Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Vedenov & Barnett 2004). Though several studies have explored 
ways to design index schemes to reduce basis risk by using index variables that are highly 
correlated with actual yields, it still remains a big challenge of index-based insurance (Collier 
et al., 2009; Sina 2012; J. Skees et al. 1999; Barnett, Black, Hu, & Skees, 2005; Barrett et al., 
2007; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; Stoppa & Hess, 2003). Vedenov & Barnett (2004) argue that 
to completely eliminate basis risk, separate contracts would have to be written on indices 
measured at the various locations where the contract is to be used, which would be costly and 
defeat one of the most attractive properties of index-based insurance (i.e., low transaction 
costs).  
Other challenges of index-based insurance include its crop-specific nature. Many index 
insurance products are designed for specific crops and thus, farmers who practice intercropping 
may be excluded or not fully benefit from them (Sina 2012). Amidst its challenges, index-
based insurance is deemed to be a promising insurance option as compared to traditional 
insurance, especially for developing economies where transactions costs tend to be high 
(Barnett et al. 2008; Barrett et al. 2007; Leblois et al. 2013).  
The development of insurance programmes based on weather indices is more recent as 
compared to those pertaining to area-yields. Although it has been used less in empirical studies 
 17 
 
than area-yield, research (Sina 2012; Skees et al. 1999) acknowledges the potential of weather-
based indices, especially in developing economies, where yield data is unreliable. 
Governments and non-governmental international organizations have piloted index insurance 
schemes in various developing countries, including Brazil, India, Malawi, Mongolia, Kenya 
and Ethiopia, though most have been weather-based (Carter et al. 2014; Miranda and Farrin 
2012). Skees et al. (1999) notes that although area-yield index is likely to produce better 
contracts since they are more correlated to individual yields, “rainfall insurance contracts may 
be technically more feasible for most countries because of the existence of long data series at 
regional weather stations”. Weather-based indices are likely to capture climate variability more 
than area-yields due to the direct relation between the weather variables used and climate.  
Nevertheless, for reasons further discussed in Section 5.5.4, we are unable to use weather-
based indices in this study; consequently, we concentrate on area-yield index-based insurance. 
Area-yields insurance (AYI) was first implemented in Sweden in the 1950s. Area-yields 
insurance contracts are designed based on the  long-term average yield of a region (e.g. district, 
community or county), and payments are made to farmers who purchase the contract when the 
area-yield of the region falls below a pre-determined limit (e.g., 70% percent of the long-term 
average) (Skees et al. 1999; Barnett et al. 2005; Olivier Mahul 1999; Oliver Mahul 1999; 
Miranda and Farrin 2012). Contracts require long and reliable historical area-yield data to be 
feasible and accurate. 
In general, an insurance contract specifies a premium paid by the policyholder and an 
indemnity schedule of the insurer that specifies the pay-out in case the policyholder faces a 
loss (Huberman, Mayers and Smith 1983). The following sections review how AYIs are 
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designed and priced in terms of indemnity and premiums, as well as the effect of premium     
subsidies on insurance uptake. 
2.4.1 Indemnity Schedule 
Miranda (1991) developed a theoretical framework and indemnity function for area yield index 
insurance.  Since then, several AYI studies (Barnett et al. 2005; Smith, Chouinard and Baquet 
1994; Olivier Mahul 1999; Vercammen 2000) have used—with some modifications—the 
indemnity function as formally proposed by Miranda (1991): 
?̃? = max(𝑦𝑐 − ?̃?, 0) ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒,    and 
𝑦𝑐 = 𝜇 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
(2.3) 
where ?̃? represents the indemnity unit of production per acre or, dollar value per acre, 
representing the pay-out policyholders receives when they experience losses ; 𝑦𝑐   refers to the 
critical or trigger yield (i.e., the yield below which the insured receives a pay-out);   ?̃? denotes 
the stochastic area yield; 𝜇 is the predicted area yield; 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the percentage of  the 
predicted area yield chosen by policyholders which determines their critical yields; and 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 
is a choice variable, in monetary units per acre, that the insured varies per acre to align expected 
indemnities with expected farm-level losses (Barnett et al. 2005). The general assumption is 
that there exists a constant price, determined when the contract begins, that acts as a scaling 
factor to convert the units of production per acre into monetary units per acre. Typically, either 
estimated average market or futures prices, or a combination of the two, are used to indemnify 
yield losses (Wang et al. 1998; Barnett et al. 2005). An alternative indemnity function, also 
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based on Miranda (1991)’s model, is that used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for its 
area yield insurance scheme, the Group Risk Plan (GRP)3: 
?̃? =  max [(
𝑦𝑐−?̃?
𝑦𝑐
) ∗ 𝑦𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∗  𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒, 0]  and 
𝑦𝑐 = 𝑦𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
(2.4) 
where yfcast represents the forecasted per acre county yield, 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is as defined in 
equation (2.3) and ranges from 70% to 90% of expected area yields in 5% increments, and 
𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 (i.e., a choice variable that determines the monetary value of losses and estimated as a 
percentage of a pre-determine amount) ranges from 90% to 150% (Skees, Black and Barnett 
1997). Under the GRP, policyholders receive indemnity payments depending on the percentage 
differences between actual area yields and forecasted yields and the dollar value of protection 
selected (Skees, Black and Barnett 1997; Barnett et al. 2005).  
Using Miranda (1991)’s function, Smith et al. (1994) argued that an “almost ideal” area yield 
insurance scheme would allow the insured to select the level of coverage, conditional on scale 
being 100% and coverage any non-negative value. Smith et al. (1994) compared the net yield 
variances in the “almost ideal” case (i.e., scale =100%, and coverage>0%), the GRP case (i.e., 
scale = 90% to 150%, and coverage = 70% to 90%) and, when coverage was constrained at 
75% and 90%. Their findings indicate that the almost ideal case lowered net yield variability 
the most (65%), while the 75% coverage lowered it the least (46.6%). 
                                                 
3 The GRP was replaced by a similar area yield insurance scheme, the Area Risk Protection Insurance 
Plan, in 2014. 
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2.4.2 Pricing (Premium) and Subsidies 
Accurate pricing of an insurance contract is crucial to the success of insurance programmes. 
In area-yield insurance, transaction costs and adverse selection problems tend to be less, 
relative to conventional insurance (which makes it cheaper to administer),  and thus contracts 
are normally assumed to be actuarially fair where premiums paid are equal to expected 
indemnities (Wang et al. 1998; Barnett et al. 2005; Smith et al. 1994). An actuarially fair 
premium is derived from the expected indemnity as: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐸?̃?𝑖𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗 (2.5) 
where 𝜋𝑖𝑗  is per acre premium for farm 𝑖 and insurance contract j, and ?̃?𝑖𝑗  is per acre indemnity. 
Premiums are determined for the insurer to also cover expected loss (i.e., expected 
indemnification) and administrative costs and to possibly make a profit (Brockett, 2015). 
Accordingly, insurers typically incorporate a proportional load factor, (1 + 𝜆) to account for 
administrative expenditures and profits (Briys 1985). As Coble and Barnett (2013) note,  given 
the possibility of extreme catastrophic events, “…a private insurer would add to the expected 
loss cost a load which reflects ambiguity regarding the extent to which the available historical 
data adequately reflect the probability and magnitude of catastrophic events” (pp. 500). 
Berg, Quirion, & Sultan (2009), in investigating the feasibility and farmers’ interests for 
weather index-based insurance in Burkina Faso, presented a premium, 𝑝,  as: 
𝑝 = 1.1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖] (2.6) 
Berg, Quirion, & Sultan (2009) assumed that the farmer pays an additional 10% margin, the 
load factor, of the average indemnity in annual premiums as the cost of transferring risk. They 
adopt this margin for simplicity, as they acknowledge that index-based contracts do not clearly 
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indicate how insurers derive their margins. Since a mark-up of 10% seems reasonable, we 
adopt their assumption for this study. 
Governments typically subsidize premiums to encourage participation in crop insurance 
schemes, as is the case in the US (e.g., O’donoghue, Roberts and Key (2009); Goodwin and 
Smith (2013)). However, the effects of subsidies on uptake remain inconclusive at best. In an 
econometric analysis of the effects of subsidized crop insurance in the U.S., Goodwin and 
Smith (2013) note that subsidizing risk fosters various distortions in farmers’ decisions. For 
instance, the insured may assume more risks than they might have otherwise by altering their 
production patterns and practices, i.e., changing the quantity of acreage allocated to crops, and 
cultivating riskier crops on riskier land. Using OLS regression, county-level data on planted 
acreage and five-year historical subsidy rates and subsidy-adjusted loss ratios from 2000-2010 
for corn, cotton, wheat and soybean, they estimated the extent to which acreage responds to 
changes in crop insurance subsidies. Goodwin and Smith (2013)’s results shows increased 
acreage allocation in response to high subsidies. In a different vein, Du et al. (2014) used a 
mixed logit model to analyse coverage choices and the determinants of those choices 
(premiums, subsidies and soil quality at the county-level) for corn and soybean growers. Their 
results indicate that farmers’ actual crop insurance decisions are not consistent with the 
expected utility maximization framework (i.e., that given actuarially fair premiums, one would 
select high coverage levels or coverage levels with high subsidies). 
2.4.3 Empirical Studies on the Performance of Area Yield Insurance 
Wang et al. (1998) assessed the performance of individual farm and area yield crop insurance 
programmes for a representative southwest Iowa corn farmer who uses combinations of 
options, futures and different crop insurance schemes using stochastic simulation. They 
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assumed area yield crop insurance to be actuarially fair and then defined the individual yield 
crop insurance at initially 35% above the fair premium to capture transactions costs from 
providing individual crop insurance. Their findings indicate that performance (i.e., farmer 
participation in an insurance scheme and welfare or willingness to pay) for different crop 
insurance schemes was primarily affected by the correlation between individual farm-yields 
and area yields as well as limits on the coverage.  
Barnett et al. (2005) also compared the performance of multiple peril crop insurance and area 
yield insurance contracts to determine how much each lowered variances in net yields. They 
used the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s actual indemnity function for GRP explained 
earlier. Their results suggest that area yield insurance performed better relative to multiple peril 
crop insurance in states where there were high correlations between farm-level and area yields. 
Similarly, Clover and Nieuwoudt (2003) used the  indemnity function and premium schedule 
used in Barnett et al. (2005), as well as linear regression, to assess the viability of a 
government-subsidized area yield insurance programme in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Their analysis suggests that such a scheme in South Africa would require high levels of 
subsidization, which would be costly.  
In a different vein, in an econometric analysis of the effects of index-based insurance on 
irrigated rice smallholder producers’ welfare and loan repayment in  northern Peru, Carter, 
Galarza and Boucher (2007) assessed two types of actuarially fair alternative schemes: one 
based on directly measured average area yields and another estimated using weather 
information. They found that directly measured area-yield insurance was better for lenders and 
borrowers than weather-index insurance, and both insurance schemes could crowd-in the 
supply and demand of credit.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the foregoing literature review provides context for this study in several aspects. The 
first pertains to the importance of using a non-separable agricultural household model, given 
the market imperfections and constraints in our study area. The second is the use of the THI to 
assess the extent of diversification as an important risk management strategy because of its 
intuitive interpretation and the complexity of the relationship between diversification and area-
yield insurance. Finally, following Miranda (1991)’s framework for deriving an indemnity 
schedule, premium, and the related attributes of coverage and scale, which inform how most 
studies calculate these variables, our study assumes actuarially fair premiums and a 10% load 
factor.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter provides the theoretical background for this study. Farmers’ behaviour under risk 
has been studied primarily through an extension of the theory of consumer behaviour-expected 
utility theory. Presented in the following sections are reviews of expected utility theory in a 
household decision-making and households’ risk preference. 
3.2 Expected Utility Theory and Household Models 
For several decades, expected utility theory has provided the main theoretical basis for studies 
of choice under uncertainty. The theory maintains that if a decision maker’s behaviour satisfies 
the completeness, transitivity and independence axioms as postulated by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947), then  a utility function exists such that the decision maker acts in a manner 
that maximizes his/her expected utility (Fishburn 1982). 
The expected utility theory is based on an ordinal ranking of utility derived from different 
goods and services (Hazell 1982). It presents decision-making as a choice between risky 
alternatives under various states of nature. Assuming that the expected utility of consumption 
is being maximized, and that there are n different states of nature, the expected utility from a 
risky situation or action, 𝑎𝑗, can be represented as in Barry (1984), as: 
𝐸(𝑈𝑗) = ∑ 𝑝(𝜃𝑖) ∗ 𝑈
𝑛
𝑖=1
[C(θ𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)] (3.1) 
where  C(𝜃𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗) is the level of consumption for the ith state of nature (𝜃𝑖) that may correspond 
to, for example, prices and yields and the jth action ( 𝑎𝑗), e.g., a specific farming 
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activity; 𝑈[C(θ𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)] is the corresponding utility function; and 𝑝(𝜃𝑖) refers to the probability 
of the occurrence of the ith alternative state of nature.  
In a household decision-making framework, the expected utility theory is applied to instances 
where households are assumed to maximize expected utility subject to specified constraints. 
The type of model under consideration determines the constraints needed. In typical production 
models, the constraints usually considered are land, labour, capital and production technology 
(Bardsley and Harris 1987; Singh et al. 1986). In addition, a household model would consider 
budget and household time related constraints (Singh et al. 1986). Presented below is a generic 
constrained optimization model assuming EU maximization.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑝𝑈(𝑥) (3.2) 
subject to:  
𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝑑 (3.3) 
𝑥 ≥ 0 (3.4) 
where 𝐸(𝑈) is expected utility, 𝑥 is  a vector of non-negative activity levels, p is a vector of 
state probabilities which incorporates risk into the model, and  𝑈(𝑥) is a vector of utility values 
for various activities in different states of nature. 𝐴 is a matrix of technical coefficients and 𝑑 
is a vector of resource stocks. 
Expected utility theory has been criticized based on evidence against the empirical validity of 
its axioms, especially the independence axiom (Allais and Hagen 1979; Dreze 1974; Machina 
1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Alternative approaches 
such as the safety first theory (Roy 1952) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
have accumulated experimental evidence, raising doubts about the  expected utility theory as 
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a sound behavioural theory. Bar-shira, Just and Zilberman (1997) and Richter, Schiller and 
Schlesinger (2014) argue that most of the violations of the expected utility hypothesis are from 
carefully planned experiments. Consequently, they question the validity of abandoning the use 
of the expected utility hypothesis based on such experiments when studying real-world 
decision-making.  
Other supporters of  expected utility theory point to the lack of viable alternatives with 
comparable predictive power and versatility (Machina 1983). Moschini and Hennessy (2001) 
argue that expected utility models are intended to capture the notion of risk aversion, which is 
the main characteristic of choice under uncertainty. Therefore, the expected utility theory is 
deemed acceptable and is used in numerous risk-related empirical studies (Bhende and 
Venkataram 1994; Heidelbach 2006; Saha 1994).  
Several studies have incorporated expected utility theory into agricultural household models. 
The generalized non-separable agricultural household model typically ignores risk. It is 
assumed that an agricultural household is a price-taker in both the goods and factor markets, 
and has a monotonically increasing and strictly concave utility function. Following Barnum 
and Squire (1979), Ahn and Squire (1981) and Saha (1994), a risk-free household model is 
presented below where the household maximizes its utility of consumption subject to 
production, resource and income constraints within a single agricultural cycle planning 
horizon: 
  Max 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶)          with  𝑢𝑖 > 0, 𝑢𝑖𝑖 < 0,   𝑖 = 𝑐 (3.5) 
subject to:  
𝐹 = 𝐹(𝐷, 𝑑𝑗 , 𝐴)          𝑗 = 1, … ., (3.6) 
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𝑇 = 𝐻 + 𝑙 + 𝐷 (3.7) 
𝑃′𝐶 = 𝑤𝐻 + 𝑅 + 𝑝𝑐𝐹 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑗 , (3.8) 
where 𝐶  is a (ℎ ∗ 1) vector of items consumed (own-consumption and purchased), including 
leisure; 𝐹  is the total output of own-consumption goods; 𝐷 is the total labour input (both family 
and hired) used in 𝐹 production; 𝑑𝑗 is other variable inputs used in 𝐹 production; 𝐴 is the area 
of land used in 𝐹 production; 𝑇 is the total household time available for labour; 𝑙 is leisure; 𝐻 
is the net quantity of labour time sold if 𝐻 > 0 and net quantity of labour time purchased  if 
𝐻 < 0; 𝑃′ is a (1 ∗ ℎ) vector of prices of consumed goods; 𝑤 is wage rate; 𝑅 is net other 
income; 𝑝𝑐 is prices of own-consumption goods; and 𝑝𝑗 is prices of other variable factors. 
Incorporating expected utility, risk has been introduced into agricultural household models 
through several methods. Saha (1994) incorporates price and output risk by including random 
variables that capture uncertain changes in output and/or prices. He assumes that the household 
is a price-taker in the goods and factor markets and faces the following expected utility 
maximization problem: 
max
𝑥
𝐽 ≡ 𝐸[𝑈(𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑙)] (3.9) 
subject to:  
?̃? = ?̃? + 𝐼 ≡ ?̃? + 𝑤𝐹 − 𝑝𝑐 + 𝐼 (3.10) 
?̃? = 𝑝?̃? − 𝑟𝑇𝐴 − 𝑤𝐿 (3.11) 
?̃? = 𝐺(𝐴, 𝐿)𝜖̃ (3.12) 
𝑇0 = 𝐹 + 𝑙 (3.13) 
where 𝐸[𝑈(𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑙)] is the expected utility that households derive from consuming farm 
produced commodity 𝑐 = (𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑚), market purchased goods 𝑔 = (𝑔1, … , 𝑔𝑛) and leisure, 𝑙; 
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?̃? is full household income, ?̃? denotes household’s total income less expenditure on food crops, 
𝐼 is exogenous income; 𝑤 represents wage rate, ?̃? is farm profit, 𝐹 is total available family 
labour, 𝑝 is a vector of random prices of households’ consumption goods;  ?̃? is random farm 
output, 𝜖̃ is the random output coefficient, 𝑟𝑇 denotes a ( 𝑛 ∗ 1) vector of non-labour input 
prices, A is a vector of non-labour farm inputs, L is total labour used in production, G(.) is a 
twice continuously differentiable function, that is, concave in A and L; and  𝑇0 is the 
household’s total time endowment. 
Bhende and Venkataram (1994) used the expected utility theory within an agricultural 
household framework to study the impact of diversification on household income and risk in 
Maharashtra, India, where households maximize the expected utility of their net returns. In 
insurance research, the expected utility theory has been applied to determine optimal insurance 
policies and risk reducing effects of various insurance contracts (Arrow 1971; Mossin 1968; 
Young and Browne 2000; Bokusheva, Breustedt and Heidelbach 2006; Heidelbach 2006; 
Breustedt, Bokusheva and Heidelbach 2008). In Bokusheva et al. (2006) the expected utility 
framework is used to measure and compare the risk reduction abilities of farm yield, area yield 
and weather index crop insurance schemes in Kazakhstan. In line with these studies, the 
expected utility theory forms the theoretical basis for this thesis.  
3.3 Household Risk Preferences 
In the expected utility framework, the risk preference of the decision-maker imposes 
restrictions on optimal responses to yield, income, and/or price changes (Saha 1993). Hazell 
(1982) notes that, household’s risk preferences underpin their production and consumption 
decisions. There are three general categories of risk preferences: risk averse, risk neutral and 
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risk loving. Bardsley & Harris (1987) define risk aversion as a preference for a “sure thing” 
over a gamble with the same expected value. In the following section we discuss how risk 
preferences are measured. 
3.3.1 Measures of Risk Aversion 
There are various methods of measuring risk preferences. Risk preference in the expected 
utility framework can be inferred from the curvature of the household’s utility function, where 
a linear utility function suggests risk neutrality, while concave and convex functions imply risk 
aversion and risk loving, respectively (Barry 1984). Alternatively, one can use the relationship 
between the expected monetary value (EMV) and certainty equivalence (CE) (i.e., a guaranteed 
outcome or return that an individual would accept, rather than take a chance on a higher, but 
uncertain outcome) to classify risk preferences. In this case, the EMV of a risky investment 
always exceeds the CE for a risk averse individual; the CE always exceeds the EMV for a risk-
loving one; and equality of the two suggests risk neutrality (Barry 1984). The risk premium, 
which is the difference between the EMV and CE, is the monetary amount that a risk averse 
decision-maker would be willing to pay to avoid a risky choice (Barry 1984). The slope of the 
utility function determines the premium, which rises as the degree of concavity increases. Since 
the marginal utility of concave functions declines when the level of the pay-off rises, increased 
concavity indicates a higher degree of risk aversion (Bardsley and Harris 1987).  
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, A(w), and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
relative risk aversion, R(w), are the two most common ways of measuring risk aversion (Arrow, 
1965; Pratt, 1964).  
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The coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 𝐴(𝑤), is derived as the negative of the ratio of the 
second derivative of the utility function of total wealth, w, to its first derivative: 
𝐴(𝑤) ≡ −
𝑈′′(𝑤)
𝑈′(𝑤)
, (3.14) 
where the concavity of U(w) is equivalent to risk aversion,  𝑈′′(𝑤) denotes the degree of 
concavity that measures the degree of aversion and 𝑈′(𝑤) > 0. The greater the curvature of 
U(w) (i.e. 𝑈′′(𝑤)), the greater the absolute value of 𝐴(𝑤) and the higher the level of risk 
aversion. A(w) is often assumed to be a decreasing function of w  since, as wealth rises, 
individuals tend to become less averse to a given gamble (Bar-shira et al. 1997; Moschini and 
Hennessy 2001). 
An alternative type of risk preference is captured by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, which is represented as: 
𝑅(𝑤) ≡ 𝑤𝐴(𝑤) (3.15) 
This measure of relative risk aversion is typically used where the stochastic and non-stochastic 
parts of wealth change proportionally (Bar-shira et al. 1997), and when considering the 
preferences of risk-averse agents towards gambles that are a fraction of their wealth. Unlike 
the absolute risk aversion case, this version is scale-free and does not depend on the units of 
measurement (Bardsley and Harris 1987; Gollier 2001). Although 𝑅(𝑤) is a function like 
𝐴(𝑤) and may increase, decrease or remain unchanged with varying w, it is less likely to 
change as compared to 𝐴(𝑤) and its unit free nature makes it comparable for different 
measures of w (Hardaker et al. 2004; Raskin and Cochran 1986). Arrow (1971) notes that, 
although 𝑅(𝑤) may fluctuate with varying w, the actual value is likely to be around one. On 
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the contrary, Hamal & Anderson (1982) found that 𝑅(𝑤) could reach values as high as four or 
more for extremely resource-poor farmers. Anderson and Dillon (1992) proposed a 
classification of degree of risk aversion using 𝑅(𝑤) of 0.5-4.0, capturing both the Arrow 
(1965) and Hamal and Anderson (1982) assertions. In this study, we capture risk aversion using 
the absolute risk aversion coefficient. The relative risk aversion coefficient range proposed by 
Anderson and Dillon (1992) is used to derive a range for the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
(see section 5.5.1). 
3.3.2 Risk Aversion and the Choice of Utility Functional Form 
Gollier (2001) argues that to make problems of uncertainty tractable under the expected utility 
framework, further assumptions must be made on the form of utility function. As discussed in 
the previous section, risk aversion can be constant, increasing or decreasing with varying 
wealth or income. Since Pratt (1964) argued that the behaviour of people support utility 
functions that exhibit Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA),  DARA has been regarded 
as a “stylized” fact (Bar-shira et al. 1997; Moschini and Hennessy 2001; Hardaker et al. 2004; 
Gollier 2001; Guiso and Paiella 2008; Saha 1993). However, empirical evidence on this issue 
is mixed. Although several studies have found evidence of risk aversion, it is ambiguous as to 
whether risk aversion is decreasing, constant or increasing (Saha 1993; Wolf and Pohlman 
1983).  
Gollier (2001) argues that although the expected utility framework has simple and “intuitively 
appealing” axioms, the utility functions selected for the application of this theory have been 
on “the basis of purely technical convenience” (pp.5&6). Depending on the assumptions made, 
different forms of utility functions such as quadratic, linear, negative exponential, power and 
logarithmic, have been used. Several studies assume either Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
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(CRRA) or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), which are special cases of Hyperbolic 
Absolute Risk Aversion utility functions (Domingo, Parton and Mullen 2015; Galanis, 
Sycheva and Broccardo 2015; Kazianga and Udry 2006; Grimard 1997; Udry 2009; Leblois, 
Quirion and Alhassane 2014).  CRRA (which is necessarily also DARA) implies that 
preferences remain unchanged if payoffs are multiplied by a positive constant, (Hardaker et al. 
2004). CARA on the other hand, implies that preferences do not change if a constant amount 
is subtracted from or added to payoffs (Hardaker et al. 2004). Hardaker et al. (2004) provide 
specifications of functional forms commonly used for CRRA (i.e., logarithmic and power 
utility functions) and CARA (negative exponential), as presented below.  
Logarithmic:  
𝑈 = 𝐼𝑛(𝑤), 𝑤 > 0 (3.16) 
where 𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑤−1 and 𝑅(𝑤) = 1  
Power:  
𝑈 = [1/(1 − 𝑟)]𝑤(1−𝑟), 𝑤 > 0 (3.17) 
where 𝑅(𝑤) = 𝑟 and 𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑟/𝑤  
Negative exponential:  
𝑈 = 1 − exp(−𝑐𝑤) , 𝑐 > 0, (3.18) 
where 𝐴(𝑤) = 𝑐 (constant) and 𝑅(𝑤) = 𝑐𝑤.  
Other utility functional forms such as the polynomial-exponential (Bell 1988) and the expo-
power (Saha 1993) have been suggested to have more flexibility in representing increasing and 
decreasing risk aversion but they remain  relatively unpopular since the simpler forms 
discussed above usually produce comparable results (Hardaker et al. 2004). In this study, we 
assumed CARA and thus used the negative exponential utility function. 
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CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL METHODS 
4.1 Overview 
The objective of this thesis is to understand how diversification and index-based insurance 
work in concert under climate variability. To pursue this objective in a developing country 
context, we develop non-separable agricultural household models using the expected utility 
framework. The agricultural household is assumed to maximize its expected utility of 
consumption by allocating resources (land and labour) among six crop activities. As in Saha 
(1994), risk is introduced in the models by incorporating stochastic crop yields. Several yield 
states of nature are used to represent different possible yield scenarios. Absolute risk aversion 
coefficients representing the risk preference of the household are also incorporated into the 
objective function. Assuming CARA4, the objective function of the household is specified as 
a negative exponential utility function. In the base model, the household manages risk by 
diversifying its activities and allocating resources among the six crop activities without the 
option of insurance. In the second model, however, the household, in addition to 
diversification, has the option to purchase area yield-based insurance. The following sections 
discuss the details of the empirical models developed in this study. 
4.2 Model Development 
This section presents the structure of the two empirical models developed in this study. A base 
model which allows farmers the option to diversify their farm activities with no insurance is 
presented and extended into a second model with an area yield-based insurance option. The 
models capture static behaviour using a stochastic framework (i.e., various states of nature) 
                                                 
4 As in Galanis et al. 2015 and Domingo et al. 2015, we assume that the household’s risk aversion does 
not change with changes in the value of consumption. 
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since households face multiple period decisions influenced by risk. The households analysed 
are assumed to be farmers who grow crops mainly for own consumption with few sales, which 
are usually the surplus after consumption. Income from sales is generally used to purchase 
consumption goods. The objective of the household is therefore to maximize its expected 
utility of consumption of the crops it cultivates. In the following sections, we define the 
activities and parameters used in our models, as well as the mathematical representation of the 
household’s objective function and constraints. 
4.2.1 Activities and Parameters 
This section defines the activities and parameters used in the models developed in this study. 
Table 4.1 presents the activities in the base model. In addition to the activities in the base 
model, the insurance model requires other activities which are defined in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 
presents the parameters used in the base model and Table 4.4 presents additional parameters 
used in the insurance model. Further discussion on the values and procedures used in deriving 
the activities and parameters are in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.1: Base Model Activities 
Activities Descriptions 
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑 
 Land allocated to crop d (acres), where d represents the crops (i.e., cowpea, 
groundnut, maize, millet, rice and sorghum) considered in our models. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑑  Predicted output of crop d (kg) in state of nature i
a 
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑑 Quantity of crop d sold in state of nature i (kg) 
𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑑 Quantity of crop d purchased in state of nature i (kg) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑑 Quantity of crop d consumed in state of nature i (kg) 
𝐻𝐿𝑑 Hired labour (hours) allocated to d 
𝐹𝐿𝑑 Family labour (hours) allocated to d 
Notes: 
a 500 states of nature (i) are simulated to represent different yield scenarios due to climate variability 
(see section 5.5.5). 
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Table 4.2: Additional Activities in the Insurance Model 
Activities Descriptions 
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 Land allocated to crop d with no insurance (acres)a  
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛 Land allocated to crop d under insurance (acres)a 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀 Total premium (GHCb) paid for insurance 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖  
Total indemnity in state of nature i (GHC). Total indemnity refers to the sum 
of insurance pay-outs received by the household for crop d in each state of 
nature i. 
Notes: 
a In the insurance model, the activity for the land allocated to crop d  in the base model (i.e.,  
𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑) is split between insured and uninsured. 
b GHC represents Ghana Cedis, the currency used in Ghana. As at May 9, 2016,  GHC 1 was 
equivalent to $0.34 CAD. 
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Table 4.3: Base Model Parameters 
Parameters Descriptions 
𝐸𝑋𝑃  Exponential function 
𝜓 Risk aversion parameter 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖  Probability of occurrence for state of nature i 
𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑑
𝑐  Consumption value per unit quantity of crop d (GHC/kg) 
𝑃𝑑
𝑠 Selling price per unit quantity of crop d (GHC/kg) 
𝑃𝑑
𝑝
 Purchase price per unit quantity of crop d (GHC/kg) 
𝜙𝑑 
Scaling factor necessary to convert purchase price to consumption value 
for crop d 
𝛾𝑑 
Scaling factor necessary to convert purchase price to selling price for crop 
d 
𝑤𝐻  Wage rate for hired labour (GHC/hour) 
TOTFL Available family labour (hours)  
TOTHL Total hired labour (hours) 
𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 Yield for crop d (kg/acre) in state of nature i 
𝑉𝐶𝑑 Variable cost for producing crop d (excluding labour cost) (GHC/acre) 
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 Household land base (acres)  
𝐿𝑎𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑑 Labour requirement for crop d (hour/acre)  
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Parameters Descriptions 
𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑑 
Quantity of crop d for other uses (kg). This parameter refers to the 
quantity of crop d used for purposes (e.g., gifts) other than consumption, 
sale or purchase. 
𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃 
Other farm expenses (GHC). This parameter refers to hired labour and 
variable expenses incurred on the crop and livestock activities that are not 
explicitly modelled in this study. 
𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃  
Other non/off-farm expenses (GHC). This refer to expenses, such as 
school fees, medical and personal (e.g., clothing), household incur outside 
the farm. 
𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸  
Other farm income (GHC). This parameter represents revenues from 
other crop (e.g., tomato, yam) and livestock activities that are not 
explicitly modelled. 
𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 
Other non/off-farm income (GHC). This parameter captures household 
income from non-farm sources such as remittances. 
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Table 4.4: Additional Parameters in Insurance Model 
Parameters Descriptions 
𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑  Observed area yield for crop d in state of nature i (kg/acre) 
𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑑  Average area yield of crop d (kg/acre) 
𝑌𝐶𝑑 
Critical yield of crop d (kg/acre). This parameter refers to the yield below 
which insurance pay-out is triggered. 
𝑌𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑑 
Difference between 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 and 𝑌𝐶𝑑 in state of nature i 
(kg/acre) 
𝐸𝐿𝑑 
Expected loss of crop d (kg/acre). This parameter is the average of the 
difference between the observed and critical yields for all states of 
natures in which the observed yield is lower than the critical yield. 
𝜃  
Premium subsidization factor. Governments and donor agencies might 
have to subsidize premiums to make insurance programmes attractive. 
We therefore include this parameter to vary the level of subsidies given. 
𝜆  
Insurance coverage level factor. Insurance coverage level is a choice 
variable that determine the percentage of area yield below which pay-
outs are triggered (i.e., the critical yield). This parameter therefore 
allows the household to vary its coverage level. 
𝛽 
Insurance scale factor. Scale is a choice variable, in monetary units per 
acre, which the insured varies to align expected indemnities with 
expected farm-level losses. This parameter therefore allows the insured 
to choose the percentage of the pre-determined price used in estimating 
pay-outs. 
𝜎 
Premium load factor. This parameter allows the insurer to add mark-ups 
(profit) to premiums paid by the insured to serve as profit for taking up 
the risks of the insured. 
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4.2.2  Objective Function 
The objective function of the household in the models (both the base and insurance models) is 
to maximize its expected utility of consumption of the crops it cultivates.  
The household’s objective function is represented as: 
Maximize:  
∑ [𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 (1 − 𝐸𝑋𝑃 {𝜓 ∗ ∑(
𝑑
𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑑
𝑐 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑑)})]
𝑖
 (4.1) 
4.2.3 Constraints 
4.2.3.1 Output Constraint 
This constraint requires the total output of any crop in each state of nature to be equivalent to 
the product of its yield per acre and number of acres under cultivation.  
In the base model, this constraint is specified as: 
In the insurance model, this constraint considers both acreage with and without insurance, and 
requires the total output of any crop in each state of nature to be equivalent to the product of 
its yield per acre and number of acres under cultivation with and without insurance: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑑 ≡ 𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 ∗ (𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 + 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛 )      ∀𝑖, 𝑑 (4.3) 
4.2.3.2 Land Constraint 
Land used in production cannot exceed the household’s land resource base in each state of 
nature. This constraint ensures that the total land area used in the optimal solution does not 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑑 = 𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑      ∀𝑖, 𝑑 (4.2) 
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exceed the total area of farmland available to the household. In the base model, this constraint 
is presented as: 
∑ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑑
≤ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 (4.4) 
In the insurance model, since land used is split between insured and uninsured production, the 
land constraint is specified as: 
∑(𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 + 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛)
𝑑
≤ 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 (4.5) 
4.2.3.3 Labour Constraint 
Households have the option of hiring additional labour to supplement family labour. The 
labour constraint ensures that total labour hours used in production do not exceed the sum of 
available family and hired labour hours. This constraint is represented in the base model with 
three equations as: 
The only difference between this constraint in the base and insurance models is the split of 
available labour between insured and uninsured acreage in the insurance model, thus equation 
(4.6) is specified in the insurance model as: 
𝐿𝑎𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑑 ∗ (𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 + 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛) ≤ 𝐹𝐿𝑑 + 𝐻𝐿𝑑       ∀ 𝑑 (4.9) 
𝐿𝑎𝐻𝑅𝑆𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑 ≤ 𝐹𝐿𝑑 + 𝐻𝐿𝑑      ∀ 𝑑  (4.6) 
∑ 𝐹𝐿𝑑 ≤ 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐿
𝑑
 
And 
 
(4.7) 
 
∑ 𝐻𝐿𝑑 ≤ 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐿
𝑑
 
(4.8) 
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4.2.3.4 Crop Use Constraint 
The crop use constraint balances the availability and uses of the crops that households produce 
and/or purchase in each state of nature. The constraint states that the use of any crop cannot 
exceed its availability and ensures that the quantity of a crop consumed, sold and/or used for 
other purposes is equal to the sum of the quantity produced and/or purchased in each state of 
nature. This constraint is specified in the base model as: 
The crop use constraint in the insurance model is similar to the base model, except that 
production from insured acreage is differentiated from uninsured production and is specified 
as: 
4.2.3.5 Income-Expenditure Constraint 
This constraint expresses the fact that households cannot spend what they do not have; 
household expenditures cannot exceed household income inflows in each state of nature. The 
constraint specifies that the sum of variable production costs, hired labour expenses, crop 
purchases and other farm and non-farm expenses must at least be equal to the sum of revenues 
from crop sales and other farm and non-farm income. In the base model, this constraint is given 
as: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑑 + 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑑 + 𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑑 = (𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑) + 𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑑      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑑 (4.10) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑑 + 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑑 + 𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑑 ≤ {𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑 ∗ (𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 + 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛 )}+𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑑      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑑  (4.11) 
∑{(𝑉𝐶𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑) + (𝑤𝐻 ∗ 𝐻𝐿𝑑) + (𝑃𝑑
𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑑)} +  𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝑑
+ 𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃
≤ ∑(𝑃𝑑
𝑠
𝑑
∗ 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑑) + 𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 + 𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸      ∀ 𝑖 
(4.12) 
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The difference between the income-expenditure constraint in the base and the insurance 
models is that in the latter, variable production costs are separated for insured and uninsured 
acreage, with premiums paid for the insured acreage and pay-out received when triggered. 
In the insurance model, this constraint is specified as: 
4.2.3.6 Additional Insurance Constraints and Parameter Estimations 
The average area yield for crop d (𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑑), critical yield (𝑌𝐶𝑑), yield deviation (𝑌𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑑) 
and expected loss (𝐸𝐿𝑑) are parameters estimated and used in specifying two other constraints 
(i.e., indemnity and premium ) that are used in addition to the ones above for the insurance 
model. 
The average yield of crop d is estimated as the mean of the observed area yields: 
𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑑 = ∑ (𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑  ) 𝑖⁄
𝑖
     ∀ 𝑑 (4.14) 
The critical yield for crop d is given as the average area yield multiplied by the insurance 
coverage level: 
𝑌𝐶𝑑 = 𝐴𝑉𝐺𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑑 ∗ 𝜆      ∀ 𝑑 (4.15) 
The yield deviation of crop d in state of nature i is the difference between the critical yield of 
crop d and the observed area yield in state of nature i multiplied by a trigger factor. The trigger 
∑{(𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑑 ∗ (𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑢 + 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛)) +  (𝑃𝑑
𝑝 ∗ 𝑃𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑑) + (𝑤𝐻 ∗ 𝐻𝐿𝑑)} + 𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝑑
+ 𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃 +   𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀
≤ ∑(𝑃𝑑
𝑠
𝑑
∗ 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑑) + 𝑂𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 + 𝑂𝑇𝑁𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸
+  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖       ∀ 𝑖 
(4.13) 
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factor ensures that yield deviation of the crops would be greater or equal to zero in each state 
of nature. 
𝑌𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑑 = 𝜋 ∗ (𝑌𝐶𝑑 − 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑)      ∀ 𝑖, 𝑑  
where, 
𝜋 = (
1 𝑖𝑓 (𝑌𝐶𝑑 − 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑) > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 (𝑌𝐶𝑑 − 𝑂𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑌𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑑) ≤ 0
) 
(4.16) 
The expected loss for crop d is given as the sum of the yield deviation of crops for all states of 
nature multiplied by the probability of each state of nature occurring: 
𝐸𝐿𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 ∗ ∑ 𝑌𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑑
𝑖
      ∀ 𝑑  (4.17) 
When insured households experience losses, they receive pay-outs (indemnities) from the 
insurer. An indemnity constraint ensures that the value of realized output and pay-out received 
by a household in any given state of nature do not exceed the total value of production under 
insurance. The indemnity in state of nature i must be equal to the sum of yield deviation for all 
crops in state of nature i multiplied by pre-determined insurance price, scale and insured 
acreage: 
 Households who purchase insurance are required to pay premiums. An actuarially fair 
premium is estimated as the sum of expected loss for crops d multiplied by pre-determined 
insurance price, scale and premium load factor. Insurance may not be attractive to households 
if they are to pay actuarially fair premiums. Thus, our premium constraint includes a variable 
factor to allow for different levels of premium subsidization. 
   𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖 = ∑(𝑌𝐿𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑑 ∗ (𝑃𝑑
𝑠 ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛)
𝑑
      ∀ 𝑖 (4.18) 
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𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀 = (1 − 𝜃) ∑((𝑃𝑑
𝑠 ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑑
𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐿𝑑)
𝑑
∗ (1 + 𝜎) (4.19) 
4.2.3.7 Non-negativity Constraint 
The non-negativity constraint requires all variables to be greater than or equal to zero: 
𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 ≥ 0 (4.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
CHAPTER 5 STUDY SITE, DATA, PARAMETER ESTIMATIONS AND MODEL 
CALIBRATION 
5.1 Overview 
As a basis for our empirical models, we employ data from the Integrated Modelling Platform 
for Mixed Animal Crop systems (IMPACT) Lite household survey on Ghana collected by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Program on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS)5. This information was supplemented with 
data from the Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMA), the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MoFA), Ghana, the Ghana Statistical Services (GSS), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) database and the World Bank databank. The following sections discuss in detail the 
IMPACT Lite survey, study site and data used in this study, as well as the procedures used for 
deriving the parameters in the models. 
5.2 IMPACT Lite Survey 
The IMPACT Lite database was developed initially to share data to facilitate evaluations of 
various farming systems (Rufino et al. 2012). The IMPACT Lite survey tool was implemented 
between May 1, 2012 and November 1, 2012 in 15 CCAFS benchmark sites in twelve countries 
across West Africa (one site each in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Senegal), East 
Africa (two sites each in Kenya and Uganda and one each in Tanzania and Ethiopia) and South 
Asia (two sites in India, one in Nepal and one in Bangladesh).The data help capture the 
diversity of farming activities and characterize the main agricultural production systems. The 
                                                 
5 Questionnaire and the dataset from the IMPACT Lite survey used for this study can be found at 
http://data.ilri.org/portal/dataset/implite-ghana 
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datasets collected by IMPACT Lite provide detailed information on household composition, 
agricultural production systems and activities, land and labour allocation, on-farm and off-farm 
activities and income, as well as household consumption and assets (Rufino et al. 2012). For 
the purpose of this thesis, the Ghana site is used as a case study because I had site-specific 
knowledge and personal contacts, which were helpful in gathering other secondary information 
and data.  
5.2.1 Sampling Procedure  
The IMPACT Lite land survey teams, in collaboration with stakeholders (e.g., village chiefs, 
elders, local research and development partners) geographically divided the research site into 
several major production systems that determine the land use, farming activities and market 
characteristics that affect the combinations of farming activities available (Rufino et al. 2012). 
A list of villages was constructed for the research site and an equal number of villages were 
randomly selected for each production system.  Each village and household were assigned to 
one production system. The number of villages per production system was determined as: 
𝐻𝑅𝐷 = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑉 ∗ 𝐻𝑉 
where HRD is the number of households per research site, P is the number of production 
systems per site, V is the number of villages per production system and HV is the number of 
households per village. For each site, a total sample of 200 households (with 10 households 
per village) was targeted. Thus, the number of villages per research site (VS) depended only 
on the number of production systems (P) identified (i.e., VS=200/(10*P)).  
For the purposes of this survey, a household was defined as “a group of people living in the 
same home and sharing meals and income generating activities, and acknowledging the 
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authority of the household head” (Rufino et al. 2012). In order to sample households in selected 
villages, a list of households in each village was compiled. Only land-using households (i.e., 
households cultivating land, involved in aquaculture and/or keeping livestock) were 
considered for the survey. The pre-determined number of households was randomly selected 
from the constructed list. 
5.2.2 Study Site and Data 
A representative household was defined as a basis for the models developed in this study. This 
household was defined using the IMPACT Lite survey data from the CCAFS Ghana site, 
Lawra-Jirapa. Lawra-Jirapa is located in the Guinea Savannah agro-ecological zone in the 
Upper West region of Ghana, as indicated in Figure 5.1. The CCAFS Lawra-Jirapa site covers 
parts of the neighbouring Lawra and Jirapa districts, two of the eleven districts in the Upper 
West region. Lawra-Jirapa has ferrallitic soils and an average annual rainfall of approximately 
950-1100 mm (Förch et al. 2011). The primary cropping system is smallholder mixed crop and 
livestock.  
The most important food crops in Ghana, in terms of total area planted and total output, 
respectively, are maize and cassava. In contrast, groundnuts and sorghum are the most 
important crops in terms of both total area planted and total output in the Jirapa and Lawra 
districts, respectively (MoFA 2011). Agricultural production constraints in the region, 
characterized by high poverty levels, include limited access to capital and climate variability, 
especially seasonal rainfall. CCAFS sampled 200 households from 20 villages (10 households 
per village) at the Lawra-Jirapa site. 
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Figure 5.1: CCAFS Lawra-Jirapa Site Portfolio ( Source: Förch et al. 2011). 
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5.3 Specifying a Representative Household 
This section guides the choice of the model(s) needed to represent the households in our 
sample. Different models could be necessary for different representative households if there 
are differences among variables, such as output, input (labour) usage and output/labour (labour 
productivity).  
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) argues that insurance and diversification may interact differently 
for households of varying agricultural productivities and wealth. He stresses that formal 
insurance may not be valuable to wealthier and high productivity farmers who may already be 
self-insured. Poor farmers with low productivity, although less self-insured, are cash/credit 
constrained and may not be willing to pay insurance premiums that only pay out after harvest. 
Such differences could result in insurance operating differently for these various households. 
We thus investigated the data to ascertain whether or not multiple models are needed to 
represent different categories of households.  
The sample was divided into four quantiles based on the distribution of land area used by each 
household. We used land as the basis for dividing the quantiles because it is argued to be 
correlated with wealth (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas 2003; 
Mulder et al. 2009; VanWey 2005; Glewwe and Jacoby 2004; Ganjanapan 1986). Several 
studies acknowledge the potential differences in productivity due to land size, but the 
relationship (positive or negative) between land size and productivity seems to be contentious. 
Ahmad (2003) argues that small farms under-utilize various factors of production, which leads 
to lower output and income. Adamopoulos & Restuccia (2011) contend that large farms are 
likely to have higher labour productivity than small ones. On the contrary, several studies have 
found an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in developing countries due 
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primarily to missing and imperfect markets (Berry and Cline 1979; Feder 1985; Heltberg 1998; 
Assunção and Ghatak 2003). One could therefore expect higher or lower output for households 
with either large or small land sizes.  
If households in all quantiles have similar output, inputs and output/input, then it can be argued 
that they have similar production technologies and productivity, and can therefore, be 
combined into one model. Otherwise, it could be more appropriate to group household with 
similar output, input (labour) and output/input and run different models based on those 
groupings. In the following sections, we discuss the differences and/or similarities among the 
quantiles in terms of land area, household size, as well as output, input (labour) and 
output/input for various crop activities. 
5.3.1 Land Area and Quantiles 
As discussed earlier, households are divided into four quantiles based on their total 
landholdings. Households with 0 to 5 acres are grouped into the 1st quantile, 5.01 to 8 acres 
into the 2nd quantile, 8.01 to 13 acres for households in the 3rd quantile and households with 
landholdings of more than 13 acres are found in the 4th quantile. Overall, households have an 
average landholding of 12.7 acres. Households in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quantiles have average 
land sizes of approximately 3.83, 6.07, 10.79 and 19.89 acres, respectively. Out of 200 
household sampled in this survey, 54 were in the 1st quantile, 57 in the 2nd quantile, 44 in 3rd 
quantile and 45 in the 4th quantile6. 
                                                 
6 By definition, each quantile is supposed to have the same number of observations (50 households each 
in our case). Here, the differences in the number of households in each quantile stem from “ties” in 
land area. For example, the 51st - 57th households which should belong to the 2nd quantile are considered 
quantile 1 households because they have land area of 5 acres as does the 50th household, which is the 
border household for quantile 1. 
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5.3.2 Landholdings and Household Size 
The popular aphorism that “the rich get richer and the poor get children” by Fitzgerald (1925) 
suggests that poorer people in society have more offspring and presumably larger households 
when compared to their richer counterparts.  Banerjee and Duflo (2007) argue that the 
extremely poor (that is, households living on less $2 a day) have large family/household sizes. 
Netting (1982) draws the opposite conclusion from comparing wealth level as measured by 
estate values, landholdings, or livestock ownership and mean household sizes. He contends 
that “it is safe to say that where resources gather, so do people”. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) 
found a positive relationship between household size and poverty up to a point, after which the 
relationship becomes negative due to size economies of consumption. There are, thus, mixed 
positions on the relationship between household size and wealth.  
As shown in Figure 5.2, the ‘exact’ household sizes of the different quantiles in our data reflect 
these mixed positions but, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test on the mean household sizes 
of the quantiles indicates that there is no statistically significant difference among the 
households in terms of household size. On the average, households in our sample have seven 
members7. 
                                                 
7  In discussing the relationship between wealth (landholdings in our case) and household size, several 
studies (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995; Lancaster, Ray and Valenzuela 1999; Musgrove 1980) stress the 
importance of household composition (where households with more adults tends to be wealthier than 
those with more children) but in this study we do not consider the composition of the households. 
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Figure 5.2: Mean Household Size.  
Note: Error bars represent standard deviation 
5.3.3 Crop Activities and Resources 
In total, there were combinations of 19 different crop activities reported by the households in 
the survey (Table 5.1). For the purpose of our analysis, the top eight crops (groundnut, maize, 
millet, sorghum, Bambara beans, beans, cowpea and rice) accounting for 89.4% of the total 
available land were selected. Due to the lack of district level price and yield data for Bambara 
beans and beans, cowpea was used to represent the entire beans group (i.e., Bambara beans 
and beans and cowpea), bringing the considered household crop activities to six. Summaries 
of output and the labour requirement in each quantile for the six crops are shown in Table 5.2. 
In Table 5.2, for each crop and variable of interest, quantiles with the same letter indicate that 
they are significantly different from one another at a 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 5.1: Proportion of Land Allocated to Crops 
Crop Area 
(acres) 
Average 
Area 
(acres)a 
Average Area 
(acres) (N)b 
Proportion 
of Land 
Allocated 
Groundnuts 560.00 2.814 3.164 (177) 0.222 
Maize 500.00 2.513 2.674 (187) 0.198 
Millet 395.00 1.985 2.705 (146) 0.156 
Sorghum 239.00 1.201 2.779 (86) 0.095 
Bambara beans 225.00 1.131 2.711 (83) 0.089 
Beans 210.00 1.055 2.838 (74) 0.083 
Cowpea 130.00 0.653 2.826 (46) 0.051 
Rice 120.00 0.603 1.714 (70) 0.047 
Yams 43.00 0.216 1.024 (42) 0.017 
Fallow 40.00 0.201 4.444 (9) 0.016 
Soyabean 30.00 0.151 1.765 (17) 0.012 
Pepper (Chillie) 16.00 0.080 1.000 (16) 0.006 
Okra 6.00 0.030 1.200 (5) 0.002 
Sweet Potatoes 3.00 0.015 1.000 (3) 0.001 
Tomato 3.00 0.015 1.000 (3) 0.001 
Melonseed 2.00 0.010 2.000 (1) 0.001 
Other 2.00 0.010 2.000 (1) 0.001 
Vegetables, assorted orchard 2.00 0.010 2.000 (1) 0.001 
Tobacco 1.00 0.005 1.000 (1) 0.000 
TOTAL 2527.00 12.698 39.844 1.000 
Notes: 
a Average taken over the whole sample. 
b Average taken over the households who grow that particular crop. Numbers in parentheses 
represent the number of households who grow the crop. 
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As shown in Table 5.2, there are no consistent patterns or relationships among the means of 
the variables considered for the crops to sufficiently suggest pattern in the quantile groupings. 
We therefore ran an ANOVA to test whether the difference in the means of the variables across 
quantiles are statistically significant. While ANOVA is able to determine whether there are 
significant differences in the means of the various groups (quantiles), it is unable to determine 
the exact groups that differ. The Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) post-hoc test 
was used to determine the specific groups whose means differed significantly. The detailed 
results of the ANOVA test and the Tukey’s HSD test for the various crops and variables of 
interest (Output/acre, Labour hours/acre and Output/ labour hour) are presented in Appendix 
A (Figure A 1 to Figure A 17 and Table A 1 to Table A 8).  
The ANOVA tests suggest that, for maize and groundnut, at least one quantile is significantly 
different in terms of labour hours/acre and output/labour hour; for millet, at least one quantile 
is significantly different in terms of all the variables of interest; for cowpea, at least one 
quantile is significantly different in terms of output/acre. For rice and sorghum, the quantiles 
are not significantly different from each other in all the variables considered. But the results 
for the Tukey’s HSD test do not disclose consistent patterns in statistical differences among 
the quantiles.  Given the lack of systematic difference between the quantiles, we conclude that 
a single model is sufficient to represent the whole sample. 
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Table 5.2: Quantile Mean Output/Acre, Labour/Acre and Output/Labour Summaries for Crop 
Activities8 
Quantiles 
Mean Output 
Kg/Acre 
Mean Labour 
Hours/Acre 
Mean Output 
Kg/Labour Hour 
Maize 
Whole Sample 207.27 525.96 2.29 
1st Quantile 242.39 233.93a 2.85 
2nd Quantile 189.50 747.07a 2.12 
3rd Quantile  172.62 536.91 1.13a 
4th Quantile 189.50 531.43 3.18a 
Groundnut 
Whole Sample 272.57 257.45 2.30 
1st Quantile 299.17 132.16a 4.16a,b 
2nd Quantile 233.99 291.37 1.62a 
3rd Quantile 244.17 366.66a 1.34b 
4th Quantile 247.47 230.62 2.57 
Millet 
Whole Sample 120.50 328.55 0.83 
1st Quantile 173.56a,b,c 212.36a 1.75a,b,c 
2nd Quantile 115.59a 319.20 0.85a 
3rd Quantile 99.22b 517.30a,b 0.49b 
4th Quantile 79.16c 259.60b 0.83c 
                                                 
8 To account for outliers, all averages were taken over 10% trimmed data. This was done by sorting the 
data in ascending order and deleting 10% of the observations from both the top (lowest values) and the 
bottom (highest values). 
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Quantiles 
Mean Output 
Kg/Acre 
Mean Labour 
Hours/Acre 
Mean Output 
Kg/Labour Hour 
Cowpea 
Whole Sample 97.83 208.96 1.38 
1st Quantile 55.25a 154.17 1.65 
2nd Quantile 275.00a 641.56 0.96 
3rd Quantile  62.50 432.68 0.40 
4th Quantile 125.83 190.85 1.84 
Sorghum 
Whole Sample 117.85 530.35 0.66 
1st Quantile 109.5 335.61 1.50 
2nd Quantile 121.25 550.99 1.15 
3rd Quantile 122.60 784.67 0.20 
4th Quantile 133.89 463.63 0.88 
Rice 
Whole Sample 176.91 387.26 0.92 
1st Quantile 145.83 166.32 0.62 
2nd Quantile 137.82 294.14 1.13 
3rd Quantile 193.33 562.59 0.87 
4th Quantile 237.78 489.69 0.94 
Note: For each crop and variable of interest, quantiles with the same letter indicate that they are 
significantly different at a 95% confidence interval. 
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5.4 The Representative Household 
Table 5.3 shows the values of the parameters of our representative household as required in 
section 4.2; on the average, our representative household is endowed with 12.7 acres of land. 
The representative household has seven members and a total of 3,746.43 hours of agricultural 
labour, of which 44.2% is provided by the household and 55.8% is hired. This available labour 
is estimated by summing the labour used for all crop activities. The household pays a wage of 
GHC0.70/hour for hired labour. The household spends a total of GHC 527.89 on other 
expenses, of which 58.3% is on other farm activities (i.e., farm activities that are not explicitly 
modelled in this study) and 41.7% is on non-farm activities, such as school fees, medical and 
personal (e.g. clothing) expenses. The household receives a total of GHC 499.38 income from 
other sources, of which 86.5% is from other farm activities that are not explicitly modelled and 
13.5% from non-farm sources, such as remittances.  
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Table 5.3: Summary of Representative Household Derived from IMPACT Lite Dataseta 
Variables Value 
Household Size 7 
Land (Acres) 12.70 
Family Agricultural Labour (Hours) 1656.05 
Hired Labour (Hours) 2090.38 
Wage for Hired Labour (GHC/Hour) 0.70 
Other Farm Expenses (GHC) 307.70 
Other Non-Farm Expenses (GHC) 220.19 
Other Farm Income (GHC) 431.82 
Other Non-Farm Income (GHC) 67.56 
Notes: 
a  The data for the representative household is derived as a 10% trimmed mean values of the IMPACT 
Lite survey data. 
5.5 Derivation of Other Model Parameters and Simulation Procedure 
In addition to the parameters derived from the IMPACT Lite (i.e., Table 5.3), this section 
discusses the values and methods for deriving other parameters used in the empirical models, 
including the estimation of the coefficient of risk aversion and prices, as well as simulating 
yield series to represent states of nature. 
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5.5.1  Coefficient of Risk Aversion Estimation 
In this study, the risk preferences of households are incorporated in the objective function 
through 𝜓 in equation (4.1). As discussed in section 3.3.2, we assumed that our representative 
household has a constant absolute risk aversion. We therefore needed an estimate of the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (CoARA) of our representative household. A review of 
empirical studies points to a wide range of variation in estimates of the CoARA for smallholder 
agriculture in developing countries (Table 5.4).  
As Raskin and Cochran (1986) noted, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is 
difficult to compare or transfer from one study to another. We therefore approximated a 
plausible range for the CoARA of our representative household using a range of coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (CoRRA), which, as discussed in section 3.3.1, is comparable due to its 
unit-less nature. 
Ideally, the CoARA derived from other studies would be converted to a coefficient of CoRRA 
using a measure of wealth. However, with the exception of Bar-shira et al. (1997),  who report 
the two measures of risk aversion, the measure of wealth is not clear in most studies, preventing 
conversion between the two risk aversion measures. We therefore reviewed additional studies 
that report the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The coefficient of relative risk aversion 
from Bar-shira et al. (1997) and the additional studies, as shown in Table 5.4, fall between the 
0.5-4 range proposed by Anderson and Dillon (1992). For example, Harrison, Humphrey and 
Verschoor (2008) estimated relative risk aversion ranges of  0.874 to 0.951 for Ethiopia and 
1.01 to 1.104 for Uganda. Elamin and Rogers (1992) and Wiens (1976) found the risk aversion 
coefficient to be different for large and small African and Asian farms, reflecting the general 
consensus that wealthier farmers are less risk averse than poorer farmers. 
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Table 5.4: Summary of Empirical Estimates of Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion in 
Developing Countries. 
Source Country Method Absolute Risk 
Aversion Estimate 
Relative Risk Aversion 
Estimate 
Dillon and 
Scandizzo 
(1978) 
Brazil DEU9 0.04 to -3.46. N/A 
 
 
Harrison, 
Rutström, and 
Veiga (2005) 
Timor-
Leste 
DEU  0.608 to 0.613 
 
 
Harrison, 
Humphrey and 
Verschoor 
(2008) 
India, 
Ethiopia 
and Uganda 
DEU N/A India: 0.841 to 0.896 
Ethiopia: 0.874 to 0.951 
Uganda:1.01 to 1.104 
Domingo, 
Parton and 
Mullen (2015) 
Philippines DEU 0.000317 to –
0.00000816 
N/A 
 
 
Wiens (1976) Asia OEB10 Large farms (0.0085) 
and small farms 
(0.091).  
N/A 
 
 
                                                 
9 DEU - Direct Elicitation of Utility functions. Decision makers’ risk preferences are inferred from the 
choices they make in “reaction to a large number of randomly arranged hypothetical bets and insurance 
schemes”. (Moscardi & de Janvry, 1977, pp.710). 
10 OEB - Observed Economic Behaviour. Risk preferences of decision makers are inferred from the 
relationship between observed (actual) behaviour and the behaviour predicted from an underlying 
behavioural model (Hedden-Dunkhorst 1997; Antle 1987). 
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Source Country Method Absolute Risk 
Aversion Estimate 
Relative Risk Aversion 
Estimate 
Moscardi and 
de Janvry 
(1977) 
South 
America 
OEB The distribution of risk 
aversion was centred on 
the risk aversion 
parameter, K, where K-
1.12. K was the 
marginal rate of 
substitution between 
net income and risk. 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antle (1987) Asia OEB Mean of 3.272.  N/A 
 
Elamin and 
Rogers (1992) 
Africa OEB N/A The coefficient of relative 
risk aversion for small, 
median and large farms 
was found to be 1.93, 1.50 
and 2.54, respectively 
Hedden-
Dunkhorst 
(1993) 
Africa 
 
OEB 0.58 to -0.06. N/A 
 
 
Bar-Shira et al 
(1997) 
Middle East OEB The median and mean 
coefficients of absolute 
risk aversion were 
0.0000044 and 
0.0000045, 
respectively. 
The median and mean 
coefficients of relative 
risk aversion were 0.615 
and 0.611, respectively. 
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In estimating our CoARA, we  used the bounds of CoRRA as proposed by Anderson and Dillon 
(1992) to the estimate bounds for CoARA and the Observed Economic Behaviour (OEB) 
method to elicit the CoARA of our representative household (see section 5.6.2 for further 
discussion on the elicitation process).  
Wealth is used as the argument for risk aversion in Arrow and Pratt's original measure, but, 
due to difficulties in defining and estimating wealth, several studies have used other measures, 
such as income (Zindi 2006; Schechter 2005; Gandelman and Hernández-Murillo 2014; 
Elamin and Rogers 1992). Moreover, the expected utility axioms do not delineate between 
using wealth, income or consumption as the argument for the utility function. In this study, we 
used the market value of household consumption because we assume that the objective of the 
household is to maximize its expected utility of consumption. Therefore, the value of 
consumption should be able to define the household’s risk preference well. The steps below 
are taken to convert CoRRA to CoARA. 
First, the total value of average household consumption (C) is estimated as the product of the 
mean quantities of crops consumed and their respective prices. Since this estimate is an average 
of the whole sample, an upper bound and lower bound were derived as 150% and 50% of C, 
respectively, to define a reasonable range of C values to be used for the CoRRA to CoARA 
conversion as in Zindi (2006). 
CoARA is estimated using the formula 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑟 𝐶⁄ , where 𝑟𝑎 is CoARA and 𝑟𝑟 is CoRRA. 
Values of 0.5 and 4 were used for 𝑟𝑟 as proposed by Hamal and Anderson (1982) and used by 
Hardaker et al. (2004). The lowest and highest values of 𝑟𝑎 (i.e., 0.004 and 0.020) calculated 
from this procedure for the representative household are used to represent the lower and upper 
bounds of CoARA in the models to limit the range of risk aversion considered.  
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5.5.2  Yield Series 
To capture climate variability in our models, as discussed in section 4.2, we need area (i.e., 
district11) and farm-level yield series to represent various yield states of nature. We collected 
district (Lawra and Jirapa) historical data (2000-2013) from the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture. The average yields of the two districts in each year were used as our historical 
area yields. There were no farm-level historical yields. Thus, as in Zindi (2006), we used the 
observed yields (representative household yields) from the available cross-sectional data 
(CCAFS IMPACT Lite dataset) and the area yields (2000-2013) to derive household’s farm-
level yield series. Observed yields were used for the base year (2012), with the remaining 
values derived by extending the observed yields (2000-2011, 2013).  
Swinton and King (1991) argue that crop yield time-series data must be de-trended to eliminate 
“technology bias”, and for practical purposes, the method used must be simple, efficient and 
unbiased. They further argue that the method should only require yields and time and be able 
to accommodate short series. OLS thus remains a popular method for de-trending yields series 
and is employed in this study.  
With the OLS method, de-trending is generally accomplished by regressing yields on time and 
the estimated coefficient tested for significance (Haan 2002; Swinton and King 1991). In this 
study, historical district yields are regressed on year (results shown in Table B 1, Appendix B) 
and crop yield series with significant time trends (i.e., cowpea and rice) are de-trended using: 
𝑌𝑡
∗ = ?̂?2012 ∗
𝑌𝑡
?̂?𝑡
, 
                                                 
11 Districts are decentralized administrative subdivisions of the government of Ghana. It can be 
considered as synonymous to counties in Canada in terms of structure and governance. 
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where 𝑌𝑡
∗ is the de-trended yield for year t, ?̂?2012 is the predicted yield for the base year, 𝑌𝑡 is 
the actual yield for year t and ?̂?𝑡 is the predicted yield for year t. 
We used the relative variation in the de-trended historical district yields to convert district yield 
series to farm-level yield series (Table B 2, Appendix B). For example, to calculate the farm-
level yield for 2002, we first estimate the relative variation in 2002 area yields by dividing the 
2002 district yields by the base year (i.e., 2012) district yields. This relative variation 
estimation is done individually for each year.  The household’s farm-level yield for each year 
is consequently estimated by multiplying the relative variation in that particular year by the 
household’s 2012 observed farm-level yield obtained from the cross-sectional data (Table B 
2). 
5.5.3 Selecting the Index for the Insurance Programme: Weather-Based Index or Area 
Yields? 
This section discusses the considerations made in selecting an index for our insurance 
programme. Index insurance contracts are complex to design and require an index that is 
“sufficiently” correlated with crop loss (Dick and Stoppa 2011; Sina 2012; Stoppa and Hess 
2003; Skees, Barnett and Murphy 2007; Zeuli and Skees 2005; Collier et al. 2009).  In the case 
of weather-based insurance, Dick and Stoppa (2011) contend that the weather variables used 
must be closely correlated with crop yields. Sina (2012) notes that the lower the correlation, 
the higher the basis risk.  
Although there is a consensus that weather variables must be well correlated with crop yields 
for weather-based insurance to work, what constitutes sufficient correlation is not well defined 
in the literature. For example, in their Morocco weather insurance study, Stoppa and Hess 
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(2003) found a 67% correlation between cumulative rainfall and yields, but contend that it does 
not sufficiently explain yield variability. McNally et al. (2015), in their Water Stress Index 
(WRSI) study using remotely sensed soil moisture, suggest that a correlation greater than 0.5 
is sufficient.  
Since numerous factors influence crop yields, several studies have used combinations of crop 
modelling approaches, satellite imagery, statistical tools and rainfall simulators to circumvent 
data challenges that might be present in weather stations, especially in developing countries, 
in order to develop a weather index that is highly correlated with crop yields (Sina 2012). For 
this study, historical data of cumulative rainfall (1990-2013) from two weather stations in the 
study districts collected from the Ghana Meteorological Agency was converted to a cumulative 
rainfall index (Table B 2, Appendix B). The cumulative rainfall index for each year (It)  is 
given by dividing the cumulative rainfall for year t, 𝑅𝑡
𝑐 , by the average annual cumulative 
rainfall for all years T (Zeuli and Skees 2005).  
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑐 (∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑐 𝑇⁄
𝑡
)⁄  
Sina (2012) iterates that weather insurance contracts are limiting and offer “minimal risk 
protection”’ in places where there are microclimates (i.e., weather conditions vary within short 
distances) like the Sahel region of Africa, including our study site. Dick and Stoppa (2011) 
also argue that weather-based insurance may be limiting in the humid subtropics where there 
are complex causes of crop loss, such as pests and diseases; they contend that in such cases, it 
might be appropriate to use other insurance products such as area-yield index insurance. 
Ideally, we would have used a weather index for our insurance since it captures weather 
variability directly and is commonly suggested in the index-based insurance literature (for 
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mostly pilot cases). However, the maximum correlation between yields and our weather 
variable (cumulative rainfall) is less than 17% for all considered crops (Table B 7, Appendix 
B) which, according to both Stoppa and Hess (2003) and McNally et al.(2015), is not sufficient 
for a weather-based insurance. We thus used area-based yields as the index for our insurance 
contract, as suggested by Dick and Stoppa (2011).12  
5.5.4 Empirical Literature on Correlations between Farm and Area Yields 
The procedure we used in converting historical area yields to farm-level yields produces a 
perfect correlation between the two. This is not realistic as it completely eliminates basis risk 
(see sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.5). We therefore reviewed empirical studies to suggest an 
appropriate correlation to use in simulating yield states of nature. 
Empirical research on the correlation between farm-level and area yields under index-based 
insurance is limited. Wang et al. (1998)  used optimization and stochastic techniques to assess 
the performance of individual farm and area yield crop insurance programmes for a 
representative southwest Iowa corn farmer. Their simulation model used the average sample 
correlation of 0.85 between individual farm and county (area) yield predictions from 1983 to 
1992.  Similarly, Deng, Barnett and Vedenov (2007) analysed the relative performance of 
farm-level multiple peril crop insurance and area yield insurance contracts for cotton and 
soybeans production in Georgia and South Carolina between 1971-2000 and 1972-2000, 
respectively. Their findings indicate average correlations of 0.63 and 0.32 between farm-level 
and area yields for cotton and soybean, respectively.  Using farm level data  on corn and sugar 
                                                 
12 Note that the type of index used for this analysis will not influence the gist of our empirical 
investigations. Whether weather or area yield based, the general objective of the index is to get an 
indirect measure of actual losses. 
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beet farms in the US,  Barnett, Black, Hu and Skees (2005) compared the performance of  
multiple peril crop insurance and area yield insurance contracts. They found a wide range of 
average correlation between farm and area corn yields by state, from 0.36 in Michigan to 0.82 
in Illinois. Also, their results suggest that area yield insurance performed better relative to 
multiple peril crop insurance in states where there were high correlations between farm-level 
and area yields. From the above review, we assume that a correlation of 0.8 between farm-
level and area yield series is reasonable and thus used this correlation in our yield simulations. 
5.5.5 Simulating Yield Series to Represent States of Nature 
As discussed in sections 4.2 and 5.5.2, yield states of nature are required to represent possible 
yield scenarios due to climate variability, as in equations (4.3), (4.10) and (4.11). In this section 
we discuss the procedure used in simulating yield series to represent these states of nature. 
The “fit distribution” function in the @RISK add-in for Microsoft Excel is used to fit the best 
distribution for the 14 years (2000-2013) area and farm yield series (Table B 2, Appendix B). 
@RISK uses five statistical criteria (Akaike Information Criteria, Bayesian Information 
Criteria, Chi-Square statistic, Anderson–Darling statistic and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic) 
to determine the distribution that best fits the historical data. The first ranked distribution for 
each crop (i.e., the distribution with the least sum of rank scores) from these statistics is used 
for the yield simulations.  
Table B 3 and Table B 5 in Appendix B respectively, present the ranking of the three best 
distributions of each crop’s area and farm-level yields. Table B 4 and Table B 6 in Appendix 
B respectively, present summaries of the best distribution of each crop used in our area and 
farm-level yield simulations. 
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Because our farm-level yields are derived from historical area yields (see section 5.5.2), there 
is a perfect correlation between the two, for each crop. We therefore used the distribution of 
the historical area yields and the estimated farm-yield series to simulate series that have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.8 between area and farm yields for each crop.  
In order to do these simulations in @RISK, we need a complete correlation matrix. To 
complete the correlation matrix, we need inter-crop correlations (i.e., the correlations between 
the different crops). Since the procedure we used in deriving the farm-level yield series from 
the area yield series only considered the correlation between area and farm yields for each 
crop, the correlations between the different crops from this procedure were implausible, given 
the agronomic relationship between the crops  (Table B 7, Appendix B). For example, there is 
a negative correlation between sorghum and maize, but these two crops are agronomically 
similar and should, at the very least, have a weak positive relationship. 
To decide on the appropriate area and farm yields between-crop correlations, we had the option 
of using the inter-crop correlations of historical national yield from the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s database (Table B 8, Appendix B) or area yield series from the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, Ghana. These sets of correlations (Table B 9, Appendix B) were 
presented to two experts13 who selected the inter-crop correlations of the national yield series 
as being more consistent with agronomic expectations compared to that of the area yield series. 
For cowpea, because there was no historical national yields data, we used the national beans 
yields inter-crop correlations since we consider cowpea as a proxy for the beans group (i.e., 
                                                 
13 Dr. Christiana Amoatey, Head,  Department of Crop Science, University of Ghana and Dr. John K. 
M. Kuwornu, Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, University of 
Ghana. 
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Bambara beans, beans and cowpea) in our models. Table B 10 in Appendix B presents the 
complete correlation matrix specified in @RISK. 
@RISK assesses the validity of any specified correction matrix using the basic principle that 
if two inputs are each strongly correlated to a third, they must be at least weakly correlated to 
each other. @RISK thus adjusted the matrix we specified to generate a self-consistent 
correlation matrix14 (Table B 11, Appendix B). Several yield simulations are then run to find 
the number of iterations that gives the closet correlation matrix to the @RISK adjusted one. 
We found the correlation matrices of simulations at 500 iterations (Table B 12, Appendix B) 
to be close to the @RISK adjusted one. We thus used the 500 simulated area and farm yields 
to represent 500 yield states of nature in our GAMS models. These states of nature are assumed 
to represent 500 possible yield events with equal probabilities of occurrence (i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 =
0.002) and capture the climate and yield risks in the models. 
5.5.6 Prices 
In the models developed, we required three sets of prices for the crops, purchase prices, selling 
prices and consumption values, as in equations (4.1), (4.12) and (4.13). For purchase prices, 
historical district retail price data (2009-2013) from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture was 
used (Table B 13, Appendix B). The nominal historic retail prices were deflated using the CPI 
to give real price series using the formula: 
𝑃𝑘
𝑟 =
𝑃𝑘
𝑛
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑘
 
                                                 
14 The @RISK procedure for adjusting matrices is discussed in Appendix B1.3. 
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where 𝑃𝑘
𝑟  is the real price in year k; 𝑃𝑘
𝑛 is the nominal price in year k and 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑘 is the consumer 
price index (agriculture) in year k. We assumed that price is exogenous and deterministic and 
thus used the average real retail prices (2009-2013) for the crops as their purchase prices in our 
models (Table 5.5). 
For selling prices, we needed farm-gate prices, but they were not available. There was also no 
available literature to suggest the relationship between them and retail (purchase) prices in our 
study area. However, Kalinda & Campenhout (2011) found farm gate prices for food crops in 
Tanzania to be 10%-20% less than retail (purchase) prices due to marketing costs. Given that 
similar economic conditions prevail in the site considered in this study, we assumed selling 
prices in our model to be 20% less than the purchase (retail) prices (Table 5.6).  
With consumption values, there was no literature to suggest their relationship with purchase 
prices, even in other countries, and we therefore could not approximate them using other 
sources. As a result, a grid search was programmed in GAMS to calibrate the model by 
searching for consumption values and CoARA that closely predict the observed baseline land 
allocation behaviour of the representative household (procedure further discussed in section 
5.6.2). 
5.6 Model Calibration and Validation 
Calibration is defined as the process of adjusting uncertain parameters in a model to improve 
its agreement with data (Thacker et al. 2004). Validation is defined as a subjective process of 
assessing the appropriateness and soundness of a model for its intended purpose (Thacker et 
al. 2004; Finlay and Wilson 1991). In the literature, quantitative validation mostly concentrates 
on testing the goodness of fit between the behaviour of a model and the observed real world 
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data. Since this study assumed that the household’s land allocation behaviour is optimal, a well 
calibrated model should be able to closely replicate that behaviour. The next sections discuss 
the measure of model performance and the procedure for the calibration and validation of the 
base model developed in this study. There is no empirical data on households’ land allocation 
behaviour in the presence of insurance. Thus, the insurance model cannot be explicitly 
validated. Since the insurance model is an extension of the base model, it can be argued that a 
well calibrated base model produces a well calibrated insurance model. 
5.6.1 Measure of Model Performance 
The base model in this study focuses on how resources are allocated to competing crop 
activities in the absence of insurance. Thus, how well the model predicts the allocation of land 
to the crops is the primary criterion for the assessment of model fit. Several measures of 
goodness of fit, such as percentage deviation, mean absolute deviation, sum of squared 
deviation and root squared deviation, can be used to measure the performance and validity of  
models (Buisson et al. 2014). As in Zindi (2006), we used the sum of squared deviation 
between predicted and observed land allocations calculated as ∑ [𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑑) − 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑜(𝑑)]
2
𝑑 ,   
where, 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑑) is predicted acres allocated to crop d and 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑜(𝑑) is observed acres 
allocated to crop d, as the measure of goodness of fit to validate our model. 
5.6.2 Procedure for Model Calibration and Validation 
In calibrating our model, we concentrated on two sets of values for which we had little 
information for our site: consumption values and risk preferences. With consumption values, 
we assumed that the consumption values for the crops are at most equal to their purchase prices. 
And for risk preferences, the range of CoARA established in section 5.5.1 (i.e., 0.004 to 0.020) 
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was used as the lower and upper bounds in searching for the risk preference for our 
representative household.  
A grid search using seven loops, one for the CoARA and one each for the consumption values 
of the six crops, was programmed in GAMS to find the combination of risk aversion coefficient 
and consumption values that minimized the sum of squared deviations between the predicted 
and observed land allocated to the crops using several iterations. During each iteration, the risk 
aversion coefficient increased by 0.004 until it reached the upper bound of 0.020 and the 
relative values of consumption to purchase prices for the crops changed by a factor of 0.25 
from 0 to 1. The grid search indicates that the best combination that minimizes the sum of 
squared deviation between observed and predicted land allocation is an absolute risk aversion 
coefficient of 0.016 and consumption values half the respective purchase prices of the crops 
(Table 5.5).  
Table 5.6 shows the observed household land allocation behaviour from the survey data and 
the predicted allocation based on this combination. The observed and predicted allocations of 
maize and millet are equal and that of the other crops are quite close. In total, the observed and 
predicted land allocation to crops have a sum of squared deviation of 0.734, with cowpea 
having the largest (0.385). The absolute risk aversion coefficient and consumption values 
established from the grid search procedure are used in subsequent analyses in the base and 
insurance models. Also sensitivity analyses are done to assess the effect of changing risk 
aversion, as in equation (4.1) and insurance parameters such as premium subsidies and 
coverage level, as in equations (4.18) and (4.19) on household land allocation behaviour and 
welfare. 
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Table 5.5: Purchase, Selling Prices and Consumption Values Used in Models 
Crop 
Purchase Price 
(GHC)a 
Selling Price 
(GHC)b 
Consumption Value 
(GHC)c 
Groundnut 1.67 1.34 0.84 
Rice 1.26  1.01 0.63 
Cowpea 1.11 0.89 0.56 
Sorghum 0.76 0.61 0.38 
Millet 0.75 0.60 0.38 
Maize 0.53 0.42 0.27 
Notes: 
a Purchase prices of the crops are derived as their mean district real retail prices from 2009 to 2014. 
b Selling prices of the crops are estimated as 80% of their purchase prices as discussed in section 5.5.6. 
c As established by our calibration process (section 5.6.2), consumption values of the crops are 
estimated as 50% of their respective purchase prices. 
Table 5.6: Observed vs. Best Predicted Household Land Allocation Behaviour 
Crops Observed Acres Predicted Acres Squared Deviation 
Millet 1.985 1.988 0.000 
Maize 2.513 2.534 0.000 
Groundnut 2.814 2.636 0.032 
Sorghum 1.201 1.498 0.088 
Rice 0.603 1.081 0.229 
Cowpea 2.839 2.218 0.385 
SUM 11.955 11.955 0.734 
 75 
 
CHAPTER 6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the results and discussions from the base and insurance models developed 
in this study. The base model was structured to give the representative household the option of 
diversifying its activities among six crop activities with no insurance. As discussed in section 
5.6, the base model was established by calibrating the model to the baseline land allocation 
behaviour of the household. Using the calibrated model, the results for the base model 
discussed in this chapter concentrate on the sensitivity of the representative household’s crop 
diversification behaviour to changes in its risk preference.  
The insurance model is an extension of the base model, where in addition to the option of crop 
diversification, the representative household can buy area yield insurance to ameliorate its 
yield risk. The insurance model is structured to allow the representative household to put some 
or all of its available landholdings under insurance based on the attributes of the insurance 
programme such as the scale, coverage level, and premium subsidy. As discussed in 2.4.1, 
scale is a choice variable, in monetary units per acre, that the insured varies per acre to align 
expected indemnities with expected farm-level losses. In the insurance model, the results focus 
on how changes in these attributes influence the household’s decision to insure or not to insure. 
In addition, we consider the relationship between diversification and insurance and how 
changing risk preferences and insurance attributes influence this relationship.  
6.2 Risk Aversion and Diversification 
Using the Transformed Herfindahl Index (THI) discussed in section 2.1 as a measure of 
diversification, we assess how diversification varies with changes in the Coefficient of 
 76 
 
Absolute Risk Aversion (CoARA) (see sections 5.5.1 and 5.6.2) in the base and insurance 
models. We used CoARA values of 0.008, 0.012, 0.016 and 0.020 to represent low, moderate, 
high and very high risk aversions, respectively. We expect that since diversification is a risk 
management strategy, highly risk averse households would diversify more than others to 
spread their risk. Figure 6.1 shows changes in the household’s land allocation behaviour as risk 
aversion increases in the base model. In the base model, the representative household tends to 
allocate its land more evenly among the crops as risk aversion increases. For example, at the 
low risk aversion level, the household allocates 5.89 acres to maize and 0.36 to cowpea but, at 
the very high risk aversion level, the household allocates 1.71 and 2.22 acres to maize and 
cowpea, respectively. The high risk aversion level fits the current (“observed”) land allocation 
behaviour of the household based on the calibration model. 
 
Figure 6.1: Risk Aversion and Land Allocation (Acres) Behaviour in the Base Model. 
Low Moderate High Very High
Maize 5.89 3.67 2.534 1.713
Groundnut 2.852 2.686 2.636 2.109
Rice 1.845 1.367 1.081 0.986
Millet 0.568 2.34 1.988 2.117
Sorghum 0.438 0.438 1.498 2.616
Cowpea 0.362 1.454 2.218 2.414
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As baseline insurance attributes to compare the diversification behaviour of the household with 
increasing risk aversion in the base and insurance models, we assume 70% coverage (which 
implies that the household’s observed yield must be less than 70% of the average area yield to 
trigger pay-out), 100% scale (which implies that pay-out is valued at 100% of pre-determined 
retail prices) and actuarially fair premiums (i.e., premiums are equal to expected indemnities) 
with a 10% load factor (which is the mark-up (profit) to the insurer for taking up the risks of 
the insured). Using these baseline insurance attributes, the household puts all available land 
under insurance; thus, land allocations discussed here represent insured acres.  
Figure 6.2 shows that although the extent of even land allocation among the crops as risk 
aversion increases in the insurance model is lower compared to the base model, as risk aversion 
rises, more land is allocated to crops which have low allocation at lower risk aversion levels 
and vice versa. For example, at the low risk aversion level, the representative household 
allocates no land to rice, compared to 0.22 acres at the very high risk aversion level.  
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Figure 6.2: Risk Aversion and Land Allocation (Acres) Behaviour in the Insurance Model. 
It is important to note that although the base and insurance models show that diversification 
rises with risk aversion, the degree of diversification in the base model is higher than in the 
insurance model at all risk aversion levels, as shown in Figure 6.3. The THI increases with risk 
aversion in the base and insurance models, although the THI values in the base model are 
higher than those in the insurance model. In the base model, THI increases by approximately 
22% from 0.672 at low risk aversion to 0.822 at the very high risk aversion level. But in the 
insurance model, THI increases from 0.531 at low risk aversion by 6% to 0.561 at in the very 
high risk aversion level.  Also, at the low risk aversion level, the degree of diversification is 
approximately 23% more in the base model than in the insurance model. And at the very high 
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risk aversion level, the extent of diversification in the base model is approximately 38% more 
than in the insurance model. This finding can be argued to be a result of the perceived risk-
reducing effect of insurance. With the assurance that it can rely on insurance should anything 
go wrong, the representative household diversifies less than it might have without insurance. 
Our results are consistent with findings from several other studies, which suggest that to reduce 
price and production risks,  highly risk averse farmers tend to diversify more than those who 
are less risk averse (Bhende and Venkataram 1994; Mishra and El-Osta 2002; Mishra, El-osta 
and Sandretto 2004; Lu, Xi and Ye 2006).   
 
Figure 6.3: Risk Aversion and Diversification. 
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6.3 Risk Aversion and Expected Value of Consumption  
The expected value of consumption is the value the household places on the quantity of crops 
it expects to consume across states of nature. It is estimated as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 ∗ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑑
𝑖,𝑑
∗ 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑑 , 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖 is the probability of each state of nature i, 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑑 is the amount of crop d 
consumed in state of nature i and 𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑑 is the value of consumption of crop d. Since 
maximising the expected value of consumption is the objective of our representative 
household, it can be regarded as a household’s measure of welfare. Thus, increasing expected 
values of consumption imply increasing welfare. In this section, our aim is to analyse how the 
expected value of consumption (welfare) changes with risk aversion and the addition of 
insurance. 
 The results from the base and insurance models show that regardless of the level of risk 
aversion, the expected value of consumption from the insurance model is higher than in the 
base model, as illustrated in Figure 6.4. Insurance increases welfare by approximately 45% 
and 55% at the low and very high risk aversion levels, respectively. Figure 6.4 also indicates 
that in the base and insurance models, the more risk averse a household is, the lower its 
expected value of consumption. For example, at the low risk aversion level, the expected value 
of consumption is GHC 429.41 and GHC 623.29 in the base and insurance models, 
respectively, but progressively decreases as risk aversion rises, reaching GHC 379.23 and GHC 
586.38 at the very high risk aversion level, which represents approximately 12% and 6% 
reductions in the base and insurance models, respectively. In the base model, this relationship 
can be explained by the fact that the higher the risk aversion of the household, the more land 
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it allocates to crops with lower yield variance (i.e., lower yield risk) even if the expected output 
from those crops are lower than those with higher yield variance. Figure 6.5 shows the yield 
variance of the various crops. From Figure 6.5 and the risk aversion and base model land 
allocation behaviour in Figure 6.1, we see that land allocation to sorghum, which has relatively 
lower yield variances, increases with risk aversion (i.e. from 0.44 acres at the low risk aversion 
level to 2.62 acres at the very high risk aversion level) but the opposite is the case for 
groundnut, which has relatively higher yield variances (i.e., from 2.86 acres at the low risk 
aversion to 2.11 at the very high risk aversion level). This finding is similar to that of Mishra 
and Goodwin (1997), who also found that risk averse farmers allocate more resources to 
activities which they perceive have lower variance in outcomes, compared to those with higher 
variance, even if the expected benefits from the latter is more. The above argument does not 
hold for the insurance model, however. In the insurance model, as shown in Figure 6.2, even 
as risk aversion increases, the household allocates a substantive amount of land to groundnut 
(i.e., 6.49 acres at low risk aversion and 6.32 acres at high risk aversion), which is the most 
valuable crop (in terms of selling and purchase prices) and has a high yield variance. This result 
can be attributed to insurance reducing the household’s yield risk and therefore making yield 
variability less of a concern in determining the household’s land allocation behaviour. 
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Figure 6.4: Risk Aversion and Expected Value of Consumption. 
 
Figure 6.5: Yield Variance of the Modelled Crops. 
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6.4 Sensitivity of Insurance Model to Insurance Attributes 
For the purpose of discussion in this section, all other insurance attributes are fixed at the 
assumed baseline levels (see section 6.2), with the exception of coverage levels and subsidies.  
6.4.1 Coverage Level, Insurance and Diversification 
We examine the representative household’s diversification and insurance behaviour at 70% 
and 90% coverage with changing risk aversion levels. The 70% coverage level was used as the 
baseline value. This section presents results for the 90% coverage level and compares the 
household’s diversification and insurance behaviour, as well as welfare measure, with the 70% 
coverage level. Unlike at the 70% coverage level where the household insures all of its 
available land regardless of risk aversion as discussed in section 6.2, at 90% coverage, the 
household insures only part of the total available land and the portion under insurance 
decreases as risk aversion rises, as shown in Figure 6.6. While this result is contrary to Wu and 
Adams' (2001) argument that higher coverage should shift more land into insurance, it can be 
explained by the fact that high coverage levels come with high costs of premium. And, as 
reported by Du et al. (2014), households generally prefer insurance schemes that have 
relatively low out-of-pocket premiums.  
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Figure 6.6: Risk Aversion and Insurance Behaviour at 90% Coverage Level. 
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degree of diversification. This observation can also be attributed to the associated higher 
premium cost of the 90% coverage level, which makes it less beneficial compared to the 70% 
coverage level.  
 
Figure 6.7: Risk Average, Insurance Coverage and Diversification 
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is higher at the 70% coverage level than the 90% coverage level by approximately 1.33%, 
0.78% and 0.86% at the low, moderate and high risk aversion levels, respectively, but about 
3.12% lower at the very high risk aversion level. These results suggest that, holding other 
attributes of the insurance scheme fixed, the representative household is better off at the 70% 
coverage level than at the 90% coverage level, unless the household is very highly risk averse. 
This observation can be explained by the fact that high coverage also implies high premiums 
(costs). Therefore, if the expected benefit from increased coverage is lower than the added cost, 
the household would be better off at the lower coverage level, except for a very risk averse 
household whose extreme risk attitude would make the high cost of a high coverage level 
worthwhile.   
 
Figure 6.8: Risk Aversion, Insurance Coverage and Expected Value of Consumption. 
623.29 618.92 618.34
586.38
615.02 614.13 613.07 604.98
0.00
100.00
200.00
300.00
400.00
500.00
600.00
700.00
Low Moderate High Very High
E
x
p
ec
te
d
 V
al
u
e 
o
f 
C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 (
G
H
C
)
Risk Aversion
70% Coverage 90% Coverage
 87 
 
6.4.2 Subsidy, Insurance and Diversification 
For the purpose of discussion in this section, the representative household is assumed to be 
highly risk averse (i.e., CoARA=0.016) as elicited from the calibration model. We discuss how 
subsidising premiums influences the insurance and diversification behaviour of the household, 
as well as its welfare, at both 70% and 90% coverage levels. As shown in Figure 6.9, at the 
70% coverage level, the household insures all of its available land irrespective of the level of 
subsidy, but, at 90% coverage, it only insures part of its available land, with the insured portion 
increasing with the subsidy. This figure also suggests that as coverage rises, more subsidies 
are required to make insurance attractive than it would be otherwise. For the representative 
household to insure all of its available land at the 90% coverage level, 80% of its premiums 
must be subsidised.  
 
Figure 6.9: Premium Subsidy and Insurance Behaviour at 90% Coverage Level. 
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Figure 6.10 shows that at 70% coverage, the degree of diversification is fairly constant 
regardless of the level of subsidies, indicating that subsidies do not substantively influence the 
household’s diversification behaviour. But at the 90% coverage level, changing levels of 
subsides influence the representative household’s diversification behaviour, but there is no 
consistent pattern to suggest the direction of diversification. For instance, as the level of 
subsidy increases from 0% to 20%, THI decreases from 0.561 to 0.556; this reduction in 
diversification in response to increased subsidies is also reported by O’Donoghue et al. (2009). 
However, as the level of subsidy increases from 40% to 60%, THI increases from 0.558 to 
0.599. O’Donoghue et al. (2009) argue that theory remains inconclusive on the effect of 
subsidies on diversification and thus different levels of subsidies might have different effects 
on diversification, which may underpin the inconsistency observed in the direction of 
diversification as subsidies rise. Goodwin and Smith (2013) also argue that insurance subsidies 
introduce production distortions at several margins, which suggests that production behaviour 
may vary depending on the level of subsidy. 
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Figure 6.10: Premium Subsidy, Insurance Coverage and Diversification. 
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Figure 6.11: Premium Subsidy, Insurance Coverage and Expected Value of Consumption 
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maize and millet) and crops such as groundnut and cowpea that are more valuable (in terms of 
selling prices) and thus mostly sold. But in the presence of insurance, the household cultivates 
fewer crops by growing less “staples” and more “commercial” crops. Assuming that most 
households in a given area behave in this manner in the presence of an insurance market, a 
broader implication from this change in cropping behaviour would be the changes in the 
dynamics of local markets. Households would want to sell their “commercial” crops and 
purchase “staples” for home consumption, but thinning markets for these staples and over 
supply of commercial crops could cause price volatility in the short-run. In the long run, 
however, a new market equilibrium might be established. 
The results presented in this chapter also suggest that at the 70% coverage level, subsidies 
would not be required for insurance uptake. If that is the case, however, why is there a lack of 
insurance markets? It may be the case that assuming a 10% load factor in the model 
underestimated the margins, making the insurance program inexpensive and attractive to 
households but not to insurers. On the supply side, it is possible that insurers would require 
higher margins to make running an insurance programme worth their while. On the demand 
side, our model does not consider the timing of cash-flow and the fact that households might 
not have money to pay for the insurance premiums when needed and might therefore not be 
able to take up insurance even if it is inexpensive and they are willing to pay. 
In regards to welfare, our results suggest that insurance increases household welfare, but on a 
larger scale, the changes in behaviour and market dynamics due to insurance might present a 
different reality in regards to the overall welfare gains. Also, our results show that at high 
coverage levels, substantive premium subsidies are required to make the insurance programme 
attractive to households. Since high coverage levels provide more risk protection and higher 
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welfare benefit in the presence of subsidies, if governments and donor agencies decide to 
subsidize the insurance programme, more households would choose high coverage schemes, 
which would be costly. Therefore, more must be done to assess whether the welfare gains from 
insurance would offset this subsidy cost. At least from our results, the percentage increases in 
welfare from subsidies are less than the percentage reductions in premiums. The above 
discussion suggests that the implementation and attributes of an insurance programme would 
have to be thoroughly considered to tackle these potential issues. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Overview 
The chapter is organised into a summary of the context, specific objectives, methods and 
results as well as conclusions, policy recommendations, limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research. 
7.2 Context of Study 
Climate variability is an eminent source of risk in agriculture, especially in rain-fed agricultural 
systems in developing countries. Although climate variability and its accompanying challenges 
affect the globe as a whole, its negative impact is prominent in developing countries, 
aggravating production, income and price risks, and ultimately, poverty and food insecurity. 
Diversification and insurance are important risk-mitigating strategies for coping with climate 
variability in the developing world. Conventionally, agricultural insurance assesses the risk of 
the insured on an individual basis (Skees, 2008). Indemnity payments are then made to 
compensate for actual individual losses (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011; Ali 2013). But, this 
form of insurance has been troublesome in the developing world due to various market 
imperfections, including underdeveloped or non-existent insurance markets, poor contract 
enforcement, information asymmetry, high transaction costs, and high exposure to spatially 
covariate risks (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2011). Index-based insurance has arisen as a new form 
of agricultural insurance that assesses losses using measures, such as area-wide yields or 
weather, that cannot be influenced by the actions of the insured, but are correlated with yields 
as a proxy for individual losses (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012). In this case, indemnity payments 
are made based on deviations from the index and not on individual losses (Ali 2013). Index-
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based insurance seems to address challenges of traditional insurance, particularly by reducing 
transaction costs and information asymmetry, in developing economies (Leblois et al. 2013).  
Although diversification and insurance are acknowledged as important in ameliorating risk, 
little research has investigated how the two approaches work in concert. Studies on the 
relationship between insurance and diversification have been done mostly on developed 
countries and have focused on traditional crop insurance (Goodwin, Vandeveer, & Deal, 2004; 
O’Donoghue, Key, & Roberts, 2005). To our knowledge, no comparable empirical studies 
have examined the relationship between crop insurance (traditional or index-based) and 
diversification in a developing world context. The main objective of this study was, therefore, 
to understand how crop diversification and index-based (area yield) insurance work together 
as risk management strategies under climate variability using non-linear mathematical 
programming. 
7.3 Specific Objectives and Methods 
Using the Expected Utility Framework and the IMPACT Lite household survey on Ghana 
collected by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Program on 
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, we developed two non-separable agricultural 
household mathematical programming models to: 
1. recover the risk preference of a representative household using observed economic 
behaviour; 
2. assess how a household’s risk preference influences its behaviour with respect to the 
degree to which it diversifies its crop activities (measured by the Transformed Herfindahl 
Index (THI));  
 95 
 
3. investigate the behavioural relationship between crop diversification and area yield 
insurance by analysing the extent to which a household diversifies its crop activities in 
the presence of insurance;  
4. examine how a household’s risk preference influences its behaviour with respect to the 
acres of land it insures; 
5. assess how insurance coverage level and premium subsidization influence household 
participation by examining changes in the acres of land the household insures considering 
coverage levels and premium subsidies;  
6. evaluate the household’s welfare benefit from insurance by assaying changes in the 
expected value of consumption with insurance; and 
7. analyse how sensitive the household’s welfare benefit from insurance is to changes in 
coverage levels and premium subsidies. 
The agricultural household was assumed to maximize its expected utility of consumption by 
allocating resources (land and labour) among six crop activities. As in Saha (1994), risk was 
introduced in the models by incorporating stochastic crop yields. Several yield states of nature 
were simulated to represent different possible yield scenarios due to climate variability. 
Absolute risk aversion coefficients representing the risk preferences of the household were also 
incorporated into the objective function. In the base model, the household managed their risk 
by diversifying their activities and allocating resources among the six crop activities without 
the option of insurance. In the second model, however, the household had the option of both 
diversification and area yield-based insurance. 
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7.4 Summary of Results 
In line with other studies (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009; Wiens 1976; Antle 1987; Antle 1989), 
our results show that the representative household is highly risk averse, with a coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion of 0.016. Although the household’s level of diversification increases 
with risk aversion in both base and insurance models, the extent of diversification is more in 
the base model than in the insurance model. In the base model, THI increases by approximately 
22% from 0.672 at low risk aversion to 0.822 at the very high risk aversion level. But in the 
insurance model, THI increases by approximately 6% from 0.531 at low risk aversion to 0.561 
at the very high risk aversion level. This result also suggests that although insurance does not 
completely substitute for diversification, it reduces the degree of diversification. At the low 
risk aversion level, the degree of diversification is approximately 23% more in the base model 
than in the insurance model. And at the very high risk aversion level, the extent of 
diversification in the base model is approximately 38% more than in the insurance model. 
At 70% insurance coverage, the representative household insures all of its available land, 
regardless of risk aversion and premium subsidies. However, it only insures part of its available 
land at 90% coverage, and the portion under insurance decreases as risk aversion rises. At a 
low risk aversion level, the household insures 8.243 acres of its available land, compared to 
7.165 acres when risk aversion is very high. For the household to insure all of its available land 
at the 90% coverage level, 80% of premiums must be subsidised.  
In regards to risk aversion, coverage level and diversification, the results show that although 
the representative household diversifies more with increasing risk aversion at both the 70% 
and 90% coverage levels, the degree of diversification is higher at the 90% coverage level. At 
the low risk aversion level, the degree of diversification is approximately 2% more at the 90% 
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coverage level than at the 70% coverage level. And at the very high risk aversion level, the 
extent of diversification at the 90% coverage level is approximately 8% more than at the 70% 
coverage level.  
Regardless of risk aversion, level of coverage or subsidy, the availability of insurance increases 
the household’s expected value of consumption and thus increases welfare. But, welfare 
decreases with risk aversion. For example, in the base model, the expected value of 
consumption decreases by approximately 12% from GHC 429.41 at low risk aversion level to 
GHC 379.23 at the very high risk aversion level. In the baseline insurance model (i.e., no 
subsidy and 70% coverage level), the expected value of consumption decreases by 
approximately 6% from GHC 623.294 at the low risk aversion to GHC 586.383 at high risk 
aversion. This result represents approximately 45% and 55% increased welfare due to 
insurance at low and very high risk aversion levels, respectively. In the absence of subsidies, 
the 70% coverage level provides higher welfare benefits compared to the 90% coverage level 
at all risk aversion levels, except at the very high risk aversion level. The expected value of 
consumption at the 70% coverage level is higher than at the 90% coverage level by 
approximately 1.33%, 0.78% and 0.86% at the low, moderate and high risk aversion levels, 
respectively, but about 3.12% lower at the very high risk aversion level. 
 Although subsidising premiums increases the expected value of consumption at both 70% and 
90% coverage levels, the expected value of consumption is higher at the 90% coverage level. 
The expected value of consumption is approximately 1.22%, 3.80%, 5.95% and 11.35% higher 
at 90% coverage level than at the 70% coverage level when premiums are subsidized by 20%, 
40%, 60% and 80%, respectively. 
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7.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
Results indicate that households in the study site are highly risk averse and diversify their 
activities to manage their climate and yield risk. The extent of diversification depends on their 
risk preference, with high levels of diversification associated with high risk aversion. On the 
relationship between diversification and insurance, we have shown that although insurance 
does not completely substitute for diversification, it significantly reduces its degree.  
For policy makers, this study provides empirical evidence which suggests that even in the 
presence of diversification, introducing area yield insurance would help reduce the perceived 
riskiness of rain-fed agriculture and increase agricultural households’ welfare. Given that most 
developing countries heavily depend on agriculture, governments and donor agencies should 
intensify efforts aimed at introducing insurance to help agricultural households manage their 
climate and yield risks. But due to the potential differences in the performance of insurance 
across various regions, implementation must be with caution and tailored to the needs and 
dynamics of the particular area. The results from this study show that although insurance 
schemes with premium subsidies provide relatively higher welfare benefits, at 70% coverage, 
households in our study area would take up insurance even without subsidies. Therefore, for a 
start, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Ghana and other donor agencies can pilot an area 
yield insurance scheme with 70% coverage with no subsidies in the Lawra and Jirapa districts. 
This scheme would come at a very low cost since no subsidies would be required for uptake. 
The models developed can also be easily adapted to suggest appropriate insurance schemes for 
other areas. 
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7.6  Limitations and Suggestions for further Research 
Our study area is identified as a mixed crop-livestock agricultural system. Thus, a major 
limitation of this study was not explicitly modelling the livestock sector due to time and data 
challenges. The models we developed are static; including the livestock sector would require 
dynamic models that explicitly incorporate time. Further research can investigate how 
insurance and diversification may interact, considering livestock production. 
Another challenge faced in this study was the lack of household level time series data on yields 
and prices. As a result, we used district level data to approximate household data. This resulted 
in considerable differences between the values of area and farm yields. Also, while basis risk 
is known as a major challenge associated with index-based insurance, the effect of different 
levels of farm and area yield correlations on the relationship between diversification and 
insurance was not investigated. Further research can consider how different levels of basis risk 
affect diversification and insurance.  
Similarly, using weather-based insurance as our insurance programme would have better 
captured climate variability, but, given data challenges, we used area yield insurance. Further 
studies could compare the effectiveness of weather-based and area yield insurance programmes 
and how they both influence household diversification and welfare. We also contemplated 
whether insurance might work differently for households with different wealth. But our data 
was not sufficiently different between wealth groups to support differentiated analysis. Further 
studies could consider the relationship between diversification and insurance among 
households of different wealth.  
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Another simplification in our modelling was ignoring price risk. By assuming that prices are 
deterministic, we did not consider price risks. The relative variability in prices for the crops 
might have a significant implication on the relationship between diversification and insurance. 
Thus, further studies can consider price risks. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Deciding on Household Groupings 
A1: Quantile Comparisons 
Figure A 1 to Figure A 17 and Table A 1 to Table A 8 to summarize the ANOVA and Tukey 
HSD test used in analysing the similarities of the household quantiles in terms of output/acre, 
labour and output/labour. 
The ANOVA has the null hypothesis that the means of the household quantiles in terms of the 
variables of interests are the same and an alternate hypothesis that at least one household 
quantile is different from the others in some of the variables of interest. Tukey’s Honestly 
Significant Difference (HSD) is a post hoc test that uses the q distribution to compute the HSD 
between two means based on the studentized range distribution. Tukey’s method 
simultaneously applies to all pairwise comparisons of means (𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑗) (NIST/SEMATECH 
n.d.; Williams and Abdi 2010).  
Given r independent observations 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑟 from a distribution (𝜇, 𝜎
2), where w is the range 
for the set, i.e., ?̅?𝑚𝑎𝑥  − ?̅?𝑚𝑖𝑛, and  𝑠
2 is the pooled sample variance with v degrees of freedom 
(n-1), then the studentized range for the difference between any two groups is defined as: 
𝑞𝑟,𝑣 =  
𝑤
𝑠2
 
For the same sample sizes, the confidence coefficient is 1 – 𝛼 but greater when sample sizes 
differ.  The Tukey confidence limit for pairwise comparisons with a confidence coefficient of 
at least 1 – 𝛼 is: 
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?̅?𝑖. − ?̅?𝑗. ±
1
√2
𝑞𝑎;𝑟,𝑁−𝑟 ?̂?𝜀 √
2
𝑛
  𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑟; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
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A1.1: Crop Output/Acre Quantile Comparisons 
 
Figure A 1: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Groundnut Output/Acre. 
 
Figure A 2: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Maize Output/Acre. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 3: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Millet Output/Acre. 
Table A 1: Tukey HSD Test for Millet Output/Acre 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 57.97 8.97 106.96 *** 
1 - 3 74.33 22.29 126.38 *** 
1 - 4 94.40 40.65 148.15 *** 
2 - 3 16.37 -32.63 65.36  
2 - 4 36.43 -14.37 87.24  
3 - 4 20.07 -33.68 73.81  
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
 122 
 
 
Figure A 4: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Cowpea Output/Acre. 
Table A 2: Tukey HSD Test for Cowpea Output/Acre 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
 
1 - 2 -219.75 -421.63 -17.87 *** 
1 - 3 -7.25 -209.13 194.63  
1 - 4 -70.58 -235.42 94.26  
2 - 3 212.50 -20.62 445.62  
2 - 4 149.17 -52.72 351.05  
3 - 4 -63.33 -265.22 138.55  
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
 123 
 
 
Figure A 5: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Sorghum Output/Acre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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A1.2: Crop Labour/Acre Quantile Comparisons 
 
Figure A 6: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Groundnut Labour Hours/Acre. 
Table A 3: Tukey HSD Test for Groundnut Labour/Acre 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 -159.21 -339.68 21.26   
1 - 3 -234.50 -432.33 -36.67 *** 
1 - 4 -98.46 -285.07 88.15   
2 - 3 -75.29 -252.44 101.86   
2 - 4 60.75 -103.78 225.28   
3 - 4 136.04 -47.37 319.45   
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 7: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Maize Labour Hour/Acre. 
Table A 4: Tukey HSD Test for Maize Labour/Acre 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 -513.1 -828.7 -197.6 *** 
1 - 3 -303.0 -635.6 29.6   
1 - 4 -297.5 -615.9 20.9   
2 - 3 210.2 -105.3 525.7   
2 - 4 215.6 -84.9 516.2   
3 - 4 5.5 -312.9 323.9   
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 8: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Millet Labour Hour/Acre. 
Table A 5: Tukey HSD Test for Millet Labour/Acre 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 -106.84 -320.52 106.84   
1 - 3 -304.94 -531.03 -78.86 *** 
1 - 4 -47.24 -276.68 182.20   
2 - 3 -198.10 -399.03 2.82   
2 - 4 59.60 -145.09 264.29   
3 - 4 257.70 40.09 475.31 *** 
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 9: ANOVA of Quantile Means for Cowpea Labour Hour/Acre. 
 
Figure A 10: ANOVA of Quantile Means for Sorghum Labour Hour/Acre. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 11: ANOVA of Quantile Means for Rice Labour Hour/Acre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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A1.3: Crops’ Output/Labour Hour Quantile Comparisons 
 
Figure A 12: ANOVA of Quantile Means for Groundnut Output/Labour Hour. 
Table A 6: Tukey HSD Test for Groundnut Output/Labour Hour 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 2.5403 0.8738 4.2068 *** 
1 - 3 2.8137 0.9594 4.6681 *** 
1 - 4 1.5845 -0.1559 3.3250   
2 - 3 0.2734 -1.3931 1.9399   
2 - 4 -0.9558 -2.4946 0.5830   
3 - 4 -1.2292 -2.9697 0.5112   
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 13: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Maize Output/Labour Hour. 
Table A 7: Tukey HSD Test for Maize Output/Labour Hour 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 0.7323 -0.9536 2.4182   
1 - 3 1.7238 -0.0533 3.5008   
1 - 4 -0.3258 -2.0272 1.3756   
2 - 3 0.9915 -0.6944 2.6773  
2 - 4 -1.0581 -2.6640 0.5479   
3 - 4 -2.0495 -3.7510 -0.3481 *** 
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 14: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Millet Output/Labour Hour. 
Table A 8: Tukey HSD Test for Millet Output/Labour Hour 
Quantile 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits 
  
1 - 2 0.8984 0.0719 1.7249 *** 
1 - 3 1.2542 0.3796 2.1287 *** 
1 - 4 0.9195 0.0450 1.7941 *** 
2 - 3 0.3558 -0.4214 1.1330   
2 - 4 0.0211 -0.7561 0.7983   
2 - 3 0.3558 -0.4214 1.1330   
3 - 4 -0.3346 -1.1627 0.4934   
*** Comparisons significantly different at the 0.05 level. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 15: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Cowpea Output/Labour Hour. 
 
Figure A 16: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Sorghum Output/Labour Hour. 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Figure A 17: ANOVA of Quantile Means of Rice Output/Labour Hour. 
 
 
 
 
    Mean 
              Median 
      25%-75% Percentile 
          Max. Observation 
          Min. Observation 
 Outliers 
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Appendix B: Historical Yields, CRI and @RISK Simulations 
Table B 1: Regression Results for Area Crop Yields against Year  
 Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Dependent Variable= Maize Yield 
Intercept 1495.391 12860.600 0.120 0.909 
Year -0.518 6.409 -0.080 0.937 
Dependent Variable= Groundnut Yield 
Intercept 520.016 10871.990 0.050 0.999 
Year -0.001 5.418 0.000 0.963 
Dependent Variable= Millet Yield 
Intercept -268.934 9974.114 -0.030 0.979 
Year 0.300 4.971 0.060 0.953 
Dependent Variable= Cowpea Yield 
Intercept -41844.330 9452.763 -4.430 0.001*** 
Year 21.028 4.711 4.460 0.001*** 
Dependent Variable= Sorghum Yield 
Intercept 607.043 5124.780 0.120 0.908 
Year -0.136 2.554 -0.050 0.959 
Dependent Variable= Rice Yield 
Intercept 55137.570 17693.000 3.120 0.009*** 
Year -27.185 8.818 -3.080 0.009*** 
*** Significant at 1% significance level. 
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Table B 2: De-trended Area Yields, Estimated Farm Yields and Cumulative Rainfall Index (CRI) Series 
Year 
Area Yields Farm Yields 
CRI Maize Groundnut Millet Cowpea Sorghum Rice Maize Groundnut Millet Cowpea Sorghum   Rice 
2000 595.00 474.62 361.41 444.30 334.82 465.18 358.51 257.60 162.11 101.01 130.46 173.81 0.99 
2001 447.11 496.26 284.62 323.23 280.90 434.04 269.40 269.34 127.66 73.48 109.45 162.17 1.04 
2002 486.77 693.90 326.80 453.96 320.46 475.63 293.29 376.62 146.58 103.21 124.87 177.71 1.22 
2003 434.29 540.04 322.03 376.25 360.70 494.49 261.67 293.11 144.44 85.54 140.54 184.76 1.25 
2004 389.86 459.53 294.58 660.77 324.96 585.37 234.90 249.41 132.13 150.22 126.62 218.72 0.66 
2005 444.35 410.17 329.90 329.63 358.43 254.41 267.74 222.62 147.97 74.94 139.66 95.06 1.31 
2006 403.27 486.02 279.47 478.25 318.56 339.71 242.98 263.79 125.35 108.73 124.12 126.93 1.45 
2007 353.27 429.04 325.34 548.75 358.47 296.95 212.86 232.86 145.93 124.75 139.67 110.95 0.79 
2008 311.08 534.88 363.59 534.00 393.18 389.55 187.44 290.31 163.08 121.40 153.20 145.55 0.88 
2009 536.79 597.55 527.28 552.79 395.99 529.35 323.43 324.32 236.51 125.67 154.29 197.78 1.25 
2010 498.64 620.86 416.06 478.46 358.96 531.38 300.45 336.97 186.62 108.78 139.87 198.54 0.73 
2011 624.92 543.73 328.37 487.51 284.93 438.36 376.53 295.11 147.28 110.83 111.02 163.79 1.06 
2012 344.00 502.20 268.65 430.32 302.46 473.48 207.27 272.57 120.50 97.83 117.85 176.91 1.10 
2013 511.91 452.51 232.90 353.57 298.96 478.72 308.44 245.60 104.47 80.38 116.49 178.87 0.79 
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B1: @RISK Simulations 
B1.1: Summary of @Risk Tests of Best Fit Distribution for Area and Farm Yield Series 
Below is a brief discussion of the statistical criteria used by @RISK to determine the best fit 
distribution for the area and farm-level yield series. 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
AIC is a model selection criterion that identifies the optimal fitted model among competing 
models for a given data set. Smaller values of AIC indicate a model is closer to the truth. The 
AIC is represented as: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2ln𝑓(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) + 2𝑘 
where k is the number of estimated parameters in the model, In𝑓(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) is the maximized value 
of the likelihood function of the fitted model, 𝜃 is the estimated parameter. A key limitation is 
that it cannot be used to compare models with different sample sizes. 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)  
BIC is an alternative information criterion that favours smaller models than AIC. It is defined 
as:  
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2ln𝑓(𝑦|𝜃𝑘) + 𝑘 ln 𝑛 
BIC can be used to compare models that are based on different probability distributions. As 
with the AIC, the optimal model is identified by the minimum value of BIC. A key shortcoming 
is that it is valid for sample sizes that are larger than the number of parameters in the model, 
i.e., where there are at least 8 observations. 
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Chi-Square Statistic 
The Chi-square statistic is commonly used as a goodness of fit test to examine differences 
between observed and expected data that are divided into several bins.  
𝑋2 = ∑
(𝑁𝑖  − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
𝐾
𝑖=1
 
where K is the number of bins; 𝑁𝑖  and 𝐸𝑖 are the observed and expected number of samples, 
respectively, in the ith bin. Since this test fails to specific guidelines for choosing the number 
of bins, @RISK automatically selects and modifies the bin size.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) Statistic 
K-S is based on the empirical cumulative function, which, assuming a random sample 𝑥𝑖…𝑥𝑛 
for a continuous distribution function, is: 
𝐹𝑛(𝑥) =
1
𝑛
∗ [𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ≤ 𝑥] 
 K-S is the vertical difference between F(x) and 𝐹𝑛(𝑥) as: 
𝐷𝑛 = sup𝑥 |𝐹𝑛(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)|, 
where n is the total number of data points; 𝐹(𝑥) is the fitted cumulative distribution function 
and 𝐹𝑛(𝑥) is the number of 𝑥𝑖 less than x, divided by the number of data points. Compared to 
the Chi-square test, the K-S statistic does not depend on bins and focuses more on the middle 
of the distribution than the tails. 
Anderson-Darling (A-D) Statistic  
A-D differs from the K-S test in that it focuses on the differences between the input data and 
the tails of the fitted distribution. It is represented as:  
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𝐴𝑛
2  = 𝑛 ∫  [ 𝐹𝑛 
+∞
−∞
(𝑥) − 𝐹(𝑥)] 2(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 
where n is the total number of data points; 
2 =
1
F(x)[1 − F(x)]
 
f(x) is the hypothesized density function; F(x) is the hypothesized cumulative distribution 
function; and 𝐹𝑛 (𝑥) equals the number of 𝑥𝑖  less than x, divided by the number of data points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 139 
 
Table B 3: Ranking of Test statistics for Three Best Area yields’ distributionsa 
Maize 
  Gamma InvGauss Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(170.36) #1(170.36) #3(170.40) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(170.54) #2(170.55) #3(170.58) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.09) #2(0.10) #2(0.10) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.14) #2(0.15) #2(0.15) 
Sum of Ranks 5 8 11 
Groundnut 
 Pearson5 LogLogistic InvGauss 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1 (164.39) #5(165.15) #2(164.66) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(164.57) #5(165.33) #2(164.85) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1(0.14) #4 (1.00) 
 K-S Statistic  #2(0.12) #1(0.10) #5(0.13) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.18) #1(0.18) #5(0.21) 
Sum of Ranks 6 13 18 
Millet 
 LogLogistic Pearson5 Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(160.01) #2(160.15) #3(160.70) 
 Bayesian (BIC)   #1(160.19) #2(160.34) #3(160.89) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.16) #2(0.18) #4(0.19) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.30) #2(0.35) #4(0.40) 
Sum of Ranks 5 9 15 
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Cowpea 
  Gamma InvGauss Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(171.14) #2(171.16) #3(171.19) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(171.33) #2(171.35) #3(171.38) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.57) #1 (0.57) #1 (0.57) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.11) #3(0.12) #3(0.12) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.26) #4(0.29) #4(0.29) 
Sum of Ranks 5 12 14 
Sorghum 
 InvGauss Lognorm Pearson5 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(144.74) #2(144.75) #3(144.76) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(144.92) #2(144.94) #2(144.94) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.57) #1(0.57) #1(0.57) 
 K-S Statistic  #3(0.18) #3(0.18) #3(0.18) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.32) #1(0.32) #1(0.32) 
Sum of Ranks 7 9 10 
Rice 
 Weibull BetaGeneral Gamma 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(169.50) #3(172.24) #2(172.15) 
 Bayesian (BIC)   #1(169.69) #2(171.75) #3(172.34) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #4 (0.57) #4 (0.57) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #2(0.15) #1(0.13) #3(0.21) 
 A-D Statistic  #2(0.31) #1(0.27) #3(0.59) 
Sum of Ranks 10 11 12 
Notes:  
a Values in parenthesis are the test statistic for each distribution. 
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Table B 4: Summary of the Best Distribution used for Area Yield Simulations 
Name Maize Groundnut Millet Cowpea Sorghum Area Rice 
Best Fit  Gamma Pearson5 LogLogistic Gamma InvGauss Weibull 
AIC 170.356 164.3876 160.0059 171.142 144.7356 169.4999 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity 
Mean 455.8045 517.068 327.9736 460.8423 335.1274 443.1016 
Mode 438.1538 497.3907 315.471 442.3589 329.4522 463.3891 
Median 449.9346 510.3343 322.2712 454.696 333.2319 449.3642 
Std. Deviation 89.6953 73.4522 62.6488 92.2925 35.7614 84.4851 
Graph 
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Table B 5: Ranking of Test statistics for Three Best Farm-level yields’ distributionsa 
Maize 
  Gamma InvGauss Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(156.17) #1(156.17) #3(156.21) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(156.36) #1(156.36) #3(156.40) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.09) #2(0.10) #2(0.10) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.14) #2(0.15) #2(0.15) 
Sum of Ranks 5 7 11 
Groundnut 
 Pearson5 LogLogistic InvGauss 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1 (147.28) #5(148.03) #2(147.55) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(147.46) #5(148.22) #2(147.74) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1(0.14) #4 (1.00) 
 K-S Statistic  #2(0.12) #1(0.10) #5(0.13) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.18) #1(0.18) #5(0.21) 
Sum of Ranks 6 13 18 
Millet 
 LogLogistic Pearson5 Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(137.56) #2(137.70) #3(138.26) 
 Bayesian (BIC)   #1(137.74) #2(137.89) #3(138.44) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.16) #2(0.18) #4(0.19) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.30) #2(0.35) #4(0.40) 
Sum of Ranks 5 9 15 
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Cowpea 
  Gamma InvGauss Lognorm 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(129.67) #2(129.68) #3(129.72) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(129.85) #2(129.87) #3(129.90) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.57) #1 (0.57) #1 (0.57) 
 K-S Statistic  #1(0.11) #3(0.12) #3(0.12) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.26) #4(0.29) #4(0.29) 
Sum of Ranks 5 12 14 
Sorghum 
 InvGauss Lognorm Pearson5 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(118.34) #2(118.36) #3(118.37) 
 Bayesian (BIC)  #1(118.53) #2(118.55) #2(118.55) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #1 (0.57) #1(0.57) #1(0.57) 
 K-S Statistic  #3(0.18) #3(0.18) #3(0.18) 
 A-D Statistic  #1(0.32) #1(0.32) #1(0.32) 
Sum of Ranks 7 9 10 
Rice 
 Weibull BetaGeneral Gamma 
 Akaike (AIC)  #1(141.93) #3(144.67) #2(144.58) 
 Bayesian (BIC)   #1(142.12) #2(144.19) #3(144.77) 
 Chi-Square Statistic  #4 (0.57) #4 (0.57) #1 (0.14) 
 K-S Statistic  #2(0.15) #1(0.13) #3(0.21) 
 A-D Statistic  #2(0.31) #1(0.27) #3(0.59) 
Sum of Ranks 10 11 12 
Notes:  
a Values in parenthesis are the test statistic for each distribution. 
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Table B 6: Summary of the Best Distribution used for Farm Yield Simulations 
Name Maize Groundnut  Millet Cowpea Sorghum  Rice 
Best Fit  Gamma Pearson5 LogLogistic Gamma InvGauss Weibull 
AIC 156.1706 147.2767 137.5566 129.6659 118.3446 141.9346 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity +Infinity 
Mean 274.6355 280.6396 147.1089 104.7699 130.5783 165.5585 
Mode 264.0004 269.9597 141.501 100.5678 128.3671 173.1386 
Median 271.0987 276.9849 144.5512 103.3726 129.8398 167.8984 
Std. Deviation 54.044 39.8663 28.1004 20.9822 13.934 31.5666 
Graph 
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Table B 7: Correlations between Area, CRI and Farm Yields before Simulations 
 
A. 
Maize 
A. 
Groundnut 
A. 
Millet 
A. 
Cowpea 
A. 
Sorghum 
A. 
Rice 
F. 
Maize 
F. 
Groundnut 
F. 
Millet 
F. 
Cowpea 
F. 
Sorghum 
F. 
Rice 
CRI 
A. Maize 1             
A. Groundnut 0.27 1            
A. Millet 0.30 0.48 1           
A. Cowpea -0.19 0.14 0.36 1          
A. Sorghum -0.25 0.15 0.72 0.35 1         
A. Rice 0.29 0.49 0.22 0.31 -0.09 1        
F. Maize 1.00 0.27 0.30 -0.19 -0.25 0.29 1       
F. Groundnut 0.27 1.00 0.48 0.14 0.15 0.49 0.27 1      
F. Millet 0.30 0.48 1.00 0.36 0.72 0.22 0.30 0.48 1     
F. Cowpea -0.19 0.14 0.36 1.00 0.35 0.31 -0.19 0.14 0.36 1    
F. Sorghum -0.25 0.15 0.72 0.35 1.00 -0.09 -0.25 0.15 0.72 0.35 1   
F. Rice 0.29 0.49 0.22 0.31 -0.09 1.00 0.29 0.49 0.22 0.31 -0.09 1  
CRI 0.10 0.16 0.09 -0.39 0.02 -0.35 0.10 0.16 0.09 -0.39 0.02 -0.35 1 
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Table B 8: National Yield Series (2000-2013) 
Year Maize Groundnut Millet Beans Sorghum Rice 
2000 664.65 404.99 373.48 497.68 541.60 1088.19 
2001 593.33 427.55 315.84 501.67 460.35 997.00 
2002 665.40 567.96 360.57 578.29 492.62 1103.95 
2003 719.30 394.82 377.60 526.10 497.96 969.21 
2004 691.13 375.92 346.58 492.84 477.40 943.49 
2005 676.43 387.32 434.63 475.63 482.29 1093.42 
2006 643.18 447.99 354.86 503.55 462.10 897.66 
2007 655.71 363.99 295.77 340.19 339.59 749.97 
2008 730.76 550.52 448.26 481.69 534.67 984.46 
2009 707.00 628.42 548.69 519.28 570.24 1025.90 
2010 778.91 612.66 512.10 507.32 544.90 1134.86 
2011 765.12 529.78 420.99 550.88 488.37 966.29 
2012 667.00 557.37 421.94 535.12 490.85 1027.00 
2013 691.79 501.62 387.23 469.27 449.76 1050.18 
Data Source: FAO Database. 
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Table B 9: National and Area Yields Correlation Matrix 
 
N. 
Maize 
N. 
Groundnut 
N. 
Millet 
N.  
Beans 
N. 
Sorghum 
N. 
Rice 
A. 
Maize 
A. 
Groundnut 
A. 
Millet 
A. 
Cowpea 
A. 
Sorghum 
A. 
Rice 
N. Maize 1            
N. Groundnut 0.48 1           
N. Millet 0.66 0.75 1          
N. Beans 0.22 0.51 0.35 1         
N. Sorghum 0.46 0.59 0.76 0.68 1        
N. Rice 0.24 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.73 1       
A. Maize 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.39 0.38 0.45 1      
A. Groundnut 0.38 0.75 0.43 0.65 0.53 0.43 0.27 1     
A. Millet 0.42 0.49 0.73 0.09 0.60 0.22 0.30 0.48 1    
A. Cowpea 0.30 0.12 0.11 -0.16 0.05 -0.41 -0.19 0.14 0.36 1   
A. Sorghum 0.36 0.15 0.51 -0.27 0.33 -0.01 -0.25 0.15 0.72 0.35 1  
A. Rice 0.33 0.39 0.28 0.51 0.51 0.36 0.29 0.49 0.29 0.31 -0.09 1 
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Table B 10: Area and Farm Yields Correlation Matrix Specified in @RISK 
 
A. 
Maize 
A. 
Groundnut 
A. 
Millet 
A. 
Cowpea 
A. 
Sorghum 
A. 
Rice 
F. 
Maize 
F. 
Groundnut 
F. 
Millet 
F. 
Cowpea 
F. 
Sorghum 
F. 
Rice 
A. Maize 1            
A. Groundnut 0.48 1           
A. Millet 0.66 0.75 1          
A. Cowpea 0.22 0.51 0.35 1         
A. Sorghum 0.46 0.59 0.76 0.68 1        
A. Rice 0.24 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.73 1       
F. Maize 0.82 0.48 0.66 0.22 0.46 0.24 1      
F. Groundnut 0.48 0.82 0.75 0.51 0.59 0.48 0.48 1     
F. Millet 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.35 0.76 0.59 0.66 0.75 1    
F. Cowpea 0.22 0.51 0.35 0.82 0.68 0.63 0.22 0.51 0.35 1   
F. Sorghum 0.46 0.59 0.76 0.68 0.82 0.73 0.46 0.59 0.76 0.68 1  
F. Rice 0.24 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.73 0.82 0.24 0.48 0.59 0.63 0.73 1 
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Table B 11: @RISK Adjusted Area and Farm Yields Correlation Matrix  
 
A. 
Maize 
A. 
Groundnut 
A. 
Millet 
A. 
Cowpea 
A. 
Sorghum 
A. 
Rice 
F. 
Maize 
F. 
Groundnut 
F. 
Millet 
F. 
Cowpea 
F. 
Sorghum 
F. 
Rice 
A. Maize 1                       
A. Groundnut 0.47 1                     
A. Millet 0.64 0.73 1                   
A. Cowpea 0.21 0.49 0.34 1                 
A. Sorghum 0.45 0.57 0.74 0.66 1               
A. Rice 0.23 0.47 0.57 0.61 0.71 1             
F. Maize 0.80 0.47 0.64 0.21 0.45 0.23 1           
F. Groundnut 0.47 0.80 0.73 0.49 0.57 0.47 0.47 1         
F. Millet 0.64 0.73 0.80 0.34 0.74 0.57 0.64 0.73 1       
F. Cowpea 0.21 0.49 0.34 0.80 0.66 0.61 0.21 0.49 0.34 1     
F. Sorghum 0.45 0.57 0.74 0.66 0.80 0.71 0.45 0.57 0.74 0.66 1   
F. Rice 0.23 0.47 0.57 0.61 0.71 0.80 0.23 0.47 0.57 0.61 0.71 1 
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B1.2: How @RISK Decides whether a Correlation Matrix is Valid or Not 
The basic principle is that if two inputs are each strongly correlated to a third, they must be at 
least weakly correlated to each other. If the coefficient of A and B is m, and the coefficient of 
A and C is n, then the coefficient of B and C must be in the range of 
𝑚𝑛 ± √(1 − 𝑚2)(1 − 𝑛2) 
@RISK generalizes this principle for a correlation matrix of any size. If a correlation matrix is 
created using a full data set, it will be positive semi-definite if there is a linear relationship 
between any of the variables and positive definite if there is no linear relationship. 
@RISK calculates the eigenvalues for the matrix to determine whether it is positive definite 
(i.e. have all positive eigenvalues) or positive semi-definite (i.e. have eigenvalues greater than 
or equal to zero and at least one eigenvalue equal to zero). 
For @RISK, a “valid” matrix is any matrix that is positive or positive semi-definite, and an 
“invalid” matrix is any matrix that has at least one negative eigenvalue. 
B1.3: How @RISK Adjusts an Invalid Correlation Matrix 
Invalid correlation matrix can be adjusted in two ways in @RISK: 
1. Using Adjustment Weight Matrix 
Users can adjust the matrix on their own or create an adjustment weight matrix to guide 
@RISK. The adjustment matrix is a square matrix the same size as the correlation matrix, 
and its name must match the range name for the correlation matrix, with the suffix 
“Weights”. The adjustment weight values range from 0 to 100. The larger the value, the 
greater weight @RISK will place on keeping the original correlation coefficient.  
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2. No Adjustment Weight Matrix 
Users can also choose not to specify an adjustment weight matrix. In such cases, @RISK 
follows the steps below to modify the invalid correlation matrix: 
a. Find the smallest eigenvalue (𝐸𝑜) 
b. To shift the eigenvalues so that the smallest eigenvalue equals zero, subtract the 
product of 𝐸𝑜 and the identity matrix (𝐼) to the correlation matrix (𝐶).  
𝐶′ = 𝐶 − 𝐸𝑜𝐼 
c. Divide the new matrix by 1 − 𝐸𝑜 so that the diagonal terms equal 1. 
𝐶′′ = (
1
1 − 𝐸𝑜
) 𝐶′ 
Note: The matrix that @RISK calculates by this method is positive semi-definite, and therefore 
valid, but in no way is it special or optimal. It's one of many possible valid matrices, and some 
of the coefficients in it may be quite different from the original coefficients.  
We however, used this method in correcting our invalid correlation matrix because of its 
simplicity and also due to the difficulty in determining appropriate weights to use in the first 
method. 
B1.4: Correlations after @RISK Simulations 
Several iterations (10, 20, 30,…, 5000) were simulated to determine the number of iterations 
that produces the closet correlations to the @RISK adjusted correlations. The 500, 1000 and 
5000 iterations simulation produced the correlations closet to the specified ones. We used the 
500 iterations simulation to represent 500 states of nature in our GAMS models. 
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Table B 12: Area and Farm Yields Correlation Matrix at 500 Iterations 
 
A. 
Maize 
A. 
Groundnut 
A. 
Millet 
 
A. 
Cowpea 
 
A. 
Sorghum 
 
A. 
Rice 
F. 
Maize 
F. 
Groundnut 
F. 
Millet 
 
F. 
Cowpea 
F. 
Sorghum 
 
F. 
Rice 
A. Maize 1.00            
A. Groundnut 0.45 1.00           
A. Millet 0.63 0.71 1.00          
A. Cowpea 0.20 0.47 0.30 1.00         
A. Sorghum 0.46 0.58 0.71 0.63 1.00        
A. Rice 0.26 0.48 0.54 0.60 0.70 1.00       
F. Maize 0.82 0.48 0.62 0.21 0.44 0.24 1.00      
F. Groundnut 0.47 0.81 0.76 0.44 0.59 0.47 0.47 1.00     
F. Millet 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.29 0.71 0.56 0.62 0.75 1.00    
F. Cowpea 0.21 0.50 0.32 0.78 0.65 0.57 0.23 0.46 0.29 1.00   
F. Sorghum 0.46 0.58 0.71 0.63 0.78 0.70 0.45 0.60 0.71 0.64 1.00  
F. Rice 0.26 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.24 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.68 1.00 
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Table B 13: Area Series of Real Prices (GHC) from 2009-2014 for Major Crops Considered 
in the Household Models 
Year Maize Groundnut Millet Cowpea Sorghum Rice 
2009 0.55 1.12 0.64 0.83 0.76 1.17 
2010 0.45 1.19 0.59 0.95 0.65 1.05 
2011 0.52 1.75 0.73 1.03 0.73 1.19 
2012 0.61 2.07 0.87 1.37 0.84 1.38 
2013 0.46 1.83 0.86 1.23 0.75 1.25 
2014 0.58 2.09 0.83 1.26 0.85 1.49 
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Appendix C: GAMS Syntax for Models 
This appendix provides the GAMS syntax used for the models developed in this study. The 
syntax of the calibration process is presented first, followed by the base model and the 
insurance model. 
Appendix C1: Calibration of Base Model 
$Title                          CALIBRATION MODEL 
 
$inlinecom /* */ 
$offlisting 
$offsymxref offsymlist 
 
Option 
    limrow = 10000000,    /*equations listed per block*/ 
    limcol = 0,            /*variables listed per block" */ 
    solprint = on,        /* "solver's solution output printed*/ 
    sysout = off;         /*solver's system output printed*/ 
 
Sets 
    i state of nature    /1*500/ 
    d crops              /maize, groundnut, millet, cowpea, sorghum, rice / 
 
Parameters 
         lahrs(d)       "labour requirement(hours/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         248.59 
                                                          Groundnut     399.50 
                                                          Millet        238.20 
                                                          Cowpea        208.20 
                                                          Sorghum       239.28 
                                                          Rice          326.24/ 
 
         vc(d)          "variable cost{GHC/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         38.27 
                                                          Groundnut  114.56 
                                                          Millet        30.85 
                                                          Cowpea        43.68 
                                                          Sorghum       39.60 
                                                          Rice          50.34/ 
 
        otuse(d)       "d for other uses(kg)" 
                                                         /Maize         46.71 
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                                                          Groundnut     126.58 
                                                          Millet        39.19 
                                                          Cowpea        17.11 
                                                          Sorghum       43.37 
                                                          Rice          36.16/ 
 
         pp(d)        "purchase price(GHC/kg) of d" 
                                                         /Maize         0.53 
                                                          Groundnut     1.67 
                                                          Millet        0.75 
                                                          Cowpea        1.11 
                                                          Sorghum       0.76 
                                                          Rice          1.26/ 
 
         phi(d)      "value of consumption-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.25 
                                                          Groundnut     0.25 
                                                          Millet        0.25 
                                                          Cowpea        0.25 
                                                          Sorghum       0.25 
                                                          Rice          0.25/ 
 
         gamma(d)    "sale-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.8 
                                                          Groundnut     0.8 
                                                          Millet        0.8 
                                                          Cowpea        0.8 
                                                          Sorghum       0.8 
                                                          Rice          0.8/; 
 
Table    yld(i,d)       "yield(kg/acre) for d in i" 
           Maize         Groundnut     Millet        Cowpea        Sorghum       Rice 
1           288.22        333.16        172.14        103.70        149.96        168.61 
2           351.68        319.89        176.38        145.94        156.37        202.33 
3           258.45        289.08        148.06        80.08          113.93        152.69 
4           249.11        322.60        179.31        90.60          139.78        180.61 
5           261.18        277.62        157.82        94.61          135.13        154.35 
6           301.98        328.03        169.44        119.15        144.51        193.92 
7           281.68        301.43        158.97        166.29        151.87        189.52 
8           291.46        282.68        153.09        96.64          126.93        147.68 
9           319.13        218.14        99.65           93.39          106.63        93.97 
10         347.83        375.66        172.83        126.42        139.57        190.02 
11         360.95        325.81        163.26        139.00        135.55        203.92 
12         337.72        316.85        153.81        123.72        120.79        147.03 
13         331.09        271.99        137.05        90.13          112.84        137.89 
14         333.53        342.12        189.00        172.42        155.81        215.91 
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15         204.48        233.02        113.36        80.24          115.89        136.45 
16         399.51        357.49        203.72        91.85          128.16        176.49 
17         271.36        252.22        109.33        127.70        130.82        188.62 
18         308.75        262.80        133.77        93.77          127.47        131.62 
19         255.15        272.66        133.40        111.58        130.89        172.76 
20         348.14        308.58        232.02        104.86        149.35        202.72 
21         298.92        285.28        176.04        91.41          162.95        194.69 
22         248.71        257.16        93.39         104.77         115.15        115.05 
23         231.51        258.26        125.57        115.94        128.43        192.30 
24         400.97        282.83        152.74        96.42          123.93        188.61 
25         279.47        313.01        125.98        123.83        132.81        104.17 
26         352.29        299.77        162.16        109.62        128.98        181.57 
27         267.41        250.40        121.29        86.01          123.00        109.76 
28         210.54        307.80        163.66        122.55        142.29        209.67 
29         211.66        270.95        149.67        117.30        128.66        185.06 
30         192.31        273.74        135.60        145.07        139.46        198.45 
31         265.32        290.46        162.63        111.06        140.48        191.57 
32         231.81        275.21        156.64        77.44          125.68        119.93 
33         341.73        308.28        177.05        96.77          138.12        174.75 
34         170.58        207.15        126.26        91.64          115.66        167.58 
35         335.67        345.67        173.53        125.07        147.49        213.27 
36         343.93        256.50        165.10        92.66          129.72        152.35 
37         270.38        304.38        142.31        106.82        129.27        157.38 
38         391.86        364.51        195.12        131.26        151.38        223.54 
39         217.18        287.68        131.69        96.14          124.64        161.58 
40         166.56        238.96        113.96        119.34        123.81        197.24 
41         242.30        294.78        148.82        101.25        125.65        167.15 
42         301.10        302.16        157.97        85.43          126.11        156.55 
43         249.50        308.85        143.81        82.67          116.99        180.40 
44         250.59        306.74        152.14        82.50          129.86        156.86 
45         273.36        224.49        139.29        80.51          122.14        183.41 
46         244.71        286.43        150.64        79.28          117.51        186.31 
47         284.92        214.79        128.94        94.83          118.23        170.75 
48         272.24        289.35        137.69        106.97        125.33        149.19 
49         201.26        224.07        121.82        86.59          115.35        126.72 
50         281.84        251.35        140.84        101.65        148.31        195.83 
51         159.00        212.74        96.79         82.08           118.28        121.98 
52         281.05        343.67        201.21        149.00        172.44        233.47 
53         296.76        259.59        120.98        102.22        131.51        126.52 
54         322.92        277.30        151.01        98.89          136.51        196.62 
55         410.97        337.99        209.56        150.72        160.38        199.43 
56         189.23        253.15        107.41        95.52          106.01        185.40 
57         218.26        240.08        123.88        105.03        116.26        159.13 
58         322.67        296.49        164.00        65.28          128.74        130.32 
59         207.55        254.60        143.19        121.86        152.44        188.21 
60         200.35        238.65        131.43        106.41        143.35        195.77 
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61         276.42        244.73        145.37        106.00        137.16        159.24 
62         205.09        257.74        117.02        114.98        125.07        133.01 
63         148.23        236.26        118.80        92.45          117.45        164.23 
64         271.41        251.72        134.78        92.58          127.37        169.82 
65         277.97        300.42        182.60        78.54          144.98        198.92 
66         233.25        266.17        139.73        104.60        137.23        211.76 
67         308.01        269.92        159.20        103.19        118.84        175.52 
68         258.23        317.74        134.69        105.78        134.97        179.87 
69         225.00        261.84        146.16        108.00        131.36        181.93 
70         247.46        303.23        141.90        140.78        133.22        182.60 
71         260.54        295.40        128.77        103.30        121.11        132.58 
72         290.62        259.89        149.72        99.66          140.67        137.82 
73         285.97        242.55        148.50        102.70        130.33        170.68 
74         300.22        367.14        159.05        126.66        143.61        200.69 
75         304.12        257.43        148.69        78.27          139.86        124.05 
76         305.03        256.91        140.32        91.33          119.19        140.11 
77         234.71        255.72        124.02        88.48          130.00        152.92 
78         297.97        258.17        141.35        111.27        128.51        177.86 
79         268.91        316.31        150.34        97.13          127.67        166.26 
80         279.15        265.99        150.87        79.75          124.85        138.84 
81         225.59        266.71        151.48        112.55        132.49        181.45 
82         252.41        259.09        158.28        60.34          111.35        115.64 
83         218.45        343.08        168.31        84.90          123.39        179.06 
84         283.31        265.07        143.60        76.33          108.85        143.09 
85         270.84        320.87        215.95        133.62        152.26        196.20 
86         220.70        243.40        119.81        79.64          121.78        173.50 
87         255.05        346.27        154.72        97.87          122.64        183.10 
88         232.91        245.98        131.96        58.15          103.03        96.39 
89         237.34        278.66        130.73        86.03          112.12        178.87 
90         186.19        234.68        97.84         114.51         133.90        165.36 
91         424.49        296.96        220.45        57.17          128.00        175.05 
92         339.11        339.31        200.10        115.41        138.63        184.80 
93         328.92        283.81        146.53        151.66        146.84        203.46 
94         309.70        274.45        165.77        138.72        154.00        200.26 
95         341.63        269.18        167.15        106.68        149.02        170.49 
96         290.92        245.73        154.44        135.69        151.09        173.86 
97         278.19        257.85        151.82        69.28          121.91        131.15 
98         198.48        229.81        95.46         112.77         135.08        151.06 
99         179.93        254.95        112.47        96.54          116.72        100.64 
100        478.32        340.81        239.27        129.12       184.33        189.29 
101        277.16        269.79        130.28        90.82         118.52        144.42 
102        330.11        259.03        125.34        105.81       127.26        150.46 
103        295.41        354.87        182.10        144.08       153.18        208.76 
104        278.81        329.72        191.11        95.21         141.76        186.66 
105        297.24        263.14        147.74        97.18         134.50        165.65 
106        217.73        246.80        129.27        83.87         128.85        146.49 
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107        299.60        276.35        148.60        88.72         113.81        141.73 
108        197.98        203.30        69.00         98.08          105.46        82.44 
109        311.31        272.98        143.33        97.70         132.35        165.09 
110        183.49        198.43        115.43        99.32         120.86        141.49 
111        216.48        215.62        111.38        94.28         114.34        156.63 
112        257.12        295.67        140.49        139.97       133.59        163.46 
113        316.52        246.34        121.56        147.52       131.70        172.58 
114        233.43        288.56        155.55        131.86       146.78        209.04 
115        280.35        284.63        153.48        86.33         130.67        119.66 
116        224.35        247.90        112.16        115.78       117.92        121.21 
117        255.83        334.45        176.81        135.01       141.01        219.29 
118        251.93        265.57        121.18        113.23       118.71        147.27 
119        222.76        305.45        168.78        115.32       140.66        192.44 
120        267.02        230.50        114.82        99.20         120.46        145.66 
121        297.90        263.57        153.59        101.83       141.42        199.23 
122        202.89        289.50        137.90        116.07       127.51        179.48 
123        243.41        284.16        137.67        117.87       148.51        173.89 
124        251.59        310.84        145.88        104.01       129.98        164.82 
125        265.93        267.00        156.05        91.57         144.28        196.37 
126        311.88        411.25        186.35        134.37       139.97        181.06 
127        214.17        262.06        135.66        99.89         126.69        194.19 
128        302.61        324.87        171.14        130.85       137.76        173.15 
129        286.97        268.07        151.76        112.35       132.99        152.09 
130        355.49        274.02        186.60        89.30         140.23        177.72 
131        253.39        309.62        169.52        141.50       159.34        214.77 
132        234.16        233.26        132.33        95.65         121.58        113.68 
133        231.07        275.45        104.13        99.42         107.16        119.01 
134        196.84        279.79        110.84        73.96         94.90         110.90 
135        221.61        259.68        140.91        104.45       135.33        176.57 
136        267.82        277.06        149.84        93.19         122.34        137.23 
137        246.18        280.46        166.20        97.49         138.81        185.98 
138        302.32        250.02        154.93        75.48         123.09        177.18 
139        253.83        328.57        175.71        131.50       136.18        163.04 
140        290.04        351.67        161.00        121.43       142.10        166.98 
141        250.09        303.04        160.20        105.47       124.61        168.71 
142        207.11        242.24        122.72        66.39         116.61        151.26 
143        214.32        308.19        147.26        113.92       141.86        192.14 
144        178.60        231.59        101.33        92.01          96.43        156.94 
145        323.61        249.68        142.67        113.38       139.04        164.43 
146        325.24        372.40        205.17        124.17       158.93        196.88 
147        288.52        275.01        141.66        80.99         119.27        163.63 
148        280.89        264.65        145.64        105.63       135.50        190.28 
149        214.74        279.91        146.07        96.99         120.12        189.49 
150        272.11        278.39        120.42        90.70         112.50        142.00 
151        239.43        317.93        158.73        122.11       136.77        204.43 
152        286.42        251.12        159.80        120.86       152.71        217.84 
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153        324.92        311.17        193.46        95.12         138.90        141.36 
154        248.11        284.11        126.55        98.95         114.67        114.58 
155        359.73        285.38        173.96        103.07       143.05        190.19 
156        380.66        294.12        174.13        107.19       141.59        187.59 
157        247.23        253.69        126.17        74.66         114.50        171.83 
158        415.94        277.47        162.86        115.13       134.28        157.97 
159        219.63        288.12        135.04        119.39       126.34        130.59 
160        262.48        239.58        146.99        93.12         128.54        181.19 
161        239.85        323.71        175.35        102.00        139.61        217.60 
162        238.49        275.31        138.16        109.04        123.67        195.38 
163        223.12        206.09        88.05         86.21         113.56        90.96 
164        293.27        332.46        141.98        95.31         131.53        152.30 
165        264.92        237.38        119.65        82.17         107.90        111.15 
166        276.81        246.84        129.96        75.64         130.43        134.83 
167        243.74        220.71        132.49        68.91         104.84        148.03 
168        236.76        236.71        122.03        92.77         111.04        163.91 
169        308.38        312.37        193.15        104.39        132.92        166.82 
170        315.95        243.74        128.43        96.86         138.00        172.32 
171        226.15        332.89        150.84        133.48        127.20        154.82 
172        269.95        326.33        161.96        99.10         129.42        135.35 
173        309.11        305.05        150.21        101.60        129.20        171.33 
174        209.67        217.54        87.27         87.82         109.23        113.43 
175        240.95        255.32        140.16        89.74         127.32        118.34 
176        304.34        292.64        144.70        111.73        128.89        140.73 
177        256.87        245.20        104.65        70.71         108.66        74.10 
178        265.73        292.76        142.61        107.58        121.64        160.21 
179        191.97        214.02        132.64        106.05        125.77        178.17 
180        289.31        272.34        164.21        109.76        129.79        174.32 
181        353.45        337.61        175.02        117.74        145.09        194.81 
182        295.01        270.27        127.51        95.78         119.76        134.42 
183        277.71        320.52        168.29        83.06         128.36        145.01 
184        259.39        314.39        162.52        132.13        150.22        237.77 
185        297.33        267.94        161.12        130.32        140.16        180.88 
186        248.36        266.56        118.32        101.06        119.81        159.47 
187        298.29        369.07        170.55        143.13        144.70        191.24 
188        173.60        317.14        159.87        108.63        139.16        181.70 
189        266.32        286.05        152.52        118.21        128.11        205.68 
190        254.28        232.44        102.30        80.97         110.03        125.09 
191        285.52        315.20        180.40        106.31        143.50        174.45 
192        303.47        403.68        171.42        128.97        134.84        207.83 
193        326.84        227.73        110.56        82.48         111.50        72.08 
194        191.18        271.80        136.68        105.50        134.67        168.86 
195        293.19        311.66        149.14        98.51         131.22        201.16 
196        253.06        300.88        136.48        124.85        124.54        138.67 
197        274.91        292.00        145.17        99.50         127.82        153.99 
198        320.12        314.20        151.17        114.21        133.93        172.79 
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199        262.63        252.95        146.75        72.85         126.84        120.99 
200        269.60        293.40        152.60        108.20        131.89        164.17 
201        246.94        235.64        113.14        87.06         111.15        62.33 
202        315.49        248.77        135.84        87.92         126.20        165.77 
203        223.69        255.46        115.63        79.09         110.07        122.16 
204        174.08        210.03        102.57        70.10         100.33        101.58 
205        273.95        353.08        198.40        121.59        156.60        216.79 
206        254.57        270.22        136.94        95.37         120.20        135.75 
207        233.95        273.29        124.16        97.88         125.49        197.63 
208        232.68        232.10        132.08        98.42         128.24        133.56 
209        273.05        300.16        143.85        101.72        123.03        172.20 
210        271.81        298.90        134.08        107.35        122.63        163.07 
211        267.96        228.23        125.80        115.50        122.71        162.51 
212        333.93        358.78        166.59        140.37        161.95        193.06 
213        318.07        297.13        157.74        130.63        150.66        180.22 
214        264.60        280.95        141.48        99.78         124.06        189.82 
215        241.65        227.86        120.59        123.39        124.03        164.59 
216        257.36        230.85        106.91        75.94         104.01        167.52 
217        276.06        283.59        136.19        109.87        137.05        190.63 
218        253.54        275.85        126.96        181.42        137.97        201.55 
219        236.93        322.23        161.27        137.30        142.22        206.55 
220        296.44        248.31        135.46        86.77         124.83        171.50 
221        339.04        387.20        317.16        103.65        153.70        232.23 
222        289.65        286.91        156.96        88.59         127.85        182.79 
223        329.57        294.28        179.78        125.19        141.31        189.07 
224        294.01        268.98        160.64        102.23        138.31        164.98 
225        340.94        380.12        183.95        128.19        141.98        213.41 
226        262.11        234.11        106.56        91.21         105.85        118.07 
227        286.21        347.17        223.25        114.70        165.37        227.16 
228        240.27        276.57        150.55        85.63         117.69        198.13 
229        244.86        247.74        132.78        89.64         123.36        140.50 
230        236.22        225.82        111.76        92.93         119.65        124.85 
231        276.62        205.12        103.24        135.27        130.07        161.54 
232        245.13        303.84        133.21        87.61         117.37        176.22 
233        195.52        229.30        129.57        83.51         122.32        150.95 
234        331.76        327.60        207.72        108.09        148.92        128.54 
235        299.40        292.35        164.78        89.90         129.48        156.15 
236        262.97        264.77        154.53        94.41         131.43        172.00 
237        287.24        298.13        153.26        102.89        119.05        168.08 
238        213.17        245.39        109.63        63.88         113.47        133.02 
239        329.39        288.42        166.79        113.61        148.25        170.04 
240        227.52        237.73        139.54        92.15         121.81        184.63 
241        220.91        274.60        137.56        109.70        141.20        141.18 
242        301.56        241.47        155.47        94.74         131.09        185.19 
243        288.78        227.25        116.69        84.23         120.96        140.36 
244        287.66        263.93        143.68        118.01        146.47        187.44 
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245        377.39        344.56        187.03        132.54        142.98        210.09 
246        290.36        339.22        165.05        81.32         126.05        166.67 
247        267.09        287.31        145.84        129.50        138.71        182.03 
248        264.08        267.71        142.18        124.08        145.15        196.69 
249        283.09        301.20        138.07        129.82        132.62        171.55 
250        206.48        278.18        144.26        88.90         130.19        135.61 
251        312.56        302.74        183.36        112.31        145.71        190.85 
252        270.80        300.54        191.97        137.01        161.06        248.33 
253        247.63        245.06        127.86        72.79         109.15        85.01 
254        266.58        285.96        133.34        88.81         117.04        128.18 
255        229.69        278.77        140.69        98.31         133.36        169.13 
256        235.18        264.02        127.30        102.03        135.70        154.15 
257        278.71        361.80        158.10        127.76        134.77        175.29 
258        284.71        311.30        159.99        121.01        143.95        222.54 
259        190.18        191.05        90.79         67.87         99.06        111.86 
260        274.32        243.96        124.96        76.71         108.04        131.91 
261        169.62        188.16        99.23         53.92         115.22        143.94 
262        294.37        253.99        131.07        117.49        106.42        145.23 
263        358.33        265.14        149.29        78.78         121.24        160.00 
264        245.61        248.59        143.42        77.99         118.60        117.58 
265        221.26        293.77        159.36        130.21        151.64        201.74 
266        228.27        251.85        131.23        78.41         116.47        134.53 
267        256.15        239.65        134.22        84.61         140.81        149.82 
268        126.68        237.19        112.74        111.69        125.91        162.70 
269        318.42        294.65        163.03        93.54         125.30        170.95 
270        238.16        252.44        130.92        113.76        136.02        153.18 
271        361.86        318.42        188.25        108.58        131.16        193.22 
272        317.72        288.86        172.32        100.27        132.59        212.33 
273        316.88        280.71        161.79        120.70        136.40        193.60 
274        365.69        325.14        211.26        89.19         134.38        126.05 
275        185.51        211.53        76.60         100.38        110.47        125.48 
276        310.27        316.37        157.49        110.00        139.28        174.84 
277        282.70        312.89        167.57        132.96        154.11        198.78 
278        250.33        260.46        147.92        100.19        140.42        209.62 
279        338.18        296.02        142.82        121.17        123.70        161.16 
280        259.84        330.94        161.52        119.64        135.43        193.48 
281        252.87        242.99        122.52        84.33         112.91        132.15 
282        295.13        341.92        181.36        85.18         131.25        150.36 
283        292.67        313.85        170.32        87.42         134.59        182.33 
284        312.16        334.98        179.42        94.13         133.27        192.64 
285        291.80        312.10        182.49        123.50        143.75        214.08 
286        249.81        356.16        194.75        138.37        151.99        203.73 
287        212.21        337.26        152.85        119.97        145.95        195.31 
288        324.13        394.20        254.95        116.56        150.12        225.55 
289        163.31        240.86        125.05        88.06         116.56        165.21 
290        235.98        297.79        180.85        114.90        147.20        208.34 
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291        246.62        303.46        157.17        118.73        145.96        169.57 
292        366.83        314.74        146.68        110.85        118.74        112.55 
293        304.84        321.90        133.88        161.12        144.80        202.47 
294        263.13        278.92        142.28        112.10        124.14        109.07 
295        306.21        355.01        201.92        104.63        144.16        190.61 
296        196.08        234.32        105.17        85.55         111.91        124.21 
297        277.51        261.71        135.31        126.69        137.54        171.08 
298        307.52        290.67        157.38        133.03        133.64        159.60 
299        328.07        310.41        148.23        111.93        127.07        162.84 
300        264.95        291.83        130.07        118.45        136.59        180.70 
301        313.59        285.59        155.27        110.76        134.35        153.83 
302        332.20        283.44        142.44        102.38        127.95        139.92 
303        301.39        271.24        143.11        88.28         122.80        139.56 
304        188.39        281.71        122.99        118.54        131.98        188.86 
305        317.41        267.21        148.34        98.28         138.36        158.30 
306        201.98        290.38        136.80        81.40         118.41        155.89 
307        350.60        287.60        156.49        89.03         137.02        185.55 
308        283.71        291.53        159.58        107.20        147.93        206.13 
309        431.41        298.54        156.29        92.19         126.43        155.68 
310        237.94        331.56        141.43        113.89        129.52        159.74 
311        345.02        329.87        152.01        134.13        142.56        187.80 
312        239.05        262.38        124.46        63.14         104.66        87.73 
313        246.29        271.53        126.74        99.99         130.32        150.70 
314        255.38        250.72        135.19        114.33        130.48        184.18 
315        373.89        306.36        170.13        100.58        150.57        197.36 
316        250.80        247.23        156.22        96.02         135.95        182.27 
317        357.80        269.45        122.23        131.68        130.97        136.24 
318        206.67        269.59        96.28         98.14         113.31        129.49 
319        215.36        267.29        127.35        100.47        136.31        163.76 
320        222.49        249.58        124.54        100.79        119.08        133.88 
321        282.51        218.62        122.81        67.31         118.07        120.53 
322        337.18        304.67        185.64        92.33         139.10        160.65 
323        219.91        273.53        114.42        112.02        107.58        183.93 
324        178.28        242.83        107.75        71.48         108.52        105.80 
325        287.90        306.89        146.42        103.48        122.90        155.21 
326        405.38        283.08        206.71        134.74        154.69        211.04 
327        307.38        261.20        136.34        97.37         115.43        149.75 
328        201.91        270.66        138.48        87.19         133.04        151.91 
329        199.38        280.50        141.73        129.64        136.96        200.56 
330        349.59        299.46        177.63        113.13        146.59        204.29 
331        284.51        399.33        234.97        88.22         158.03        155.13 
332        289.22        240.52        139.94        65.84         118.94        156.27 
333        330.97        360.17        190.10        106.58        140.05        183.77 
334        242.94        340.50        130.35        119.72        118.01        144.85 
335        259.11        284.88        142.92        114.63        126.96        173.02 
336        332.85        289.93        134.98        122.82        129.05        157.52 
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337        213.60        243.30        137.28        77.62         126.65        137.51 
338        176.87        209.23        82.56         90.05         109.65        104.92 
339        343.64        274.79        168.57        86.87         123.58        157.10 
340        272.80        256.41        126.65        120.20        122.05        183.24 
341        242.03        252.47        129.83        103.46        132.14        187.01 
342        327.60        291.13        167.34        149.40        157.15        184.61 
343        258.96        239.20        130.77        74.24         110.27        175.85 
344        270.14        221.09        113.76        101.18        110.65        127.64 
345        182.23        247.43        93.05         117.20        124.30        176.15 
346        391.03        370.63        139.11        156.88        135.00        179.29 
347        257.90        320.35        155.80        137.76        142.63        221.88 
348        313.37        335.56        165.34        81.55         135.61        147.37 
349        266.05        248.10        137.17        114.12        130.15        162.23 
350        325.83        226.80        128.23        68.15         107.24        145.99 
351        273.74        262.45        132.30        144.77        140.34        186.06 
352        269.32        278.08        134.32        100.69        129.31        151.51 
353        231.36        253.44        123.74        108.35        122.25        148.29 
354        314.20        282.10        151.60        120.10        141.13        160.94 
355        347.12        293.01        189.33        119.01        149.74        161.75 
356        228.03        224.81        108.17        77.05         120.04        123.41 
357        216.15        219.73        105.72        84.01         117.13        116.41 
358        305.76        281.99        157.02        122.37        132.73        179.75 
359        326.32        299.11        164.36        139.22        136.14        142.17 
360        242.55        251.53        115.87        76.35         111.97        103.63 
361        194.77        289.64        115.22        127.48        136.32        200.02 
362        241.48        268.49        136.36        113.49        132.43        178.43 
363        251.18        352.23        145.55        116.36        124.93        161.35 
364        208.82        235.27        119.93        111.43        128.28        145.49 
365        252.11        256.03        123.20        93.29         117.87        198.49 
366        408.46        429.04        259.36        110.13        155.29        194.46 
367        275.31        329.21        140.23        83.24         132.26        153.65 
368        220.07        293.94        135.98        120.47        119.93        127.24 
369        354.42        279.46        173.37        80.30         142.78        165.90 
370        327.10        377.94        213.71        126.25        166.67        223.92 
371        306.56        307.38        150.08        102.48        131.60        139.33 
372        300.16        260.64        139.37        117.47        133.74        175.64 
373        291.35        323.83        169.76        115.64        126.25        170.23 
374        229.44        267.45        144.88        61.70         114.18        143.45 
375        368.60        365.19        166.07        148.30        157.54        220.13 
376        235.71        268.72        137.36        102.54        122.52        167.83 
377        217.46        222.45        124.79        86.46         123.16        166.60 
378        263.70        223.33        129.47        72.32         120.75        127.79 
379        226.87        230.07        118.59        106.17        119.51        146.74 
380        228.60        263.42        111.57        97.32         114.73        173.25 
381        261.79        301.99        154.05        107.83        138.51        148.86 
382        314.79        290.12        144.65        123.04        133.82        146.03 
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383        222.02        275.73        127.69        93.89         121.35        158.94 
384        294.62        274.17        166.54        103.97        138.48        177.09 
385        269.22        302.56        131.91        125.88        121.45        176.86 
386        307.06        384.04        180.96        142.53        170.98        215.67 
387        256.54        244.51        133.57        90.47         113.03        122.68 
388        340.29        303.99        177.36        90.43         139.37        175.16 
389        156.57        265.36        100.52        73.58         101.38        97.99 
390        244.32        271.68        149.55        110.50        144.03        184.44 
391        334.77        238.29        138.60        99.57         132.07        128.87 
392        205.49        273.35        138.86        69.65         111.70        129.41 
393        282.25        235.84        129.64        79.50         114.31        142.45 
394        303.01        309.18        195.85        122.74        150.97        185.70 
395        226.55        279.62        144.03        127.00        130.71        206.37 
396        363.13        276.59        161.57        70.32         122.01        139.03 
397        305.39        231.33        131.33        80.78         119.47        95.07 
398        293.55        305.74        158.37        87.32         131.76        144.24 
399        284.32        276.15        163.82        77.89         129.67        177.60 
400        296.20        294.98        155.76        94.93         134.01        176.82 
401        186.74        286.23        119.12        136.16        134.59        191.80 
402        298.73        261.01        145.14        64.31         115.58        79.02 
403        275.57        250.57        151.36        143.05        141.57        212.48 
404        232.13        250.04        117.52        104.18        120.31        153.35 
405        357.07        291.31        147.68        158.72        142.46        195.03 
406        259.91        286.70        156.81        106.53        130.58        199.70 
407        292.14        281.19        134.60        124.71        130.78        180.12 
408        279.77        319.17        174.32        103.04        133.50        150.06 
409        224.87        255.96        138.31        82.85         117.62        98.45 
410        235.59        248.93        129.13        123.13        131.83        162.11 
411        243.11        297.81        152.34        95.76         124.43        152.74 
412        263.38        257.52        155.19        81.89         133.16        178.32 
413        386.12        347.88        225.82        128.42        149.43        191.68 
414        204.14        263.22        118.11        93.99         123.52        160.32 
415        312.94        255.12        144.97        92.96         134.18        166.08 
416        354.62        319.43        171.55        116.89        164.89        191.16 
417        443.88        318.69        171.94        97.63         137.31        169.76 
418        320.98        313.51        148.06        87.71         123.30        160.42 
419        240.58        291.00        144.32        85.22         124.72        175.94 
420        224.12        272.39        146.90        155.93        159.91        228.82 
421        230.44        270.59        123.36        109.38        112.71        143.68 
422        275.90        297.53        163.38        107.87        146.22        204.76 
423        336.33        241.97        139.63        98.71         122.47        155.41 
424        227.10        268.73        127.15        89.38         114.84        158.52 
425        320.02        258.47        141.11        76.99         101.69        106.74 
426        381.70        306.15        187.71        120.32        137.62        202.13 
427        274.43        238.05        110.16        116.21        121.03        184.05 
428        371.01        296.30        149.41        136.59        135.26        186.78 
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429        239.91        334.02        178.41        128.04        145.38        194.01 
430        230.02        276.88        132.88        91.00         103.85        116.82 
431        258.75        281.56        158.55        83.33         125.24        161.94 
432        268.26        282.47        138.66        153.42        136.70        188.35 
433        364.00        326.65        213.89        146.68        163.26        230.01 
434        311.03        327.25        167.80        152.34        147.70        215.17 
435        374.92        349.14        199.32        124.50        158.57        204.99 
436        237.64        228.94        128.07        118.13        124.35        108.43 
437        260.85        264.23        128.81        108.50        120.66        138.26 
438        234.58        281.32        134.40        125.31        126.01        205.34 
439        320.55        280.17        144.54        109.22        136.88        155.52 
440        248.89        293.21        149.01        122.00        129.14        207.05 
441        212.58        231.76        120.72        74.89         102.74        102.74 
442        314.39        324.46        160.47        117.04        147.04        182.77 
443        349.13        321.64        191.57        101.32        145.57        207.77 
444        208.06        253.79        120.24        108.75        129.61        168.49 
445        199.48        260.24        117.93        84.62         112.32        123.25 
446        321.79        298.39        154.91        112.86        128.73        167.41 
447        254.20        212.70        133.71        94.19         117.23        174.10 
448        193.97        272.87        117.35        110.36        123.85        151.61 
449        274.68        279.16        183.89        112.97        147.46        218.54 
450        183.77        219.10        130.55        83.60         126.49        168.29 
451        324.39        336.54        160.80        162.35        167.92        197.80 
452        378.45        261.27        167.96        107.49        155.43        203.04 
453        345.34        299.99        165.60        127.12        144.40        157.75 
454        280.52        287.08        140.61        84.12         126.55        178.71 
455        394.39        315.89        164.50        100.94        135.87        158.11 
456        295.80        288.03        139.10        110.25        137.83        130.00 
457        261.28        261.50        116.92        105.12        119.90        149.53 
458        251.28        258.66        147.45        128.79        143.25        144.55 
459        283.85        201.12        131.66        74.50         116.31        177.99 
460        230.65        259.28        123.52        118.83        133.40        148.64 
461        260.20        301.59        136.05        135.80        134.13        179.62 
462        225.98        236.58        119.31        85.82         113.17        143.30 
463        309.42        295.50        184.57        108.87        140.90        187.17 
464        300.69        244.25        154.22        91.73         124.22        170.27 
465        261.53        246.50        125.73        95.88         113.99        173.69 
466        371.87        271.12        154.13        105.24        142.90        160.87 
467        272.59        221.46        105.87        96.26         120.55        136.94 
468        218.98        264.43        145.46        100.14        127.70        187.29 
469        264.23        222.62        141.20        71.30         119.36        163.28 
470        384.13        283.25        197.12        107.65        143.38        186.41 
471        280.10        226.27        114.63        91.13         125.85        148.37 
472        335.43        284.35        150.13        101.46        138.24        177.39 
473        319.53        323.07        169.06        111.17        132.78        147.84 
474        257.66        310.23        162.36        109.15        137.71        207.41 
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475        345.83        262.70        147.10        93.67         121.54        136.58 
476        364.82        309.80        152.24        105.29        127.59        142.68 
477        241.25        225.27        133.10        81.76         115.04        169.45 
478        286.66        249.21        138.88        121.39        135.79        192.91 
479        388.36        307.28        173.00        125.83        154.51        149.05 
480        268.48        252.74        153.14        90.31         137.46        154.55 
481        315.39        315.54        153.67        103.82        125.17        158.80 
482        211.42        216.18        108.88        73.37         116.02        107.93 
483        193.28        235.00        128.05        96.35         121.28        154.72 
484        369.17        330.84        178.07        110.59        145.51        169.29 
485        281.33        265.71        144.11        89.58         125.05        179.13 
486        342.43        268.35        170.91        141.80        153.36        220.91 
487        321.90        350.43        184.99        107.06        146.28        200.96 
488        285.35        254.30        125.18        75.14         110.94        90.33 
489        209.27        266.42        118.94        110.93        127.13        134.20 
490        238.70        240.26        108.71        104.23        109.59        158.48 
491        292.43        285.10        174.71        116.43        125.59        211.30 
492        244.09        296.69        147.46        125.55        148.03        210.66 
493        203.58        241.12        116.26        94.49         115.83        166.38 
494        245.77        260.11        122.00        109.43        132.18        171.95 
495        255.96        277.89        139.93        116.76        126.74        183.58 
496        228.96        254.51        116.53        102.85        116.83        146.33 
497        303.84        305.29        178.89        112.58        148.68        174.53 
498        215.78        241.79        128.55        98.81         125.41        188.02 
499        310.46        256.80        146.24        84.96         116.15        168.01 
500        210.24        233.69        137.97        72.02         120.40        130.95; 
 
 Scalars 
        psi           "risk aversion parameter"    /0/                                                                  
        w           "wage rate/hour "     /0.7/                                                                  
        totfl        "available family labour(hours}"   /1656.05/                                                                  
        tothl        "total hired labour(hours)"    /2090.38/                                                               
        probi        "probability of occurrence for i"   /0.002/                                                                  
        land          "household land base(acres)"    /12.7/                                                                  
        otfexp      "other farm expenses(GHC)"    /207.698/                                                                  
        otnfexp    "other non-farm expenses(GHC)"   /220.188/                                                                  
        otfinc       "other farm income(GHC)"    /631.821/                                                                  
        otnfinc      "other non-farm income(GHC)"   /597.56/                                                                  
        maobland  "Observed acres allocated to maize"   /2.513/                                                                  
        grobland    "Observed acres allocated to groundnut"  /2.814/                                                                  
        miobland  "Observed acres allocated to millet"   /1.985/                                                                 
        coobland    "Observed acres allocated to cowpea"  /2.839/                                                                  
        soobland    "Observed acres allocated to sorghum"  /1.201/                                                                  
        riobland    "Observed acres allocated to rice"   /0.603/ 
                                                                  
Variables 
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         z1            "negative exponential objective function" 
         sumlanddev "sum deviation of predicted acres from observed for all crops"; 
 
Positive variables 
         acre(d)         "acres of production for crop d" 
         prout(i,d)       "predicted output (kg)" 
         sell(i,d)        "d sold(kg) in i" 
         pur(i,d)         "d purchased(kg) in i" 
         con(i,d)         "d consumed(kg) in i" 
         ps(d)            "selling price(GHC/kg) of d" 
         val(d)           "consumption value(GHC/kg) for d" 
         hl(d)            "hired labour(hours)allocated to d" 
         fl(d)            "family labour(hours) allocated to d" 
         tl(d)            "total  labour(hours)for d" 
          
Equations 
        OBJ1  "expected utility function (negative exponential)" 
         OUTCON "output constraint" 
        LANDCON "land constraint" 
         LABCON "labour constraint" 
         LABCON2 "labour constraint" 
         LABCON3 "labour constraint" 
         LABCON4 "labour constraint" 
         USECON "use constraint" 
         INCEXPCON "income-expenditure constraint" 
         SELLPRICE "Selling-purchasing prices conversion" 
         CONSUMVAL "Consumption value-purchase price conversion"; 
 
OBJ1  .. z1=e=sum(i,probi*(1-exp(-psi*(sum(d,val(d)*con(i,d)))))); 
 
OUTCON(i,d)      ..      prout(i,d)=e=yld(i,d)*acre(d); 
 
LANDCON(i)      ..      sum(d,acre(d))=e=11.955; 
 
LABCON(i,d)      ..      lahrs(d)*acre(d)=l=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
LABCON2(i)       ..      sum(d,fl(d))=l=totfl; 
 
LABCON4(i)       ..      sum(d,hl(d))=l=tothl; 
 
LABCON3(i,d)    ..      tl(d)=e=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
USECON(i,d)       ..      con(i,d)=e=yld(i,d)*acre(d)+pur(i,d)-sell(i,d)-otuse(d); 
 
INCEXPCON(i)    ..     sum(d,(vc(d)*acre(d)))+sum(d,(hl(d)*w))+ 
      sum(d,(pp(d)*pur(i,d)))+OTFEXP+OTNFEXP=l= 
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                           sum(d,(ps(d)*sell(i,d)))+OTFINC+OTNFINC; 
 
SELLPRICE(d)     ..      ps(d)=e=gamma(d)*pp(d); 
 
CONSUMVAL(d)  ..    val(d)=e=phi(d)*pp(d); 
 
Model    calibration /all/; 
 
Option   decimals=3; 
 
Option   nlp=GAMSCHK; 
 
calibration.bratio=1.0; 
 
calibration.workspace=330; 
 
calibration.solvelink=%solvelink.CallModule%; 
 
sets 
         risk  Risk aversion scenarios       /R1*R4/ 
         mascens   Maize consumption value scenarios  /ma1*ma3/ 
         grscens   Groundnut consumption value scenarios  /gr1*gr3/ 
         miscens   Millet consumption value scenarios   /mi1*mi3/ 
         coscens   Cowpea consumption value scenarios  /co1*co3/ 
         soscens   Sorghum consumption value scenarios /so1*so3/ 
         risns   Rice consumption value scenarios   /ri1*ri3/ 
 
Parameters       output(*,*,*,*,*,*,*,*,*) Comparative summary 
 
loop(risk, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                 psi=psi+0.004; 
                         phi("maize")=0; 
 
loop(mascens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                 phi("maize")=phi("maize")+0.25; 
                         phi("groundnut")=0.25; 
 
         loop(grscens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                 phi("groundnut")=phi("groundnut")+0.25; 
                         phi("millet")=0.25; 
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         loop(miscens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                 phi("millet")=phi("millet")+0.25; 
                         phi("cowpea")=0.25; 
 
         loop(coscens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                 phi("cowpea")=phi("cowpea")+0.25; 
                  phi("sorghum")=0.25; 
 
         loop(soscens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                  phi("sorghum")=phi("sorghum")+0.25; 
                         phi("rice")=0.25; 
 
         loop(riscens, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
                  phi("rice")=phi("rice")+0.25; 
 
Option   nlp=minos; 
Solve calibration using nlp maximizing z1; 
 
sumlanddev.l=sqr(acre.l("maize")-maobland)+sqr(acre.l("groundnut")-grobland)+ 
sqr(acre.l("millet")-miobland)+sqr(acre.l("cowpea")-coobland)+sqr(acre.l("sorghum")-
soobland)+sqr(acre.l("rice")-riobland); 
 
output("Acres 
Allocateed",d,risk,mascens,grscens,miscens,coscens,soscens,riscens)=acre.l(d); 
output("sum of  squared acres deviation","",risk,mascens,grscens,miscens,coscens,soscens, 
riscens)=sumlanddev.l 
); 
); 
); 
); 
); 
); 
); 
$libinclude xldump output calibration.xlsx sheet1! 
 
Option output: 3:7:1; 
Display output; 
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Appendix C2: Base Model 
$Title                          BASE MODEL 
 
$inlinecom /* */ 
$offlisting 
$offsymxref offsymlist 
 
Option 
    limrow = 10000000,    /*equations listed per block*/ 
    limcol = 0,            /*variables listed per block" */ 
    solprint = on,        /* "solver's solution output printed*/ 
    sysout = off;         /*solver's system output printed*/ 
 
Sets 
    i state of nature    /1*500/ 
    d crops              /maize, groundnut, millet, cowpea, sorghum, rice / 
 
Parameters 
         lahrs(d)       "labour requirement(hours/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         248.59 
                                                          Groundnut     399.50 
                                                          Millet        238.20 
                                                          Cowpea        208.20 
                                                          Sorghum       239.28 
                                                          Rice          326.24/ 
 
         vc(d)          "variable cost{GHC/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         38.27 
                                                          Groundnut  114.56 
                                                          Millet        30.85 
                                                          Cowpea        43.68 
                                                          Sorghum       39.60 
                                                          Rice          50.34/ 
 
         otuse(d)       "d for other uses(kg)" 
                                                         /Maize         46.71 
                                                          Groundnut     126.58 
                                                          Millet        39.19 
                                                          Cowpea        17.11 
                                                          Sorghum       43.37 
                                                          Rice          36.16/ 
 
         pp(d)        "purchase price(GHC/kg) of d" 
                                                         /Maize         0.53 
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                                                          Groundnut     1.67 
                                                          Millet        0.75 
                                                          Cowpea        1.11 
                                                          Sorghum       0.76 
                                                          Rice          1.26/ 
 
         phi(d)      "value of consumption-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.5 
                                                          Groundnut     0.5 
                                                          Millet        0.5 
                                                          Cowpea        0.5 
                                                          Sorghum       0.5 
                                                          Rice          0.5/ 
 
         gamma(d)    "sale-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.8 
                                                          Groundnut     0.8 
                                                          Millet        0.8 
                                                          Cowpea        0.8 
                                                          Sorghum       0.8 
                                                          Rice          0.8/; 
 
*INSERT “Table    yld(i,d)       "yield(kg/acre) for d in i"” in APPENDIX C1 HERE!!! 
 
Scalars 
        psi           "risk aversion parameter"    /0/                                                                  
        w           "wage rate/hour "     /0.7/                                                                  
        totfl        "available family labour(hours}"   /1656.05/                                                                  
        tothl        "total hired labour(hours)"    /2090.38/                                                               
        probi        "probability of occurrence for i"   /0.002/                                                                  
        land          "household land base(acres)"    /12.7/                                                                  
        otfexp      "other farm expenses(GHC)"    /207.698/                                                                  
        otnfexp    "other non-farm expenses(GHC)"   /220.188/                                                                  
        otfinc       "other farm income(GHC)"    /631.821/                                                                  
        otnfinc      "other non-farm income(GHC)"   /597.56/                                                                  
        maobland  "Observed acres allocated to maize"   /2.513/                                                                  
        grobland    "Observed acres allocated to groundnut"  /2.814/                                                                  
        miobland  "Observed acres allocated to millet"   /1.985/                                                                 
        coobland    "Observed acres allocated to cowpea"  /2.839/                                                                  
        soobland    "Observed acres allocated to sorghum"  /1.201/                                                                  
        riobland    "Observed acres allocated to rice"   /0.603/ 
                                                                  
Variables 
         z1            "negative exponential objective function" 
         sumlanddev "sum deviation of predicted acres from observed for all crops"; 
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Positive variables 
         acre(d)         "acres of production for crop d" 
         prout(i,d)       "predicted output (kg)" 
         sell(i,d)        "d sold(kg) in i" 
         pur(i,d)         "d purchased(kg) in i" 
         con(i,d)         "d consumed(kg) in i" 
         ps(d)            "selling price(GHC/kg) of d" 
         val(d)           "consumption value(GHC/kg) for d" 
         hl(d)            "hired labour(hours)allocated to d" 
         fl(d)            "family labour(hours) allocated to d" 
         tl(d)            "total  labour(hours)for d" 
         expvalcon          "expected value of consumption"; 
 
Equations 
        OBJ1  "expected utility function (negative exponential)" 
         OUTCON "output constraint" 
        LANDCON "land constraint" 
         LABCON "labour constraint" 
         LABCON2 "labour constraint" 
         LABCON3 "labour constraint" 
         LABCON4 "labour constraint" 
         USECON "use constraint" 
         INCEXPCON "income-expenditure constraint" 
         SELLPRICE "Selling-purchasing prices conversion" 
         CONSUMVAL "Consumption value-purchase price conversion"; 
 
 
OBJ1  .. z1=e=sum(i,probi*(1-exp(-psi*(sum(d,val(d)*con(i,d)))))); 
 
OUTCON(i,d)      ..      prout(i,d)=e=yld(i,d)*acre(d); 
 
LANDCON(i)      ..      sum(d,acre(d))=e=11.955; 
 
LABCON(i,d)      ..      lahrs(d)*acre(d)=l=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
LABCON2(i)       ..      sum(d,fl(d))=l=totfl; 
 
LABCON4(i)       ..      sum(d,hl(d))=l=tothl; 
 
LABCON3(i,d)    ..      tl(d)=e=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
USECON(i,d)       ..      con(i,d)=e=yld(i,d)*acre(d)+pur(i,d)-sell(i,d)-otuse(d); 
 
INCEXPCON(i)    ..     sum(d,(vc(d)*acre(d)))+sum(d,(hl(d)*w))+ 
      sum(d,(pp(d)*pur(i,d)))+OTFEXP+OTNFEXP=l= 
 173 
 
                           sum(d,(ps(d)*sell(i,d)))+OTFINC+OTNFINC; 
 
SELLPRICE(d)     ..      ps(d)=e=gamma(d)*pp(d); 
 
CONSUMVAL(d)  ..    val(d)=e=phi(d)*pp(d); 
 
Model    diversification /all/; 
 
Option   decimals=3; 
 
Option   nlp=GAMSCHK; 
 
diversification.bratio=1.0; 
 
Set scenarios /R1*R4/ 
 
Parameters 
         Output (*,*,*) Comparative summary 
         Riskaver(scenarios) Risk aversion scenarios  /R1 0.008 
                                                         R2 0.012 
                                                         R3 0.016 
                                                         R4 0.020/; 
 
loop(scenarios, 
option clear=z1,clear=acre,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=val; 
         psi=riskaver(scenarios); 
 
Option   nlp=minos; 
Solve diversification using nlp maximizing z1; 
 
expvalcon.l=sum((i,d),con.l(i,d)*val.l(d))*0.002; 
 
output('Risk Parameter','',scenarios)=PSI; 
output('Acreage Allocation',d,scenarios)=acre.l(d); 
output('Objective Value','',scenarios)=Z1.l; 
output('Expected Value of Consumption','',scenarios)=expvalcon.l; 
); 
 
Display output; 
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Appendix C3: Insurance Model 
$Title                          INSURANCE MODEL 
 
$inlinecom /* */ 
$offlisting 
$offsymxref offsymlist 
 
Option 
    limrow = 10000000,    /*equations listed per block*/ 
    limcol = 0,            /*variables listed per block" */ 
    solprint = on,        /* "solver's solution output printed*/ 
    sysout = off;         /*solver's system output printed*/ 
 
Sets 
    i state of nature   /1*500/ 
    d crops               /maize, groundnut, millet, cowpea, sorghum, rice / 
 
Parameters 
         lahrs(d)        "labour requirement(hours/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         248.59 
                                                          Groundnut     399.50 
                                                          Millet        238.20 
                                                          Cowpea        208.20 
                                                          Sorghum       239.28 
                                                          Rice          326.24/ 
 
         vc(d)           "variable cost{GHC/acre) for d" 
                                                         /Maize         38.27 
                                                          Groundnut  114.56 
                                                          Millet        30.85 
                                                          Cowpea        43.68 
                                                          Sorghum       39.60 
                                                          Rice          50.34/ 
 
         otuse(d)        "d for other uses(kg)" 
                                                         /Maize         46.71 
                                                          Groundnut     126.58 
                                                          Millet        39.19 
                                                          Cowpea        17.11 
                                                          Sorghum       43.37 
                                                          Rice          36.16/ 
 
         pp(d)          "purchase price(GHC/kg) of d" 
                                                         /Maize         0.53 
                                                          Groundnut     1.67 
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                                                          Millet        0.75 
                                                          Cowpea        1.11 
                                                          Sorghum       0.76 
                                                          Rice          1.26/ 
 
         phi(d)        "value of consumption-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.5 
                                                          Groundnut     0.5 
                                                          Millet        0.5 
                                                          Cowpea        0.5 
                                                          Sorghum       0.5 
                                                          Rice          0.5/ 
 
         gamma(d)     "sale-purchase price scaling factor" 
                                                         /Maize         0.8 
                                                          Groundnut     0.8 
                                                          Millet        0.8 
                                                          Cowpea        0.8 
                                                          Sorghum       0.8 
                                                          Rice          0.8/ 
 
         EL(d)         "Expected loss(Kg)" 
 
         avgyld(d)     "Average Area Yiels" 
 
         yc(d)         "Critical Yield" 
 
         yldif(i,d)    "Difference between Observed Area and Critical yields"; 
 
*INSERT “Table    yld(i,d)       "yield(kg/acre) for d in i"” in APPENDIX C1 HERE!!! 
 
Table obsareayld(i,d) Observed area yields 
        Maize        Groundnut        Millet        Cowpea        Sorghum        Rice 
1          550.11        595.24        396.53        588.79        360.44        512.44 
2          611.40        551.88        407.86        553.91        382.86        624.24 
3          393.69        526.89        336.69        366.92        344.67        399.84 
4          472.38        533.26        371.52        479.25        359.17        529.94 
5          465.37        509.45        317.69        364.00        307.57        418.45 
6          425.01        764.07        397.49        516.14        343.61        482.58 
7          448.07        628.19        317.07        633.27        368.62        482.17 
8          434.85        603.74        332.06        483.87        350.57        334.01 
9          519.16        477.03        246.74        475.18        289.59        220.34 
10        580.50        842.38        439.88        508.21        356.04        410.29 
11        601.94        594.76        414.67        460.07        366.47        536.90 
12        540.27        582.41        299.89        522.67        342.91        370.06 
13        546.67        491.98        310.86        348.47        290.30        377.55 
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14        613.09        638.09        359.26        628.32        384.45        541.58 
15        294.47        406.66        279.66        360.96        316.17        357.00 
16        527.40        626.39        393.31        380.71        337.28        446.80 
17        426.20        389.24        304.88        556.36        350.02        521.70 
18        448.31        479.38        330.57        436.29        329.70        412.46 
19        309.88        556.75        293.70        583.70        336.81        430.24 
20        536.67        691.23        392.35        498.17        368.46        549.58 
21        456.51        503.40        404.56        464.68        346.93        575.35 
22        422.84        487.38        276.43        449.39        280.56        279.13 
23        318.01        420.47        288.88        496.32        355.16        492.49 
24        547.19        513.88        326.87        448.07        308.17        487.43 
25        465.96        536.49        336.49        423.34        302.99        367.97 
26        494.13        558.79        315.02        524.55        342.49        417.85 
27        381.22        495.23        306.27        459.05        315.23        350.27 
28        392.87        510.24        321.87        504.02        353.19        596.65 
29        395.55        493.68        289.69        532.32        366.91        589.03 
30        359.72        589.80        299.18        671.07        363.98        489.95 
31        473.95        602.88        394.71        472.43        365.04        554.06 
32        402.12        497.79        303.93        346.04        315.00        304.58 
33        504.54        634.57        402.72        456.55        352.98        497.36 
34        307.88        453.12        240.55        354.86        312.73        458.29 
35        524.77        637.03        389.48        714.18        379.75        511.58 
36        589.26        517.27        305.90        500.89        339.76        475.23 
37        432.61        569.11        323.23        477.80        314.08        399.15 
38        533.20        641.81        425.52        742.99        438.89        524.62 
39        387.79        481.28        331.21        466.61        335.31        508.09 
40        301.44        504.46        257.20        565.82        322.11        521.20 
41        374.87        543.54        278.53        493.04        312.31        436.68 
42        561.09        562.36        365.50        394.23        308.89        469.57 
43        504.08        502.79        348.01        378.50        315.48        418.83 
44        379.38        518.43        309.72        392.59        288.82        329.43 
45        411.20        437.10        270.12        377.04        298.59        454.99 
46        391.68        514.07        335.19        344.52        312.87        447.96 
47        531.04        468.44        319.95        491.28        381.04        471.59 
48        518.57        478.60        317.80        410.13        325.75        348.92 
49        432.07        378.73        245.75        363.38        314.41        365.48 
50        472.44        507.19        361.41        564.50        345.82        557.85 
51        298.01        369.08        230.72        361.55        282.45        423.78 
52        479.30        552.44        402.28        787.76        451.49        615.32 
53        475.30        441.45        297.38        526.16        323.22        342.44 
54        606.65        494.34        377.51        484.99        350.70        500.11 
55        725.14        577.95        424.51        555.52        401.65        590.64 
56        328.24        442.26        257.60        404.24        295.42        411.52 
57        392.45        477.76        263.04        468.18        330.75        435.29 
58        573.73        467.12        363.02        316.26        298.72        370.69 
59        279.19        475.34        341.55        417.62        360.65        540.13 
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60        384.04        440.55        294.46        531.41        336.91        519.02 
61        434.34        434.01        298.30        389.91        334.51        455.74 
62        429.83        493.99        287.16        459.73        318.17        394.25 
63        348.69        461.61        214.53        499.93        298.04        431.50 
64        450.23        471.82        299.80        505.95        328.41        410.20 
65        488.48        548.10        382.10        474.61        340.41        495.67 
66        331.93        485.40        301.93        513.59        316.87        573.88 
67        566.28        485.25        312.41        339.70        324.48        512.08 
68        475.22        515.49        343.49        502.78        307.82        439.40 
69        444.41        490.48        299.31        428.09        347.44        328.65 
70        385.47        587.02        297.25        557.98        331.97        494.15 
71        430.02        510.54        308.65        403.06        292.16        421.59 
72        440.73        435.79        311.99        398.57        340.00        392.82 
73        571.72        468.24        304.24        427.46        336.50        461.71 
74        403.32        630.71        420.75        528.09        355.70        499.76 
75        481.12        374.31        315.71        368.90        327.49        388.42 
76        505.38        488.89        326.74        370.81        331.00        404.89 
77        439.56        471.47        337.37        364.65        291.94        455.44 
78        502.90        505.91        324.75        552.90        363.79        516.80 
79        365.96        583.16        334.49        425.91        295.75        542.28 
80        446.91        458.59        350.81        331.67        354.93        306.44 
81        425.44        505.18        293.07        428.34        346.25        399.40 
82        446.42        484.79        293.31        255.49        302.58        281.57 
83        420.55        580.06        322.04        457.23        329.31        375.15 
84        488.85        506.42        307.79        376.47        327.26        301.64 
85        518.28        682.27        361.19        616.09        413.36        578.22 
86        381.92        443.93        290.52        507.50        312.47        469.53 
87        435.80        517.60        320.49        443.43        317.67        436.33 
88        428.01        452.22        261.77        275.35        272.12        213.54 
89        378.97        417.07        262.10        441.03        301.39        451.02 
90        351.29        470.31        304.54        420.31        304.05        327.13 
91        542.79        573.11        406.69        311.77        317.40        478.69 
92        600.18        576.43        354.33        525.53        372.24        528.45 
93        507.01        572.19        400.35        602.29        405.42        534.78 
94        636.31        585.12        373.12        681.74        383.39        605.51 
95        548.90        559.46        380.77        509.61        366.70        506.76 
96        461.14        466.57        256.32        631.41        352.51        501.99 
97        458.59        488.63        323.90        320.33        303.90        424.49 
98        377.07        409.28        288.03        520.16        325.06        436.92 
99        337.41        448.55        242.35        432.65        290.72        374.31 
100        681.37        591.95        542.90        579.07        430.87        548.23 
101        360.36        488.05        314.14        333.62        299.35        391.42 
102        538.75        469.04        351.68        431.23        333.57        419.07 
103        476.67        725.15        427.86        592.26        386.66        561.68 
104        469.89        586.77        370.87        528.53        368.16        516.15 
105        487.06        519.08        362.47        449.71        362.11        414.30 
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106        418.08        387.73        295.00        359.90        312.00        379.67 
107        481.27        507.75        253.98        435.82        297.71        345.18 
108        284.82        436.32        177.07        530.23        258.73        247.74 
109        507.77        492.27        384.05        433.13        354.68        484.94 
110        448.77        405.34        226.90        405.25        307.33        381.50 
111        357.14        384.89        258.17        375.59        316.78        451.91 
112        494.77        609.71        330.84        515.49        336.17        466.48 
113        445.31        560.13        328.81        545.16        356.29        456.65 
114        321.43        522.24        357.38        499.27        388.80        566.93 
115        455.07        558.55        359.99        402.21        339.37        393.38 
116        394.74        433.01        226.49        429.24        287.73        333.39 
117        491.12        635.29        385.08        636.11        420.35        545.85 
118        353.85        443.54        231.66        565.10        329.88        335.12 
119        462.26        469.51        326.13        538.65        393.34        537.04 
120        414.16        422.81        282.67        442.23        313.65        488.86 
121        516.10        539.00        406.00        501.52        373.47        563.73 
122        343.91        488.38        296.48        411.33        326.12        457.09 
123        417.84        567.87        326.44        613.88        322.94        472.29 
124        401.53        591.15        345.52        424.14        319.74        396.62 
125        438.86        479.53        414.18        413.06        371.83        538.07 
126        515.70        665.56        443.12        494.67        402.65        471.86 
127        382.47        516.99        311.46        477.02        323.56        535.07 
128        529.67        668.45        348.99        612.14        371.02        556.04 
129        510.70        479.08        310.10        521.25        357.80        564.28 
130        569.45        565.86        390.11        433.65        362.74        486.27 
131        443.96        562.67        369.06        527.43        361.89        580.68 
132        363.50        441.71        237.32        409.34        316.53        372.24 
133        404.85        457.62        222.98        441.48        255.80        323.55 
134        315.21        541.96        267.93        289.71        263.04        150.59 
135        341.61        556.13        305.54        550.99        334.78        544.20 
136        362.34        485.93        272.70        444.58        334.98        347.40 
137        423.75        525.64        360.88        381.29        357.30        428.19 
138        537.60        481.63        349.74        340.46        332.50        387.72 
139        484.59        706.21        345.26        485.88        365.12        421.92 
140        459.18        618.78        371.91        532.69        343.03        463.52 
141        386.61        524.68        375.57        335.80        371.72        486.96 
142        369.11        427.36        298.50        352.01        296.01        341.49 
143        413.46        534.37        372.26        430.15        347.97        432.39 
144        264.36        426.37        156.06        407.48        273.44        291.76 
145        531.41        447.49        319.20        386.17        331.20        385.58 
146        503.71        657.29        501.68        471.04        391.31        497.02 
147        615.39        546.63        348.65        347.41        285.96        303.18 
148        511.38        511.43        358.35        401.36        331.32        519.93 
149        412.85        535.57        328.23        410.99        338.87        499.20 
150        444.68        499.98        323.83        397.67        305.72        353.80 
151        339.58        662.79        364.64        489.11        351.63        562.32 
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152        453.27        489.57        316.49        535.87        349.33        536.11 
153        571.43        554.28        374.27        382.49        357.58        453.60 
154        403.66        508.19        328.09        362.41        328.86        403.89 
155        468.52        598.45        379.01        462.71        351.36        477.85 
156        686.62        523.62        384.41        497.11        361.23        489.37 
157        440.54        495.66        369.95        330.78        330.34        294.72 
158        666.56        484.20        347.28        466.18        367.31        444.92 
159        432.91        527.56        275.72        445.34        289.77        475.60 
160        461.83        512.65        321.23        425.35        345.53        459.30 
161        368.33        605.08        394.18        516.86        384.96        509.03 
162        452.58        589.52        298.15        625.27        337.46        439.60 
163        379.70        404.27        224.13        392.51        280.02        241.05 
164        560.25        486.63        370.66        464.96        317.94        464.84 
165        410.08        457.24        247.02        393.99        283.59        366.64 
166        411.66        464.86        366.09        273.13        292.87        351.96 
167        414.82        418.09        263.45        357.71        330.86        363.15 
168        410.54        414.94        259.66        377.59        319.52        315.99 
169        469.03        530.18        342.70        408.38        384.24        474.48 
170        395.67        470.77        325.85        492.10        325.56        443.39 
171        342.38        618.00        333.40        479.89        369.03        458.01 
172        490.55        538.38        331.55        379.33        320.17        339.86 
173        558.03        504.65        337.96        504.77        338.06        468.55 
174        348.13        414.45        199.09        390.81        248.17        298.75 
175        367.22        523.37        315.59        336.09        299.76        437.87 
176        445.53        523.03        332.70        488.67        352.06        473.31 
177        437.29        429.71        260.44        438.15        286.15        193.73 
178        372.20        537.66        315.40        469.15        341.81        506.28 
179        387.02        440.25        241.46        476.21        346.79        448.38 
180        493.69        554.87        332.94        463.23        365.43        508.71 
181        500.98        600.67        430.33        491.67        381.39        454.70 
182        447.46        462.98        313.95        393.41        309.80        440.27 
183        522.07        616.53        395.90        353.72        318.64        429.31 
184        576.06        568.07        383.52        623.24        378.77        510.54 
185        471.14        526.19        324.36        497.44        377.22        491.62 
186        355.60        461.93        267.20        468.10        298.22        336.37 
187        545.48        585.82        352.11        562.06        352.79        526.44 
188        321.95        555.39        300.19        540.03        348.86        483.61 
189        460.27        480.55        302.90        453.70        340.19        504.36 
190        336.78        350.80        253.83        405.75        310.43        367.47 
191        591.16        584.69        381.75        483.08        359.34        482.92 
192        436.78        678.21        463.41        541.28        393.01        570.49 
193        521.11        446.52        272.22        396.20        292.63        270.86 
194        407.14        529.58        329.29        440.07        325.29        493.58 
195        506.67        560.77        476.54        546.40        404.01        539.45 
196        491.92        582.16        322.38        460.33        333.19        344.09 
197        396.38        536.27        288.40        582.72        320.88        496.60 
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198        507.91        571.29        367.84        477.79        343.35        454.30 
199        513.39        454.03        331.20        341.88        323.44        376.90 
200        621.09        483.61        339.64        519.02        374.85        438.98 
201        442.46        431.84        236.47        355.80        270.90        284.52 
202        456.98        457.92        291.57        434.92        303.57        362.35 
203        389.41        497.25        304.30        407.33        305.55        373.54 
204        276.26        422.10        217.19        305.59        273.72        307.87 
205        535.79        625.06        417.86        575.11        379.29        586.18 
206        477.80        438.92        287.63        396.86        324.32        376.02 
207        360.68        472.88        311.92        517.50        321.00        494.64 
208        397.49        450.12        285.39        429.80        338.75        456.18 
209        514.48        538.46        334.60        404.43        308.41        423.46 
210        464.28        519.52        314.37        485.54        321.62        381.95 
211        398.02        437.95        286.88        382.79        342.68        490.23 
212        520.27        639.75        457.14        650.43        372.83        585.30 
213        583.79        499.56        376.65        524.19        376.75        480.70 
214        459.43        514.51        302.51        438.30        296.86        464.08 
215        454.50        496.23        256.64        479.55        310.77        416.92 
216        383.25        390.72        238.50        417.36        278.95        286.43 
217        481.97        475.66        350.42        678.41        378.17        522.03 
218        329.83        505.53        278.80        665.21        375.30        493.69 
219        332.33        542.51        331.88        537.84        374.45        556.98 
220        362.65        489.31        318.84        387.88        309.34        422.44 
221        646.45        686.52        570.88        513.87        408.88        551.51 
222        400.18        472.22        327.32        385.45        330.44        433.56 
223        433.64        533.73        320.78        452.97        357.11        481.71 
224        470.19        498.90        327.63        415.04        341.07        458.97 
225        489.25        599.70        416.78        511.02        376.14        561.00 
226        429.25        463.49        264.79        313.70        271.53        237.11 
227        517.26        570.02        464.57        534.96        423.59        543.41 
228        393.35        491.40        306.57        443.93        334.31        517.92 
229        450.78        476.01        284.70        416.59        302.17        392.36 
230        343.11        464.67        277.82        365.77        294.19        369.34 
231        352.99        393.40        212.81        617.49        332.09        476.68 
232        384.72        497.46        335.03        435.34        326.29        429.75 
233        326.59        429.10        271.97        365.06        314.62        498.64 
234        598.20        595.88        366.44        456.19        358.39        465.72 
235        547.91        550.14        316.26        475.47        310.25        509.33 
236        487.34        524.18        306.79        391.10        304.23        419.54 
237        465.69        645.30        330.17        395.62        318.36        324.35 
238        316.46        407.66        280.10        379.76        283.93        318.99 
239        563.45        516.24        386.80        474.29        375.64        502.75 
240        404.97        537.19        295.38        488.28        338.47        479.50 
241        391.45        477.44        344.62        473.76        370.13        412.12 
242        596.06        444.08        300.77        442.46        341.01        457.56 
243        425.80        438.67        265.13        464.40        288.94        360.75 
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244        421.23        503.95        321.11        512.97        337.60        437.59 
245        608.81        674.16        474.46        604.18        424.06        595.68 
246        457.26        591.77        358.01        447.36        313.32        446.91 
247        488.05        557.55        300.58        576.27        322.86        514.48 
248        370.60        512.97        314.63        596.42        353.44        550.40 
249        463.19        577.04        343.07        555.03        345.14        500.97 
250        419.73        498.13        291.14        446.32        313.56        383.81 
251        567.91        545.11        368.62        436.57        355.33        496.32 
252        491.47        575.75        432.64        595.63        465.41        701.10 
253        419.50        492.78        253.23        322.99        265.21        355.97 
254        426.82        469.03        309.35        445.75        328.78        433.11 
255        460.56        483.05        344.88        356.20        319.01        397.58 
256        390.50        421.49        292.42        495.43        333.99        408.29 
257        421.88        621.84        378.32        502.06        355.91        505.97 
258        462.91        532.32        333.56        706.86        358.20        569.30 
259        273.16        399.76        201.60        285.90        251.60        407.17 
260        415.60        469.91        286.25        292.33        274.99        395.30 
261        286.04        346.29        195.02        240.78        237.76        383.45 
262        453.80        449.69        205.44        381.37        287.24        401.64 
263        538.90        503.19        338.12        400.72        322.62        377.92 
264        407.57        494.98        297.69        368.97        327.58        356.59 
265        355.20        549.85        318.74        609.84        370.40        531.43 
266        430.89        408.86        313.48        329.56        341.98        272.78 
267        486.40        459.84        335.63        448.39        331.56        296.88 
268        254.08        401.35        219.18        402.71        297.28        479.02 
269        585.89        474.96        324.47        461.33        349.19        459.63 
270        376.12        480.70        319.47        483.57        359.84        442.02 
271        603.95        647.68        403.71        471.95        389.67        461.24 
272        562.54        542.89        433.34        408.14        388.40        529.33 
273        484.11        520.60        329.65        507.04        369.52        488.06 
274        595.27        626.04        365.40        406.29        350.23        384.95 
275        289.00        415.86        229.25        421.86        294.54        355.11 
276        519.94        561.46        373.32        584.95        353.94        581.36 
277        492.67        604.62        410.09        653.24        415.94        553.05 
278        592.46        520.91        353.11        493.69        327.05        533.55 
279        568.34        549.04        358.92        444.67        351.04        449.96 
280        471.77        578.40        339.14        542.43        353.63        491.31 
281        417.20        413.31        286.11        334.60        306.66        389.28 
282        582.71        615.16        511.36        423.86        396.18        445.33 
283        541.16        537.00        387.90        446.91        348.65        501.61 
284        522.34        698.62        413.20        421.28        329.44        462.49 
285        435.25        546.27        367.26        496.08        397.29        495.10 
286        496.59        588.81        359.63        573.90        389.94        571.89 
287        378.13        533.06        375.93        412.12        329.57        505.09 
288        574.20        743.25        561.03        473.40        396.68        636.35 
289        299.80        459.29        248.63        425.64        309.08        484.59 
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290        449.32        597.05        352.89        567.41        380.56        566.35 
291        433.48        508.76        301.54        620.71        353.82        473.79 
292        701.09        577.17        338.68        470.72        340.76        290.98 
293        554.93        612.23        337.66        702.20        324.57        460.25 
294        451.24        547.26        291.93        422.41        315.54        449.22 
295        469.42        565.15        368.33        518.50        364.53        558.32 
296        350.68        411.73        251.00        373.11        297.55        257.46 
297        470.83        479.89        294.32        533.54        344.24        389.96 
298        540.95        514.86        317.50        468.67        358.89        467.27 
299        525.09        606.95        345.97        467.37        321.74        408.85 
300        389.69        500.67        305.79        569.13        318.10        476.85 
301        500.34        528.27        321.57        455.00        336.37        415.45 
302        587.65        579.15        340.29        511.37        309.99        487.58 
303        514.80        552.82        336.13        397.87        309.53        386.83 
304        349.50        424.65        276.10        578.71        341.55        480.41 
305        532.17        483.94        357.56        368.08        327.88        417.47 
306        406.41        425.50        280.48        399.00        311.70        342.70 
307        563.86        453.51        398.25        367.61        340.64        440.80 
308        449.91        516.75        360.42        490.14        343.81        509.98 
309        617.79        549.21        377.18        400.14        315.82        362.92 
310        388.56        532.50        339.31        451.35        336.10        407.90 
311        576.64        632.96        420.37        580.87        356.75        515.49 
312        409.60        435.02        259.21        262.94        265.51        177.59 
313        437.91        526.97        332.50        416.24        301.81        359.87 
314        399.00        466.26        266.70        521.97        328.20        426.54 
315        795.30        540.08        429.48        541.64        349.61        525.67 
316        439.94        539.35        308.22        534.17        351.23        503.92 
317        482.82        482.61        308.91        481.53        319.30        364.71 
318        396.74        446.53        298.86        422.97        305.30        349.28 
319        372.02        455.34        324.94        465.44        339.69        435.69 
320        399.41        460.33        251.31        458.79        314.88        390.56 
321        475.98        399.28        312.83        294.71        300.84        310.24 
322        495.55        613.80        349.42        472.49        326.51        528.07 
323        441.85        455.19        270.63        452.71        311.30        427.81 
324        311.30        394.89        235.16        319.71        269.39        299.94 
325        501.89        556.50        378.71        384.17        347.32        412.98 
326        674.78        649.69        422.96        510.54        400.63        530.91 
327        530.24        515.91        284.01        450.32        307.10        396.45 
328        390.09        511.79        351.96        519.39        359.76        492.98 
329        303.34        570.43        290.80        530.77        326.37        548.76 
330        641.32        656.09        408.72        509.55        352.31        503.18 
331        427.09        650.34        460.50        420.95        357.84        490.69 
332        415.98        447.11        325.32        321.99        294.79        507.26 
333        627.31        629.99        445.82        487.36        375.78        545.25 
334        436.36        511.40        323.44        454.21        337.80        346.98 
335        422.22        521.81        288.31        503.66        330.08        426.18 
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336        479.67        545.27        310.21        572.56        324.72        438.60 
337        376.83        445.21        274.46        314.92        277.17        319.47 
338        243.90        419.67        239.58        324.64        275.20        331.74 
339        542.31        535.07        374.88        388.88        367.63        470.05 
340        384.64        462.35        242.78        560.46        319.11        462.03 
341        351.88        574.16        355.69        500.00        343.21        510.93 
342        635.28        562.04        400.72        571.59        408.31        542.73 
343        386.04        428.72        286.76        338.84        306.91        397.83 
344        367.02        395.69        234.16        369.66        301.54        432.77 
345        311.76        494.72        273.09        451.00        283.22        311.06 
346        498.66        601.80        341.78        732.88        338.17        529.05 
347        466.61        599.89        389.02        605.93        385.91        567.60 
348        466.96        540.55        369.46        434.08        322.47        371.40 
349        463.77        478.30        283.67        506.25        339.15        450.38 
350        485.92        439.67        268.76        350.75        285.50        314.65 
351        365.55        528.50        329.99        568.39        370.72        540.36 
352        454.22        545.78        346.21        386.91        293.14        480.07 
353        394.13        493.35        268.52        424.65        303.22        312.26 
354        489.88        529.61        295.12        514.71        324.10        317.35 
355        556.95        587.76        356.22        438.76        363.47        425.82 
356        428.38        378.03        260.15        410.32        282.05        425.22 
357        325.28        364.46        187.20        470.21        284.57        359.12 
358        534.96        543.96        281.11        551.57        326.80        460.95 
359        579.46        519.94        343.75        412.63        373.92        443.87 
360        305.19        410.50        243.72        396.40        288.42        246.55 
361        370.15        467.52        319.85        529.72        317.50        517.15 
362        375.57        515.16        335.98        451.56        341.79        532.82 
363        404.04        573.86        284.35        558.70        300.44        471.15 
364        373.58        520.20        292.22        419.22        306.32        445.68 
365        374.12        473.37        320.29        494.20        348.01        464.10 
366        650.61        716.52        851.50        546.13        398.27        583.88 
367        478.47        531.51        391.10        439.63        305.04        363.95 
368        368.65        565.35        291.47        480.67        348.50        388.61 
369        516.56        491.20        382.58        341.16        319.87        411.08 
370        551.84        733.81        498.15        607.46        381.53        533.70 
371        406.20        621.12        316.19        552.28        320.30        394.37 
372        480.16        503.75        313.20        490.55        332.60        498.09 
373        512.67        677.18        350.18        403.76        333.76        413.36 
374        412.18        473.75        328.65        236.59        285.08        321.48 
375        525.86        563.19        487.01        644.79        405.96        573.41 
376        418.52        552.16        310.51        431.95        310.61        467.47 
377        364.72        451.08        262.86        430.75        303.38        414.95 
378        552.91        412.71        265.62        454.41        311.55        276.18 
379        330.01        444.82        221.42        426.46        295.05        373.20 
380        292.48        507.85        281.60        385.15        276.47        375.90 
381        430.74        530.42        347.59        498.45        360.14        472.76 
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382        451.50        526.10        285.17        559.28        335.64        339.65 
383        325.80        449.05        289.32        391.69        304.67        452.45 
384        501.45        597.57        344.44        436.91        344.38        398.34 
385        455.90        524.29        353.76        502.19        377.40        444.28 
386        555.93        659.37        522.90        597.71        387.16        518.16 
387        409.13        486.95        273.43        354.47        308.74        357.93 
388        555.00        583.94        367.05        476.40        334.18        441.28 
389        226.72        431.05        244.74        302.23        261.88        409.50 
390        533.83        465.75        395.43        415.49        372.60        547.61 
391        428.74        434.55        303.53        350.39        322.34        326.13 
392        399.89        518.27        307.45        377.94        304.43        478.00 
393        414.58        442.93        290.08        301.02        291.21        386.40 
394        495.21        623.37        325.69        561.83        362.36        466.99 
395        408.89        547.70        279.23        619.48        347.02        485.45 
396        606.18        451.52        343.84        337.24        323.82        404.50 
397        427.42        430.54        271.34        298.60        281.10        353.47 
398        534.52        566.70        364.43        409.00        328.55        288.54 
399        458.42        456.75        363.93        328.97        339.28        484.04 
400        509.86        502.25        385.74        359.11        335.47        442.24 
401        347.56        557.75        322.54        641.81        351.94        527.08 
402        544.25        437.48        279.86        346.74        296.18        227.29 
403        422.86        501.56        333.87        539.48        409.85        546.55 
404        431.53        474.61        277.99        418.65        296.64        361.28 
405        559.74        522.40        354.55        659.14        416.75        476.25 
406        467.70        575.19        351.05        492.76        354.22        520.31 
407        478.79        499.24        292.89        570.22        327.99        465.30 
408        502.31        580.55        346.58        372.68        332.25        434.78 
409        398.32        501.95        294.07        284.23        287.90        405.77 
410        424.64        471.06        276.90        523.58        344.65        440.44 
411        452.82        566.84        337.03        387.22        320.52        473.71 
412        464.56        459.95        309.26        384.72        311.02        427.20 
413        656.61        701.85        449.23        516.22        411.26        522.92 
414        320.08        455.80        282.96        489.49        321.35        421.09 
415        442.06        481.98        355.29        394.84        345.71        443.04 
416        497.88        572.74        436.96        549.18        371.28        514.06 
417        733.51        544.34        450.51        406.53        347.80        477.21 
418        545.15        496.61        318.08        462.32        306.15        391.49 
419        509.10        527.87        340.77        431.73        316.33        382.58 
420        373.15        498.47        340.11        587.86        394.89        538.42 
421        388.26        513.22        269.35        429.11        308.57        379.91 
422        446.36        490.07        338.38        482.33        329.09        604.41 
423        593.35        451.88        311.68        415.77        338.43        428.73 
424        364.52        509.20        313.67        413.94        321.13        469.09 
425        472.95        594.12        283.32        352.52        279.31        336.80 
426        697.19        548.56        391.66        420.62        369.31        515.30 
427        438.68        482.17        248.01        600.07        291.64        481.10 
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428        528.98        559.78        353.87        548.54        361.60        501.18 
429        346.33        652.04        357.04        547.57        382.93        519.29 
430        416.70        500.31        270.97        342.95        300.54        345.91 
431        477.33        539.77        363.66        327.59        313.80        522.43 
432        467.37        521.31        318.36        537.22        363.38        526.04 
433        663.23        670.93        484.44        637.43        427.92        612.61 
434        477.00        564.39        342.27        688.98        399.50        532.32 
435        508.99        608.16        471.50        505.11        379.61        619.44 
436        474.57        474.25        250.23        401.80        318.83        351.39 
437        438.22        541.61        302.80        486.65        337.05        403.16 
438        340.74        512.21        310.96        544.02        360.98        492.02 
439        412.42        518.85        362.81        455.31        358.74        431.71 
440        334.56        610.95        347.72        526.44        367.71        559.13 
441        345.43        458.90        232.91        307.94        266.95        384.73 
442        623.03        525.20        388.14        576.88        365.62        505.40 
443        645.04        495.87        441.94        373.90        366.02        524.56 
444        377.45        418.91        281.38        520.64        345.28        420.75 
445        338.71        461.34        275.44        356.96        302.51        267.81 
446        423.44        581.07        356.49        452.11        356.48        466.04 
447        380.35        463.86        301.38        326.38        344.96        442.67 
448        335.28        460.92        295.64        455.65        335.74        416.10 
449        513.31        501.05        346.78        563.70        400.50        600.62 
450        314.12        432.39        255.59        344.69        293.93        413.96 
451        499.36        644.14        435.47        649.19        382.29        555.33 
452        624.32        463.95        453.27        427.15        394.56        503.75 
453        585.42        619.60        342.21        550.19        335.11        488.75 
454        400.58        445.60        303.30        418.27        293.70        434.26 
455        565.09        606.70        410.75        442.85        346.13        401.35 
456        408.41        490.60        305.26        484.34        317.04        400.39 
457        354.49        472.83        296.98        399.71        305.82        402.38 
458        457.61        506.31        312.59        447.58        348.38        513.71 
459        455.37        397.49        269.88        349.54        300.17        462.87 
460        358.82        492.46        329.07        413.61        341.33        420.22 
461        420.69        528.94        296.08        660.64        350.44        460.35 
462        418.88        403.01        264.11        304.80        291.05        251.90 
463        496.63        550.54        386.61        375.16        377.98        447.37 
464        497.45        535.39        355.04        310.18        333.28        453.43 
465        443.31        507.07        267.57        480.90        299.67        474.92 
466        526.79        531.92        340.73        463.55        320.64        407.51 
467        357.87        433.41        296.31        360.10        313.06        264.61 
468        407.98        476.87        301.17        487.08        361.30        416.27 
469        473.80        425.74        285.68        371.68        321.92        423.07 
470        630.46        543.23        373.96        448.96        386.12        406.58 
471        461.66        448.06        274.79        458.28        281.42        378.73 
472        482.49        501.27        327.75        512.32        326.96        451.62 
473        523.51        553.80        323.02        389.56        315.97        395.60 
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474        441.23        612.84        348.40        536.57        344.01        513.00 
475        493.21        486.14        307.54        383.10        332.91        338.44 
476        550.77        531.02        352.52        437.53        331.80        434.00 
477        356.44        454.34        261.21        434.50        325.87        452.98 
478        511.53        483.16        334.05        587.33        390.86        449.48 
479        577.96        609.61        411.93        466.77        363.01        405.17 
480        499.45        427.62        302.23        461.73        342.32        485.81 
481        505.94        511.04        308.37        478.62        323.87        431.03 
482        323.64        382.48        208.62        374.54        268.34        322.03 
483        333.60        456.31        266.31        371.20        311.83        470.57 
484        523.84        568.84        419.27        440.63        364.36        424.75 
485        442.88        541.19        380.25        388.17        346.44        468.28 
486        485.49        571.07        341.15        600.98        373.85        594.06 
487        451.82        593.37        361.95        590.73        349.76        577.13 
488        528.08        420.64        274.97        318.64        277.59        262.35 
489        382.97        423.85        277.16        419.79        307.70        428.83 
490        402.89        509.77        251.98        414.18        278.11        330.11 
491        484.90        534.04        307.01        543.33        387.91        523.58 
492        401.16        551.21        399.34        592.95        392.31        552.65 
493        361.75        450.39        254.73        457.67        299.02        498.94 
494        405.70        487.65        289.44        508.85        301.04        402.52 
495        416.43        553.51        316.94        469.99        333.84        448.72 
496        345.24        466.90        249.43        581.56        332.79        380.56 
497        553.35        563.87        379.89        440.36        354.37        483.19 
498        435.64        465.16        273.89        482.20        314.23        451.22 
499        483.38        476.53        282.29        460.85        325.11        446.36 
500        371.04        452.57        281.95        280.10        286.55        368.80; 
 
Scalars 
        psi           "risk aversion parameter"    /0/                                                                  
        w           "wage rate/hour "     /0.7/                                                                  
        totfl        "available family labour(hours}"   /1656.05/                                                                  
        tothl       "total hired labour(hours)"    /2090.38/                                                               
        probi        "probability of occurrence for i"   /0.002/                                                                  
        land          "household land base(acres)"    /12.7/                                                                  
        otfexp      "other farm expenses(GHC)"    /207.698/                                                                  
        otnfexp    "other non-farm expenses(GHC)"   /220.188/                                                                  
        otfinc       "other farm income(GHC)"    /631.821/                                                                  
        otnfinc      "other non-farm income(GHC)"   /597.56/                                                                  
        theta      "subsidization factor"     /1/                                                                  
        lambda     "coverage level"     /0.7/                                                                  
        beta       "Scale"      /1/                                                                  
        zigma      "Premium load"     /0.1/ 
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Variables 
         z1            "negative exponential objective function" 
         sumlanddev "sum deviation of predicted acres from observed for all crops"; 
 
Positive variables 
         acreunins(d) “Uninsured Acres of d”  
         acreins(d) “Insured Acres of d” 
         prout(i,d)      "predicted output (kg)" 
         sell(i,d)        "d sold(kg) in i" 
         pur(i,d)         "d purchased(kg) in i" 
         con(i,d)         "d consumed(kg) in i" 
         ps(d)            "selling price(GHC/kg) of d" 
         val(d)           "consumption value(GHC/kg) for d" 
         p(d)          "pre-determined selling price of d" 
         totval           "predicted output value" 
         totindem(i)   "Total indemnity" 
         totprem       "Total premium" 
         hl(d)            "hired labour(hours)allocated to d" 
         fl(d)            "family labour(hours) allocated to d" 
         tl(d)            "total  labour(hours)for d" 
         expvalcon        "expected value of consumption"; 
 
Equations 
         OBJ1             "expected utility function(negative exponential)" 
         OUTCON           "output constraint" 
         LANDCON       "land constraint" 
         LABCON           "labour constraint" 
         LABCON2        "labour constraint" 
         LABCON3        "labour constraint" 
         LABCON4        "labour constraint" 
         USECON           "use constraint" 
         PREM             "Premium Payment" 
         INDEM            "Indemnity Equation" 
         INDEMPRICE   "Pre-determined prices of crops for indemnity" 
         INCEXPCON     "income-expenditure constraint" 
         SELLPRICE      "Selling-purchasing prices conversion" 
         CONSUMVAL  "Consumption value-purchase price conversion"; 
 
avgyld(d)=sum(i,obsareayld(i,d)/card(i)); 
 
yc(d)=avgyld(d)*lambda; 
 
yldif(i,d)=(yc(d)-obsareayld(i,d))$(yc(d) gt obsareayld(i,d)); 
 
EL(d)=probi*sum(i,yldif(i,d)); 
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OBJ1             ..       z1=e=sum(i,probi*(1-exp(-psi*(sum(d,val(d)*con(i,d)))))); 
 
OUTCON(i,d)      ..      prout(i,d)=e=(yld(i,d)*acreunins(d))+(yld(i,d)*acreins(d)); 
 
LANDCON(i)       ..     sum(d,acreunins(d)+acreins(d))=e=11.955; 
 
LABCON(i,d)      ..      (lahrs(d)*acreunins(d))+(lahrs(d)*acreins(d))=l=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
LABCON2(i)       ..      sum(d,fl(d))=l=totfl; 
 
LABCON4(i)       ..      sum(d,hl(d))=l=tothl; 
 
LABCON3(i,d)     ..      tl(d)=e=fl(d)+hl(d); 
 
USECON(i,d)      ..      con(i,d)=e=prout(i,d)+pur(i,d)-sell(i,d)-otuse(d); 
 
INCEXPCON(i)   ..      sum(d,vc(d)*(acreins(d)+acreunins(d)))+sum(d,hl(d)*w)+ 
                sum(d,(pp(d)*pur(i,d)))+totprem+OTFEXP+OTNFEXP=l= 
                sum(d,(ps(d)*sell(i,d)))+totindem(i)+OTFINC+OTNFINC; 
 
SELLPRICE(d)    ..  ps(d)=e=gamma(d)*pp(d); 
 
CONSUMVAL(d)  ..  val(d)=e=phi(d)*pp(d); 
 
INDEMPRICE(d)  .. p(d)=e=ps(d); 
 
PREM(i)      ..       totprem=e=(1-theta)*(sum(d,p(d)*EL(d)*acreins(d))*(1+zigma)); 
 
INDEM(i)     ..       totindem(i)=e=sum(d,p(d)*yldif(i,d)*acreins(d)); 
 
 
Model    insurance /all/; 
 
Option   decimals=3; 
 
Option   nlp=GAMSCHK; 
 
insurance.bratio=1.0; 
 
Set 
         riskscen   Risk aversion scenarios         /R1*R4/ 
         coveragescen     Coverage scenarios     /C1*C4/ 
         scalescen        Scale scenarios           /SC1*SC4/ 
         subsidyscen      Subsidy scenarios            /SUB1*SUB5/ 
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Parameters 
         Output (*,*,*,*,*,*)  Comparative summary 
         Riskaver(riskscen)   Risk aversion scenarios  /R1 0.008 
                                                          R2 0.012 
                                                          R3 0.016 
                                                          R4 0.020/ 
 
         Coverage(coveragescen)  Coverage scenarios    /C1  0.70 
                                                          C2  0.80 
                                                          C3  0.90 
                                                          C4  1.00/ 
 
         Scale(scalescen)          Scale scenarios          /SC1 0.90 
                                                          SC2 1.10 
                                                          SC3 1.30 
                                                          SC4 1.50/ 
 
         Subsidy(subsidyscen)     Subsidy scenarios           /SUB1 0.2 
                                                          SUB2 0.4 
                                                          SUB3 0.6 
                                                          SUB4 0.8 
                                                          SUB5 1.0/ 
 
loop(riskscen, 
option 
clear=z1,clear=acreunins,clear=acreins,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=p,clear=val,clear=totprem,clear=totindem; 
         psi=riskaver(riskscen); 
 
loop(coveragescen, 
option 
clear=z1,clear=acreunins,clear=acreins,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=p,clear=val,clear=totprem,clear=totindem; 
         lambda=Coverage(coveragescen); 
 
loop(scalescen, 
option 
clear=z1,clear=acreunins,clear=acreins,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=p,clear=val,clear=totprem,clear=totindem; 
         beta=Scale(scalescen);  
 
loop(subsidyscen, 
option 
clear=z1,clear=acreunins,clear=acreins,clear=hl,clear=fl,clear=tl,clear=prout,clear=sell, 
clear=pur,clear=con,clear=ps,clear=p,clear=val,clear=totprem,clear=totindem; 
         theta=Subsidy(subsidyscen); 
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Option   nlp=minos; 
Solve insurance using nlp maximizing z1; 
expvalcon.l=sum((i,d),con.l(i,d)*val.l(d))*0.002; 
 
output('Uninsured Acreage Allocation',d,riskscen,coveragescen,scalescen,subsidyscen)= 
acreunins.l(d); 
output(e'Insured Acreage Allocation',d,riskscen,coveragescen,scalescen,subsidyscen)= 
acreins.l(d); 
output('Objective Value','',riskscen,coveragescen,scalescen,subsidyscen)=Z1.l; 
output('Expected Value of Consumption','',riskscen,coveragescen,scalescen,subsidyscen)= 
expvalcon.l 
); 
); 
); 
); 
 
$libinclude xldump output insurance1.xlsx sheet1! 
 
Display output; 
 
